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1 t\N ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Leonard Siegfred Nelson for the Master of 
Arts in 	Sociology presented Febr!..ld.ry ~~O, 19744 
Title: 	 Social Action as Social Change Through a Process of 
Insulation. 
APPROVED 	 BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE: 
--- ---Jan Ha,ida, Chairman i 
Leonard 	Cain 
.. This study has attempted to investigate the rfidical change in the 
Greater Portiand Council of Churches e (GPeG's) organitqtional goals and 
actions--from its reiative uoinvoivement ove-r to its pr'eoccupation \tiith 
local social, pol1tical and economic issues. In the past, classical 
sociologica'i theory of religion has placed great emphasis on re'i·igion's 
integrative, or conservative functions in society. Empirical studies 
have documented the conservative socia-political v'ie\vs of the majority of 
Protestant parishioners. Knowing this, I expected to find a significant 
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conservative reaction swelling up from the lay parishioners of the 
GPCC's member congregations. A preliminary investigation revealed this 
assumption to be invalid. The study's sociological problem then 
became: (1) Wha t was the true character of the GPeC I s member react; on 
to the organization's abrupt change to liberal action goals? (2) If 
there was a minimum of conservative reaction, as indicated, what are 
the sociological reasons 'for this unexpected condition? 
Further investigation showed that in the la.ter 1960 1 s, as the GPCCjs 
social action involvements reached a climax, the GPeC also publicly 
reinstituted older, congregational-centered programs that have been 
neglected for several years. This dual action suggested the study's 
hypothesis: An investigation of the relationship between the GPCC's 
change to liberal action involvements and its attempts to neutralize lay 
members' conservative reactions would shed light upon the GPee's self­
insulation from conservative opposition. 
Three basic strategies were used to gather data: (1) organiza­
tional records, (2) observation, and (3) personal, in-depth interviews. 
Files and records were used largely to confirm and amplify interview 
data. I observed the GPCC and three of the church Community Action Pro­
grams by regularly attending their meetings for approximately two years, 
1969-1971. The largest amount of data was secured from interviewing, 
conducted on a representative sample of 20 active participants in the 
GPCC. Since the sample was not to be a random one, it was carefully 
pre-constructed to be representative of the organization's informal 
structure, i.e., active participants and leadership. When the data 
revealed the interviewees' unexpectedly mild negative reaction to the 
GPeC's deep involvement in very controversial socio-political issues, 
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the sample was doubled to a total of 41 actual -interviews for the purpose 
of checking the original results. A content analysis was used to analyze 
the data. 
In order to find' out why there was such a lack of internal con­
servat'jve'reaction, the investigation was turned to an extensive organi­
zational analysis of the SPCC's power and authority structures. Seven 
categories of social insulation were found to provide protection and 
organizational legitimation for the GPCC's socio-political involvements 
and its CAP's programs~ The insulation categories are: (1) The apathy 
of the 1 a rge number of GPCC 1ay members: Robert Mi che j • s ca tegory of 
membership apathy in democratic organizations is especially applicable 
to the GPCC, due to member churches' primary loyalty to their own goals, 
finances and denominations. (2) The oligarchic take-ov~r of the GPCCls 
govern; ng process,: Because the GPCC· s formal structure di d not clefi ne 
executive authority, a vacuum of power existed. The executive leaders 
informally, but pragmatically, grasped the authority and guided ,the GPCC 
toward its new course of social action. (3) The lack of communication 
with th~ uninvolved member congregations; The leaders developed a 
filtering system in the 1nter-organizational communications, which 
reinterpreted their social actions into positive propaganda, and 
a'bsorbed members I cri ti ca,l feedback. (4) The fi nanci ali ndependence of 
the GPCC's action programs: Independent foundations, individuals and 
national-regional church bodies became'interested in social action in the 
mid-1960's. They made the CAP's financially independent for a time. 
(5) The church CAP's semi-autonomous relationship to the GPCC made lay­
men's attempts to criticize, the CApls social actions very difficult, 
because they were unable to focus on the GPCC as the responsible agent. 
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(6) The secularization of an increasing number of parish pastors within 
member congregations: IISecu"larization ll does not mean being more 
materialistic, but being more sympathetic with social change through 
the churches' involvement in social action. (7) The GPCC's ambivalent 
policies simultaneously presented to lay members and the public both 
an. avowed conservative postut~e, while devoting its greatest efforts to 
liberal social actions. The various forms of insulation effectively 
turned away critical challenges from the GPCC's conservative parish lay-
I 
; 
I 
men .. 
As the GPCC·s social action activities had the effect of de-
I alienating, some of the city's most lIestablished" institutions, i.e., 
1oca1 governmen~ (e. g., jaw enforcement), School Boa rd (through 
I advocacy of school busing for racial equality), local businesses (through support of secondary local grape boycott), the GPeCts actions 
1 had the latent effect of relativ;zing them. The study indicates there 
I were definite negative reactions within the organizationJs general mem-
I bership, but the insulation processes sufficiently muffled the challenges 
I to prevent an uprising. The leaders sensed the muted reactions. By 
I covering up their increasing commitment to social action efforts with 
I generous amounts of propaganda about their promoting a few old, con­
I 
servative-pleasing programs, the leaders largely maintained the appear­
I ance that the GPCC was not rejecting its traditional goals for radical 
I ones. This ambivalent appearance was an important aspect of the GPec's 
I support of social change in the community.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The year 1963 was distinguished by the most intense, massive pro­
tests against ra-cial discrimination that had ever taken place throughout 
the Uni ted Sta tas. A 1 though Portl and was far removed from the' center of 
the ci vi 1 l"i ghts movement in the South and East, the huge non-v; 01 ent 
demonstrations i~ Birmingham, Alabama, in the face of violent police 
treatment set off a chain reaction of large racial protests across the 
country--Tal1ahassee, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Chicago, Detroit and 
elsewhere. President Kennedy was caught up in the struggle when he 
federalized the Alabama National Guard to open Alabama schools to black 
students. He addressed the nation on TV, saying the United States faced 
"a moral crisis as a result of Negro discontent. He sent a special 
message to Congress, requesting enactment of broad civil rtght~ legisla­
tion. In August, 1963, Portland and the nation watched on TV the 
largest civil rights demonstration--over 200,000 people--ever to have 
taken place in Washington, D. C., and heard Martin Luther King's call 
to fulfill the American dream. Black civil rights leader, Medgar Evers, 
and William L. Moore, a white integration crusader, were both shot to 
death. Although not directly connected to civil rights, a great sobering 
effect was left by the assassination of President J. F. Kennedy on 
November 22. 
Three weeks later, December 13, 1963, the Greater Portland Council 
of Churches' (GPCC) Board of Directors voted to administer a new program 
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that waS radically different from any organized effort the local Council 
of Churches had before attempted. The GPCC·s Board decided at that time 
t6 be the "sponsori ng agent II for conducti ng a soci a 1 acti on type of w'ork 
in the heart of the city's black community. No specific goals for 
Ilsocial action" were specified in the resolution, other than that the 
project was to deal with the black people's socio-economic difficulties. 
By April, 1964, a'full-time salaried head for the social action 
project was signed, and in July the new leader had set up an office in a 
store-front within the main business area of Portland's black community. 
Almost everything about this new effort was different from all the pre­
v; ous programs the 1 oca1 Counci 1 of Churches had adnri nis tered. For 
,local councils of churches generally, as well as the National Council, 
the stated primary purpose was to increase the amount of cooperative pro­
grams among the churches, but in -the 1960·s most churches and local 
councils understood this cooperativeness to be within very restricted 
1imits. The limits are, of course, determined theologically by doc~rinal 
differences; however, sociologically, the real limits are dete~mined by 
the constant pressures of a highly competitive market. l In fact, most 
congregations are in a constant life and death struggle for survival. 
Each congregation is daily competing for people. Although on the publi­
cized face of things, each church is primarily trying to reach the 
unchurched, underneath thi s facade is the ul1abi d-i ng ri va1 ry to obtai n 
advantage over other congregations in order to increas~ its own con­
stituency. The rationale behind this intense competition is t~at each 
church body teaches its congregations that its own form of bel iefs and 
practices is closest to the biblical faith. Each congregation operates 
on the p-remi se tha tit offers somethi ng superi or to all other nei ghbor­
3 
.... / 
hood forms of the church. 
The individual WAO feels the competitive strain most is the local 
clergyman, whose success is measured in terms of increased members. 
Increased membership of the congregation eventually means increased 
monetary income and community influence for the congregation and clergy­
man. This success~ or lack of it, is usually compared to the relative 
success of the competitive neighborhood churches. 
The, limits of the cooperativeness of the local congregations 
within the local council of churches is usually circumscribed by the 
amount each ccmgregation (or clergyman) feel s that the counci 1 can con­
tribute to his competitive task--to obtain members. Therefore, the pro­
grams wnicn the Greater Portland Council of Churches had administered 
from 19)9 until 1964 \vere the kind which increased in some way the 
ability of each congregation to attract more members and still a110wed 
the congregations to participate cooperative1y--without being threatened. 
The cooperative versus the competitive purposes of the congrega­
tions forced the GPCC to place its biggest efforts on an annual Sunday 
school, or church school, teacher-training program. This program lasted 
several weeks and enrolled over 1,200 trainees each year from 1958 to 
1964. Also in the church education field was a very successful 
released-time church school once a week throughout the school year for a 
wide number of public grade schools. Other annual cooperative efforts 
included a big, one day youth rally, a cooperative Easter service, and 
a two day theological seminar, led by a "namell theologian or churchman. 
Prior to 1964, the GPCC program closest to social action was the 
chapla;"ncy program to local jails and juvenile detention homes. The pre­
scribed limits of cooperation by the congregations strictly disallowed, 
,'1l 
theref~re, any kind of program which would contend witn the power struc­
tures of the local (city) community. Because of poss.ible controversy and 
negative reaction, such a cooperative goal might very well detract from 
t'he individual congregation's abi1ity to compete for members. 
It 'is not difficult to understand why the GPCCis decision to take 
on the social action project in the black comllunity was such a ra<iical 
departure from its previ ous pol icy.. The end resul t of the GPCC I S new 
program was not designed to increase cooperatively the ability of its 
own member congregations to strengthen (obtain new members) thems~lves 
as separate institutions in a competitive market. If the GPCCts new 
Community Action Program was not going to increase the ability of each 
member congregation to meet its own competitive problems, the question 
forc€fully presents itself: Why did the GPCC take this unprecedented 
step into the community·s arena of conflicting power structures? Why 
did the member churches vote to allow their local cooperative a·ssociation 
-(GPCC) to intentionally move into the middle of the local civil rights 
controversy? 
The main purpose of this study is to explore and describe, rather 
than to test, a possible theory for verification. The preliminary 
answer \'Jas a "working" hypothesis, which stated: By understanding the 
shift in the built-in conservative or liberal tendencies of many Portland 
churches, we will be able to obtain more sociological light ~n the social 
change taking place in the Greater Portland Council of Churches. 
Although the worldwide process of contemporary secularization i,s carrying 
liberalization of old practices to most American churches, only a few 'of 
the long-established Protestant denominations have enacted liberal social 
policies into their official documents. These churches are most active 
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in the ecumenical movement, locally and nationally. Yet, a latent con­
servativism continues within these same churches. Much of their nine­
teenth century her; tage was conservati ve, and it is 'not yet erased. The 
two social tendencies of social conservativism and secularization remain 
within the churches in a very ambivalent situation. The above hypothe­
sis tries to take this into account. It refers to the "shiftingll from 
conservative policies to liberal social involvement, followed by reac­
tionary changes back toward conservativism. My purpose was to document 
those sociological factors which were crucial ·to the GPCCrs change in 
i·ts organ i za ti ona1 goa1s . 
It fs a paradoxical situation .. I knew' theoretically that this 
situation applied to the GPCC, and my theory was further strengthened by 
the evidence I had observed previous to commencing the study. Wide 
publicity had been given to the conservative reaction from the city 
against botA the GPCC1s Youth Ministry program in the downtown area and 
2the Black Summer Crisis program in the Albina area. I knew from both 
recent research (see Chapter l) and experience about the generally con­
servative nature of many Protestant churches. Yet, ever since the 
southern "sit-inll movement in the early 1960's and the Selma, Alabama, 
Freedom March, I was aware of the increasing socia-political involve­
me.nts by several church groups, especially ecumenical groups·. The civil 
rights movement was .reflected in the GPCC's specific change-over to 
social action policies in the city. From the time of the preliminary 
; -preparations for the study, several kinds of clues came across that 
local churches in the city were quite ambivalent toward the GPCC's 
direct work within two of the city's most difficult social problem areas, 
Albina and downtown, S.W. 

I 
"'1 
It was in this frame of reference ~hat the original working hypothe­
sis was constructed. However, as I continued mY struggle for methodologi­
cal direction during the research, I concl~ded that my working hypothesis 
was not ade~uate. The data from my interviews were consistently turning 
out to refute mY subconscious expectation that there would be a strong 
conservative reaction within the GPCC. I was forced to examine aRd face 
mY unstated assumptions. I decided that I needed a new hypothesis which 
stated more clearly the paradoxical movement of both the 1 iberal and 
·conservative social forces present In the GPCC. As the GPCC increased 
its involvement in liberal social action policies, it also publicly 
reemphasized its older, conservative programs. This suggests the 
study's hypothesis: By understanding the relationship between the 
GPCC's change to liberal action involvements and its attempts to neutra­
lize lay members' conservative reactions, sociological light will be 
shed upon the GPCC's processes of insulating itself from conservative 
opposition. 
I came to see that in the early stages of this research I was 
doing two things, methodologically, which could be called "errors." 
First, I had mentally redefined both the 'independent and dependent vari­
ables during the first stages of interviewing, without realizing it and 
without stating the change on paper. In trying to analyze it, I think 
it gradually began during the early interviews, as I tried to explain 
my openning questions to interviewees. I had unconsciously narrowed 
the definition for the independent var·iable down to the. IIconser.vativism 
of the GPCC's membershipll and the definition for the dependent variable 
simply to their "conservative reaction ll within the GPCC. Unintefltion­
ally, I had set up a testable hypothesis with an expected cause-effect 
,8 

relationship between these unstated variables. I had failed to remain 
open during the first half of the research to the other side of the 
working hypothesis--that the independent variable could also reveal it­
self to be a "liberal" constitutency in the GPCC and tnat the dependent 
variable 'could also oe a strong support for the GPCC's liberal changes, 
as well as a reaction against it. 
Since the largest number of published sociological investigations 
are conducted on the basis of nypotheses that are to be tested and veri­
fied by the evidence,turned up bY,the study, this "error!! I admit to is 
not usually considered a poor research method. However, because I had 
come to assume there was an automatic cause-effect chain between the 
variables--between the GPCC's liberal sO-cial actions and the church con­
servatives' reaction--I now feel that that assumption was a mistake. 
Herbert Blumer criticizes several aspects of the II variables· 
analyses. II He says that too many researchers choose variables that do 
not have real generic, values, outside of local areas of study.3 
Further, he says empirical methodology often assumes that the observed 
change in the dependent variable (all other variables apparently held 
constant) is an automatic result of the action, by the independent 
variable. However, such cause-effect relationship does not take into 
account what has happened in between the two variables. It does not 
account for the changing interpretative processes which go on by people 
and institutions in defining and attaching meaning to intervening social 
activities, relationships, situations, etc. Such intervening ~ctivi­
ties bring about the changes .in the definitions (meanings) of social 
objects, and thereby playa central part in the changes of social prac­
tices--the way people act. To ignore the intervening interpretative 
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process is to fail to take into account the more essentia1 reasons why 
the change took place between the independent and dependent variables. 
Blumer's cY'iticism was apropos to the \'1ay I had labeled the 
independent variable in mY expectations--by mY over··emphasizing the 
possible "influence of a conservative constituency in the GPC~ and 
deemphasizing the possibility of a powerful 1iberal group being able to 
control the power and authority of the organization. There is no doubt 
that early in the research I had an expectation that the GPCC's fnvolve­
ment in controversial social actions would set off conservative reaction 
within the organization. What I did not allow for was the GPCC's inter­
venin9 organizational ability to control the interpretative process of 
its own members, and thereby change their reaction toward a threaterring 
sltuation. The interviews, the records and observation at meetings 
convinced me that I had developed a wrong assumption. After much intro­
spection and analysis of the research procedure, I finally realized that 
1 had unconsciously changed the hypothesis to a one-sided, cause-effect 
assumption. Such terminology and reasoning were not only bordering 
upon doctrinaire dialectic, but aiso had become an ~ priori judgment, 
,apart from a specific set of events. My assumption was wrong. I finally 
had to let go of ft, and restate the hypothesis in terms more affirmative 
to the dialectic process between both the conservative and liberal forces 
within the GPCC. 
The second methodological error I had'"been making was, simply" that 
I was not obtaining a representative interview sample of the"whole 
organization. When I rea'lized that, even though I doubled the intervi~\v 
sample, the data continued to support the non-reactionary attitude 
within the GPCC toward their involvement in controversial social actions" 
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I was forced into ansWe}"'in9 the question "Why?" After wrestling at 
length with the problem--at both the levels of sociological theory and 
methodo1ogy--I discovered that I had also excluded the one group other 
recent researchers have found to be generally conservative- in the main­
1i ne Pt"otes tant churches: the 1 a i ty. A 1 though I had made a s.peci fi c 
(and s'uccessful) effort to obta"in in the sample a proportionate number 
of laymen, as against clergymen, that sample still failed to be repre­
sentative-of the general church laymen. "Why was this so? 
In hindsight, I found that my difficulty with an unrepresentative 
sample arose from my failure to observe the sociological differentiation 
between the informal and formal structure of an organization. I had not 
adequately defined my unit of study and the population in it. As soon 
described, much of this study was forced to turn to investigating the 
G~CCIS organizational structure and its practical source of power and 
authority. This latter part of the investigation demonstrated that 
"those people who came to be "elected ll to the Board of Directors, and 
i~portant Commissions and Committees were largely hand-picked by the 
Executive staff. In reality, the uninitiated delegates to the annual 
meetings had nothing to say about nominations, and consequently, no true 
choice in their voting for officers. Because of this control by the 
Executive over who would serve in the top leadership, the "elected ll 
officers were largely of one mind: liberal. Since the Executive 
Director was personally committed to the church1s social involvement, 
most of tp~se people whom he ratified for nomination to those bodies of 
leadership in the GPCC had a fairly liberal attitude toward social 
I 
involvement. The GPCC·s leadership, although elected from the member 
churches, was not representative of the genera1 laity of the total member 
11 
congregations. As mentioned previously, recent research has shown that 
the majority of mainli'ne Protestant laymen are conservative and much 
more conservative than their clergymen. Because the conservative lay­
men tr/ere generally excluded from the lIinside" groups of leaders, so 
were thefr conservative opinions eliminated from my intervievl sample. 
The validity of this study heavily depends upon what is defined as 
the organizational boundary of the GPCC. If the organization is defined 
acc~rding.to its formal constitutional statements, this study has viewed 
only the upper power structure of the GPCC. However, if the GPec is 
defined sociologically in terms of its informal structure, then this, 
study's sampling of interviews and the accompanying organizational study 
are adequate w~thodological tools for the investigation. Because I 
""'­
believe the informal structure of the GPCC is, in fact (or pragmatically), 
the sum and substance of this organization, I am convinced that the GPee's 
meetings, decisions and programs exist relatively apart from its member 
c~urches. The organization itself is connected to the congregations only 
by those persons who have sufficient individual motivation t~ volunteer 
for the activities of the GPCC, or by an activist pastor who takes a 
.personal interest in the GPCC's type of social involvement. ' 
This study, therefore, does not pretend to represent the opinion of 
all the GPCC's member churches and their individual members, but the 
study does show what the informal organization of tightly-knit volunteers 
actually did during 1960-70 in order to protect itself and carry out its 
liberal policies. Consequently, to correct my second methodological 
m; stake, I am defi ning my' uni t of study as the GPCC' s ; nforma1, organi za­
tional structure of power, authority and program implementors, as 
distinct from the nominal, uninvolved member churches and their general 
l2 
lay membership. stnce this more specific definition of the organization 
is limited to the active participants in the GPCC--its leaders and volun­
teer program participants--I no l~nger consider the interview sample as 
being unrepresentative of the total group. The study does not examine 
the GPeC as defined by its own formal statements, but as that social 
entity of people who make the policy decisions and those who actively 
implement their programs and decisions. 
Definition of Terms 
The independent variable for this study's hypothesis is: lithe 
relationship between the GPCC's change to· liberal action in.volvements 
and its attempts to neutralize lay members' conservative reactions." 
In order to prevent any false cause-effect assumptions from developing
~ 
between the two ends of the liberal-conservative continuum, which makes 
up this one variable, it is extremely important to clarify the defini­
tions of Illiberal II and IIconservative. 1I As discussed above, early in 
this research I had falled to recognize the independent variable as a 
single whole, the possibility of a liberal reaction, as well as a con­
servative reaction. It is imperative to define what kind of church 
member reaction is conservative and what is liberal. 
Depending on the context in which the terms are used, they may 
denote soci~l, psychological, economic, political, as well as religious, 
categories. Represented in the GPCC. is a wide variety of religiuus 
denominations, each carrying its,own social views, along with its own 
~eligious doctrines. The problem is similar to generalizing about 
potential life. Knowing that some·Democratic congressnren consistently 
vote more conservatively than some Republican congressmen, it would be 
13 
impossible to place all Republicans and Democrats in Congress i~to their 
respective cons~rvative-liberal cubicles. 
Due to the \Last religious p'luralism in t~e United States, there 
are several possible standards by which to determine the religious con­
servativ~s .. William G. McLoughlin suggests five definitions. 4 The 
first is really theological. This measurement continuum places the 
liberals with the scholarly, or intellectual method of dealing with 
religious.doctrine. Conservatives are biblically literalistic, unsophis­
ticated, and emphasize, usually, a set of "fundamentals" for membership 
conformity. The critical criteria for measurement is, however, the 
literalistic interpretation of Scriptures. In actual analysis, this 
method is not too clear cut, because certain doctrines (millenialism, 
pe~rfectionism, etc.) are equated with the conservative view. At the 
same time, some sophisticated theologians sometimes become very dogmatic 
about their doctrines (Virgin Birth, Trinity, Infallibility, etc.). 
A second measurement of conservativism is the psychological aspects 
of religious experience and worship. The liberal attitude is defined on 
a continuum that begins with the individual asserting only a bare 
intellectual assent to belief and experiences almost no emotional con­
tact with the deity whom he worships. At the conservative end of the 
continuum is the ecstatic, highly emotional worship of the pentecostal 
J 	 or holiness groups in which individu~S experience direct, personal 
encounters with the Deity so that worshippers lose themselves and express 
themselves physically i~ the power of the Holy Spirit. This form of 
measurement has much unclear overlapping with such practices ~s those of 
wustics. For instance, the Thoreauvian transcendentalist's mystical 
experience of the Over-Soul alone in the woods is a case of emotional­
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spiritual possession, yet much mOt"e ;'ntellectualized than pentecostalists. 

So is the highly liturgical worship practices of some churches, which, 

although completely ritualized, emphasize the sensuous with robes, 

candles, incense, images, etc. 

The third measurement attempts a kind of sociological standard. On 
the one side of the continuum is the upper-class, in-group allegiance to 
the establishment church, and on the other side is the lower-class, out­
group allegiance to the IIsectll group of alienated people. The criteria 
here is ;n socio-economic terms primarily, ,along with stratification 
terms: status, prestige, wealth, power-security, etc. This formulation 
;s similar to Troeltsch's sect-church dist'inction. In America, however, 
the sect-church designation is not clear, because status and socio­
eConomic measurements vary in denominations and more extreme groups, or 
"sects, ". vary from one geographi ca1 a rea to another. Compare, for 
example, the status of Mormons and Congregationalists in New England 
with the Far Western states. 
A fourth form of meas ureIDen tis stated in terms of church pol i ty 
and ~ parallel social outlook. The criterion here has hierarchical 
church polity (bishops., archbishops and supreme head) as favoring a 
monarchy or autocracy in socio-political life. On the other end of this 
continuum are the churches with a congregational polity operating from 
the concept of the priesthood of all believers, which are more apt to be 
supportive of a democratic social system. If 'this criterion is applied, 
then the Catholic Church typifies the conservatives; the Baptists repre­
sent the liberals; and the. Calvinist churches (Reformed, Presbyterian, 
etc.) with a presbyterian poiity fall in the middle as bei'ng supportive 
of a republican form of government. In actual practice, obviously, all 
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tflree of these forms of churches have contradicted the above stereotypes 
for socio-political affiliations'. 
McLoughlfn gives a fifth measurement, which he thinks is more 
realistically applicable to the United States' past and present. He 
defines ;,t within an historical framework: America's four Great Religi­
ous Awakenings. In each hew Awakening there were those who espoused the 
new, spirited evangelicalism, and after a generation of institutionaliza­
tion, the new ~vangelicals reformulated the old orthodoxy into a new 
consensus. They became ~he new orthodoxY in religion, and accommodated 
their Christian doctrine to conservatively "fitU the new problems ()f a 
changing order. Based on this historical analysis, the Liberals are on 
the other end of the historical continuum. The Liberals today are pro­
ducts of the historical events of the early 1900 ' s when the great expo­
nents of, the Social Gospel began that great movement within Protestantism. 
The Social Gospelers wanted the churches to talk less about dO'ing good 
deeds and actually to participate in alleviating the great social ills 
of that time, of the industrial revolution--unjust working conditions, 
malnutr;tion~ poverty, political injustices, etc. The Fundamentalist 
movement within the largest, traditional Protestant denominations during 
this time was a direct reaction to the Social Gospel movement. Today's 
Liberals are updated Social Gospelers. Theologically, they are more 
orthodox', but the-ir over-riding consensus is socia-political involvement. 
As each pi~eti sti c movement swept through the churches, ,many' in the 
traditional cnurches we~e attr~cted to the movement, and joined in 
criticising the older den"ominations. The last Great Awakening took "lJlace 
during the late 1800's and e"arlY 1900 1 s, partly as a reaction against the 
Social Gospel moven~nt and partly' as a reaction against the intellectuals' 
16 
"form criticism" of the Bible that undermined the literalistic i-flfalli­
bility of Scripture. McLoughlin describes the current Awakening as 
beginning in the 1950 l s and continuing through the Sixttes. It was a 
reaction agai·nst the great uncertai-nty of liberal theology and the 
times following World War II. Out of this situation came Billy Graham's 
. ' 
revival crusades and the neo-fundamentalist federation, tne Natioflal 
Association of Evangelicals. 
Far· exceeding the limits of neo-fundamentalists, however, America's 
present conservative~ are a·new combination of pietistic Catholics, 
Protestants and Jews. Their most common characteristic today, according 
to McLoughlin, is that they are either politically reactionary, or com­
p~etely apolitical. The ultra-conservatives--the dissident fringe 
groups--are the "apoliticals. 1I They are against all forms of political 
invol vement. 
The preceding definitions of terms, especially that of conservative, 
'have an inherent problem. On the one hand, I have reemphasized the 
importance of the hypothesis' openness to both sides of the contradictory 
currents--both conservative and liberal--flowing through the Amer'ican 
churches today. As the study progressed, I made a renewed effort to 
remain open to any data which would indicate the conservative retrench­
ment of the older values of individualism, laissez-faire economy, hard 
work, thrift, piety, sobriety, all those qualities described in Weber's 
Protestant ethic, as well as data indicating the liberalization of the 
pietistic values outwar~ to more socio-political involvements. On the 
other hand, because the above definition of "conservative" is keyed to 
the term, "pO1; t i cally reacti onary ,II it may be that such a defi n i tion 
forces the data presented here to conform to categories which themselves 
1 
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assume a cause-effect relationship. That is, do the definitions of the 
hypothesis' two key terms become determinants of a theoretical assump­
tion? Does the concept of "reaction" in McLoughliR ' s definition of 
"conservativell smack at doctrinaire dialectical materialism when used as 
a basis for analysis of my research data? As used herein, is the defini­
tion of conservative an ~ priori judgment that has theoretically forced 
mY recording of in-depth interview data into pre-determined kinds of 
conclusions? Were' the analytic conclusions predefined by the concept of 
conservative Il reactio,n?U 
My answer is "No" on all accounts. My best refutation of this 
possible methodological trap is the actual results of the interview data 
and the actual analysis of them. Instead of t~is definition coercing 
the data to'show IIreactionary" opinions among the interviewees, I 
recorded their responses and found them conclusively,to refute that the 
GPCC was predominantly conservative, contrary to my expectations. 
Abraham Kaplan points out that hypotheses, principles, rules, 
a~ioms, laws, etc., become tautological because vagueness allows them to 
be always true no matter what is the case in their application to the 
world of facts. In other words, the hypothesis' practical meaning ;s 
not sufficiently specific--that is, applicable to explicit situations-­
so as to subject it to some sort of empirical control. Kaplan adds, 
though, that few laws, even in the physical sciences, are stated so 
expli~itly that their meanings, functio~allY, always exclude ambiguity.5 
The sociological methodologist finds it even easier to state his 
hypothesis in a manner removed from everyday, empirical problems, recon­
structing it to be so "analytically" logical that i,t is very difficult 
for others to retest it. It merely argues repetitiously in a circle-­
lS 
tautologica1ly. Kaplan's point is important for this research. He says 
that when the methodologist's theory takes over artd imposes its own 
logic--cause and effect--upon the data, then the theory does not allow 
the raw data. the historical events being studied, to determine their 
own relationship. They are then being theoretically coerced! 
While trying objectively t~ reinspect mY methodolegy," I have not 
found my mere use of the term "reaction" in the definition automatically 
to have jr,lp-uted into the definition an ~.E.riori assumption of any 
theory, neither of historical materialism, nor of any lireconstructed 
logic." Cel"taiflly such an assumption was not "defined into" the col­
lected data. Rather than my assuming anything in the \'1ord "reaction," 
I was 
-
trying to form a degree of precision for describing the attitudes 
that may have fit the definition. Ultimately, the word was used ~~ 
concept that would more accuratell measure the hypothesis· dependent 
variables' indicators. In retrospect, I think that any assumption of a 
cause-effect relationship would have to be between the variables, and 
consequently, within the total hypothesis itself. That is where the prob­
l~m really lies, and I have diligently retraced my steps over the 
earlier procedures in the study to strip" away my assumption that there 
was a strong conservative reaction present within the GPCC. I feel that 
this was accomplished, since the evidence and analysis disconfirmed any 
such ~ssumed conservativism. 
At the beginning Qf this research, I did not follow sufficiently 
what Marx called the principle of historical specificity. In applying 
this principle, C. Wright Mills has said: 
There is~ I believe, no "law" stated by any social scientist that 
is trans-historicai, that must not be understood as having to do 
with "the specific structure of some period. Other IIl aws " turn 
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out to be empty abstractions or quite ~onfused tautologies. The 
only meaniFlg of "social laws" or even of "soc ial regularities"
is such "principia'media" (Karl Mannheim's application of the 
mechanis{11s of change within ~~arx's principle of historical 
specificity) as we may discover, or if you wish, construct, for 
social structure within an historically specific era. We do not 
knew any universal principles of historical change; -the mechan­
isms of change we do know vary with the social structure we are 
examining. 6 (Parenthetical insert mine.) 
After thorough ly a llowi ng the data. to di scanfi rm my own _unconsci ous ly 
he.ld prejudice trrat Du.rkheim's theory (that religion integrates and con­
serves society·s established order) was· substantially applicable to all 
of the GPce's li-beral activities in its local community, I realized I 
had not been permi~ting the very social change to be recorded and 
analyzed which my hypothesis called for. 7 As C. W. Mills says above, 
each cultural setting has its own specific kind of change. The social 
~ 
change which the GPCC had organizationally 'promoted through its special­
ized use of social insulation must be understood within the historical 
context of its community and the peculiarities of this local ecumenical 
~roup. I have tried to view openly the GPCC·s own time, place and social 
forces of change; therefore, I am not here tryi ng to genera 1i ze the 
GPec's own form of change (through social insulation) to any other social 
worlds. As an aside, however, some form of social insulation appears to 
me often to have been operative \A/hen non-parish clergymen and religious 
groups participated in the civil rights activities during the Sixties 
throughout the cQuntry--Selma, Cleveland, Chicago, Delano (California) . .., 
and many other places. 
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Conservative Reaction in ~he Local Churches 
Historically, U. S. churches have been prodtlcts of strong pietistic 
traditions, evident in our- four great Pietistic Awakenings, viz., Chapter 
2. Documentation of-the great revivals reveals that pietism usually 
went hand in hand with conservat-ive politics. S. t4. Lipset states in a 
study that the conservative pietist tl'''adition in the United States has 
demonstrated a strong correlation w'tth the new conservative politics of 
former, low-status liberalism of U. S. Catholics, as they have become 
established, middle-class conservatives'o8 Lipset concludes that a 
politically conservative attitude has run through the whole of our 
religious history. 
Several other studies reflect'the more recent conservative attitude 
'-, 
toward churches' involvement in socio-political problems. Jeffrey Hadden 
reports the data gathered by the National Opinion Research Center1s 
Amalgam Survey, constituting a representative national sample of 1504 
. 9
respondents. As an abstract statement, 82 per cent of the American 
public agre~d with the statement: "Clergymen have a responsibility to 
speak out as the moral conscience of this nation. 1I However, those polled 
have restricted ideas as to what this means. Forty-nine per cent said 
that clergy should not speak out on social, economic, and political 
matters. Seventy-two per cent agreed with the statement: IIC1ergymen 
who participate in demonstrations and picketing do more harm than good 
for the cause they support. II Another statement in this series read, 
ur~arti n ~uther Ki ng, Jr., is an outstandi n9 examp1 e of maki ng Chri s ti ani ty 
relevant and meaningful for our day. II Only 29 per cent of the samp1e 
agreed with this statement. The response adds to the evidence that the 
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American public will applaud the ideal of equality for black people, 
while rejecting any real effort to change the actual conditions which 
place the black man in a disadvantaged position. Church attenders, as 
well as the general public, do not view the church as an institution for 
social change. Twenty-seven per cent of the Protestants agreed with 
Martin Luther King; 39 per cent of the Catholics agreed; and 59 per cent 
of the Jews agreed wi th Ki ng. In other words, the proporti on of the Jev/s 
who felt that King's efforts were a relevant and meaningful expression of 
Christianity was twice that of the Christians. The survey shows that 
approximately 70 per cent of our church population reject the different 
ways in which cler§y have been involved in civil rights activities. 
The same attitudes are corroborated by a similar survey published 
in September, 1969, by the National Opinion Research Center for the 
National Council of Churches. It was also a representative, religious 
cross-section (1,481) of United States' adult population. 10 The 
.important fi ndi ng of the survey for our purposes was that a majori ty, 
58.5 per cent of the sample, disapproved of church involvement, and only 
36.7 per cent favored such action by the churches. In an apparent con­
tradiction, 54.9 per cent approved of the NCC's work, while 22 per cent 
disapproved and 22.8 per cent had no opinion. Also, 60.3"per cent said 
they had heard of the NCC, which is composed of 33 Protestant and 
Orthodox Churches. In both surveys, the public said, i.e., clergymen 
and churches should not "interfere" \"/ith the political and social prob­
lems of the real world. 
During the 1959 desegregation crisis in Little Rock, Arkansas, 
Campbell and Pettigrew reported that out of 15 ministers who signed a 
public statement protesting Gov. Faubus' calling out troops to preV€nt 
--
22 
compliance with the Supreme Court order, at least nine clergymen had left 
thei r churches Has a reasonably di }"ect resul t of the i ntegreti on con­
flict. ull In January, 1963,' following James ~1eredith"s stormy entry into 
the University of Missi,ssippi" 28 native-born, Mississippi Methodist 
clergymen signed a statement publicly declaring their Christian belief 
against race discrilnination. Only two of the' 28 remained in the same 
congregation as they had at the time they signed the statement, and only 
n'ine remained in the state of Mississippi by 1965. 12 In 1~64 at 
Cleveland, 46 pe"r cent of the white clergy (221, Protestant and 10 Jewish 
rabbis) joined an ad hoc group which supported the desegregation of 
black children through busing, and some ministers began to participate 
in pickets. 13 J. K. Hadden's study of the ministers' participation in 
the·C1eve1and desegregation incident~ has showri that of the most active 
ministers, at least 12 soon were forced to leave their" congregations, 
and six left the ministry altogether. 
In 1965 a new role pattern began to develop within the groups of 
p~rticipating clergy activists, who turned up at civil rights protests. 
Most were non-parish clergy. An examination of the Selma Freedom March 
in 1965 showed that out of several hundred clergymen' who flew South to 
Selma (estimated at 650), a large majority were: staff members of 
national church bodies, campus ministers and ministers to specialized 
14areas (depressed areas) not dependent upon a congregation for support. 
During 1966 in Delano, California, J. ·K. Hadden observed the National 
Council of Churches' Migrant Ministry·s participation in the grape 
workers· strike against the DiGiorgio Fru~t Corporation and others. He 
said the data he collected indicated IIthat the large majority were not 
parish pastors. They came from the National Council of Churches, state 
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and natiQnal denominational staffs, colleges and seminaries ll (emphasis 
mine).15 
The above national surveys and local s,tudies give broad support to 
the .. contenti on that the 1 ay churchmen I s prevai 1 i M9 atti tude has been and 
continues to be decidedly conservative toward their churches' socio­
political involvements. The studies also'point to the· conservative reac­
tion of most. lay church members as being focused upon the local parish 
pastor. Non-pari·sh ministers·have recently assumed the role of being 
the church's activists in controversial social issues. In the light of 
the strong cOrlservative reaction demons~rated by laymen against their 
activist pastors in other areas, why was there an apparent mild reaction 
against the GPec's direct involvement ;n several controversial issues? 
CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
From both the newspapers and word of mouth, I had heard about the 
Greater Portland Council of Churches' new venture 'into starting a full­
time staffed community action program within the city's area of black 
-residences, the Albina a~ea. Later I ,also read about the Council 'of ' 
Churches' downtown community action "Youth Ministry" program being 
accused by the city police of aiding the youth drug traffic and the young 
runaways, in the downtown ,area. Wi th a few prel imi nary i ntervi ews ; nto 
I 
I 
~ ! the organization intself, I found that the GPeC had, indeed, made a sig­
nificant change in its practical goal's--from relative uninvo'lvement over 
'to highly direct involvement in social action activities. Some active 
members af the organ; za ti on agreed that a percepti b 1 e soci,a 1 change had 
i : oGcurred in the organization during the first part of the Sixties. During 
this preliminary inquiry, most of those with whom I discussed the topic 
agreed heartily with the idea of the GPCe's new effort, but a surprising 
number also said they knew there was already a growing reaction in the 
churches against the GPeCfs community action involvement. This evidence 
of the churches' reaction convinced me that a study of the GPec's organi­
zati ona1 change woul d serve as a worthwh; 1e reseat"ch project. From thi s 
cursory examination, I felt that change in organizational goals could beI· 
well documented and reasonably verified by the events and reaction deveTop­
ing in the GPCC. 
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When I drew up my research proposal, I decided that the purpose of 
the research \#Jould be prjmarily exploratory, rather than verifying an 
hypothesis. 
Data Gathering Methods 
My plans for gathering information included three basic strategies: 
(1) records--current and historical, (2) observation, and (3) personal I 
I 	 interviews. First, the ~ords. Since good rapport with the GPCCls 
I Executive Director developed early, almost complete access was granted to I 
< • 
! 	 the official files in the GPCC's main office. They included the minutes 
of many committees and planning commissions, together with the very 
important records of the GPCC's Board of Directors' meetings. The files 
also contained all the. annual and semi-annual reports, which are mimeo­
graphed and presented to each delegate to the annual and semi-annual 
! : 
General Assembly meetings. The annual report is extensive, including 
reports from all major commissions and committees, and thereby comprises 
the organization's official accountability report to its member congrega­
ttons. In practi ce, however, only those congrega ti ons whi ch are vi ta lly 
interested in the GPCC make the effort to attend these meetings and obtain 
their reports. The same goes for the semi-annual meeting in September. 
The Executive Committee usually met each month, just a few days before 
the Board of Directors' meeting. This group of GPCC officers and execu­
tive staff is relatively small, powerful and exclusive. As might be 
expected, I was not able to attend any of its meet~ngs, although its 
minutes were usually made available to the Board members. Often the 
Executive Committee's report to the Board included a strong recommendation 
to the Board for the adoption of a new policy or program.. 
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Although the directors of the three CApis granted me the privilege 
of e~amining their own brief records, I found little need to do so. 
Except for the verification of some data about two or three meetings of 
Albina's C-CAP and the downtown Hub-CAP, I found much more productive 
information about the CAP's several crises from re-interviewing key 
-lnformants or seeking out nevi informants who were personally involved. 
The second strategy was observation. I asked perm;ssio~ from the 
director of each Church-CAP, along with the GPCCls Executive Director, 
to attend board meetings and observe their programs in action. I 
observed (a) the three CAp1s--their leadership and staff, their programs 
and the'ir meetings; and (b) the GPCC itself--staff and officers, their 
meetings and their methods of relating to the member congregations and 
to the CAP's. With the permission of the Executive Director, I regularly 
attended the monthly meetings of the GPCCls Board of Directors and the 
meetings of the General Assembly--for two and a half years. I also 
attended some of the Church-CAP's annual meetings and a few of their 
specially called crises meetings. 
The third but primary source of data was in-depth interviewing. 
conducted several preliminary, but lengthy interviews. Most of these 
were with the GPCC's executive staff and CAP directors, and also a few 
member laymen and clergymen. 
For the forma 1- ; ntervi e\AJS, I deci ded to use twenty respondents from 
the active, or formerly active, members of the GPCC, who gave a balanced 
representation of both conservatives and liberals. I wanted the list to 
meet these requi rements : (a) at 1east as many 1aymen -as clergymen; 
(b) a few delegates to the General Assembly, who are not on the Board of 
Directors; (c) some former members of the Board of Directors from the 
I 
i 
, 
I 
i 21 
e(}V'ly 1960·s, as well as present Board members; (d) a representative \ 
i 	 number of a~tive members~or officers from each of the three Church-CAP's 
studi€d; (e) an equal number of liberals and conservativ€s--sl:tpporters 
and critics of the GPCC's recent social actions. I obtained the sug­
gestiofls for names from the Executive Director and the organi zer of the 
three Church-CAP's (then on leave of absence). I made up my list from 
their suggesti'ons, and then consulted with the most experienced secre~ 
tary in the GPCC's main office. I found that she had a broader know­
ledge of the membership of the GPCC and was possibly more objective 
about· tile members than anyone else that knew the people in the GPec. 
With her suggestion, I made one change in the list of twenty_ 
Experience soon showed me that bein9 objective as an interviewer 
was a job of constant vigilance against my own inclinati~ns to read 
things into the respondents· s~atements, especially if they were not 
clear to me. It is difficult to clarify all sides of the respondents' 
view on controversial issues in one sitting. More and more, I made a 
cqnscious effort to draw mY respondents out, but at the sa~e time, not 
to lead them into making conclusions, pro or con, about the GPCets 
crucial activities. Knowing my own prejudices, I tried to "bend over 
backwards" to let any conservative opinions emerge. 
When I began my formal interviewing of the original list of tV/enty 
respondents, I nad aOl ready done severa'l pre 1 i mi na ry i ntervi ews of GPCCI
I staff members, and therefo~e, became quite well aware of the organiza­I 
I 
I 	 tion's lIofficia1 11 line on its policies and current problems. I had drawn 
1 
up what I thought were the major controversial issues that had faced the 
three inner-city Church CApls: (1) the initial oPPosition witnin the 
GPCC against sponsor'ing the first CAP in i.\lbifl&; (2) the react-ion again.st 
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the S.W. dowfltown Hub-CAP program, its Youth Ministry to runaways and 
drug users through Chari~ coffee house and its medical drop-in center, 
the O~tside In; and {3} the reaction against the E-CApfs efforts to help 
provide low-income housing through its Interfaith Housing Corpoy'-ation. 
I built my first few interviews upon my knowledge of these three issues. 
It was not long before I found that the f'j rs t and ttl; rd were not rea 11y 
issues. The research, or at least the interview'jng, was turned against 
mY bas i c assumpti on about conservati ve reacti on exi s ti ng from the very 
start. This period became very confusing and difficult. I had to go 
back and do much more homework, by talking to some more of the staff 
members out in the CAP's, etc. Yet, I found that mY more unbiased 
information, although less complete, was coming from those on the sample. 
Consequently, I was also forced back to interviewing as well. 
I began each interview with an opening statement that explained 
i"n general terms what my study was about. liAs you know, II I said, lithe 
GPeC became directly involved in social action types of activities quite 
a~ruPt1y in 1964 when the Council hired Paul Schulze to start the first 
Church CAP in Albina. Also, as you knows the GPCCls Church CAP's have 
proliferated into seven separate CAP's scattered throtighout the city. 
As far as I can tell, before 1964 the GPCCls only direct invcrlvement in 
soc; a 1 a'cti on was he 1pi ng to support the chap1 a i ncy program to the ci ty 
and county jails, along with coordinating other band-aid types of help!l 
such as Christmas baskets, etc. It seems to me that taking on the 
CAP's represents a very real social change within the organization of 
the GPCC. This social change is what I want to know about. How did it 
come about? First, what were the elements that went into making the 
change possible in the GPCC? Second, I want to know about the contro­
I 
I 
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I v~sy surrounding the decision by the GPCCls Board to sponsor 'the first 
I CAP in Albina. What pressures were exerted for or against this importantI 
change of policy?1l .This opening statement usually gave a satisfactory 
f.rame of reference to the interviewee of \tJhat -IT\Y study vias "rea l1y u 
about, and the two questions at the end of the general description helped 
to focus the intervievleels first attempts to relate his own interpreta­
tion of what happened in the first months of the new Church CAp·s begin­
ning. 
~epending upon the answers I-received, the specificity with ~~ich 
I tne i ntervievlee described the process of the change" the number ofI people he named and identified as being for or against the new program,I the degree to which he volunteered his own opinion about what had takenI 
place-~all these things determined how I would follow up with further 
I ques~ions.Because I was so interested, I always inquired sometime 
I during the intervie\\1 about the interviewee's own "attitude ll toward each 
issue being discussed. If necessary I would ask if he could rememberI 
who on the Board, or in the GPCC·s power structure, had opposed an issue 
about the new chan.ges to social actio~l. I would point out to the inter­
vi~wee that I needed all the information I could get on eacn issue, or 
on any new controversial points which may have been stimulated by the new 
social action policies or activities. To pursue this, I asked a broad 
quest; on in one form or another: tlWere there any other' events or pro­
grams that involved social action and that you noticed resulted in some 
kind of negative reaction from within the GPCC? Out of this form of 
question came most of' ~~ other issues which are assessed in the content 
analysis. As mY knowledge of issues broadened, so did my specific ques­
tions increase dUY'ing the interviews. In this way the interviews became 
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less and less open-ended and more focused in style. Ea~h reference to a 
controversy I had not known of before needed to be checked, then fit into 
the total pattern of other social invo'vements~ and compared with con­
servative 	reactions from other controversies. 
As a growing number of controversial issues came to light, r tried 
to check them out in the organizational files and minutes fQr their 
seriotlsness in the context of a total conservative reaction. I found 
that the organization's written, records gave 4ittle important informa­
tion about such controversies, as mentioned below. Observation at some 
'meetings about issues which were still current helped me substantiate 
the fact that very controversial issues \.'.'ere either minimized or almost 
unreported \'Ihen I read the minutes of the same meetings later. My best 
sources for rechecking leads to new issues was to go back to previous I resp'ondents whom i knew were especi ally knowledgeab1e about a parti cul ar 
I 	 ~base of the GPce·s work., When necessary, questions about the new issue 
also became a part of future interviews. In connection with recheckin~I
. 
I 
new informg.tion, I found that the GPee was becoming diversified into 
enough different kinds of social action programs in different geographi­
cal areas so that v~ry active volunteers working in one or more progra~sI 
1 	 often had a limited knowledge of the GPeets total social action work. I 
also found that some Board members greatly minimized internal contro­
versies, especially evidence of current serious disagreements within the 
organi zati on. 
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A Content Analysis I 
Soon after beginning the interviews in my orig'inal sample grou.p of 
twenty, it became apparent to me that the three topics I had proposed to 
use as the most important social act;-on issues for the GPCC then were 
actually i naccura,te. I had to discard two of those proposed topi cs as 
issues and more accurately define the third. In order to find out what 
the most significant social action issues had b~en, I began to do a 
brief cont€nt analysis upon the interview notes I had gathered from each 
. formal interview. In this manner, I was able to obtain a growing list 
of the most important topics related to the GPCC's' change to so£ial 
action goals as mY informants reported them. At the same time, rny confi­
I dent sociological ~nderstanding of what was happening inside the GPCC·s 
I "obvious ll change to social action goals was jolted into con.fusion. 
l During this search for clarity, the application of a mini-content analy­
I sis ·to each interview became the instrument for pinning down what were 
the real controversies at issue between conservatives and liberals. InI the process, I discarded dead-wood topics, which had previously seemed 
to be important issues to the GPCC's change. The nine topics finally 
settled upon as the key issues went through a constant metamorphosis of 
redefining, till they were winnowed down to the definitions used in tAe 
enclosed analysis. 
In an attempt to evaluate the total interview sample, I have 
applied a relatively simple form of a content analysis to the iflterviews 
compiled together. However, as an instrument for scientific evaluation 
of "the whole sample, the content analysis used here is not without some 
problems.. First is the problem of representativeness in the sample. The 
J 
I 
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original sample of twenty was not as representative a sample as I had 
planned it to be. (Althoug~ in Chapter 1 I have discussed this same 
~roblem more on a theoretical level in relation to the hypoth~sls, its 
variables and their definit-ions, I pursue -it further here to explain the 
specific difficulties of the sample1s representativeness.) Sinte it was 
not to be a random sample, but a stratified one, I wanted it to be a 
rep~esentative of as many strata of the GPeC as possible. When I dis­
covered the lack of conservative opinion within the sample, I soon 
thought that I had fa1len. into,a great methodological hole by ,failing to 
obtain a fair representation of the conservatives I was quite certain 
were present. As discussed before, I doubled the interview sample to get 
a better representatJveness, going out of my way to find several known 
conservatives wh~ had served on the GPCCts Board of Directors. The 
1ncr~ased sample combined with the earlier one still showea a great dis­
proportion of liberal opinions in the total sample. I finally realized 
that the kind of equality between conservative and liberal opinion I 
h~d wanted represented in the sample would not be an accurate sample, 
simply because the actual population was not so divided. My sample was 
from the leaders and active, volunteer participants of the GPCC, which 
largely excluded those church laymen who are generally the conservatives 
of the mainline denominations. 
When I recogni'zed the study was focused on that group of people 
who actively worked in the political structure of the organization, 
together with those who ,voluntarily and professionally worked in carryin~ 
out the social action programs, instead of on the formally defined total 
roombership"t¥hich included all the lay members of the GPCets member 
. 
churches, then the results of my sample started to make sense. As II
~ 
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finally understood this reality, the large number of forty-one tn-depth 
interviews became very adequate for their stratified representativeness. 
I interviewed 25 present aRd former manbers of the Board of Directors. 
As discussed in Chaptel" 9, 35 people held 38 of the GPCC·g elect"tve posi"~ 
tions for 84· per cent of the time over the ten year period studied, and 
30 others held the· rest of those offices one term or less during the teil 
years. The study's interview samp'le amounts to 38 per cent of the total 
number of people who served on the Board at different intervals during 
the ·ten years. Further, the ',overall sample of 41 had ,a balance between 
'clergy and laymen, as well a's a good representation of people who had 
served on the Board 9t different intervals during the ten years, going 
back before 1959. _The sample also contained a representative number 
(nine) from the three Church-Community Action Programs studied, both pro­
fessional staff and volunteer laymen. I also intervie\\fed two lay 
delegates to the General Assembly who were not in the lIinner circle n of 
decisions (Board, Commissions or key committees) and not active volun­
teers. Seven women were in the total sample; four of them were elected 
lay officers,. and three were professional staff people. 
As far as trying to obtain a representative group for its conserva-, 
tive opinion in my s.upplemental sample, I asked several staff members and 
active officers for suggestions about some people who would be good 
representatives of the conservative view in the GPCC. Through this 
-effort, I located five very staunch conservatives for the extra sa'mple, 
making the total sample consist of ten confirmed conservative viewpoiRts. 
I am now certain that this number with strong conservative vi~ws is 
overly representative of that view out of the total population of activ,e 
participants. Yet, I now think that extra minority representation is 
3'4 
helpful to the study"s understanding of what actually went on between the 
conservatives and liberals in the light of the extremely liberal nature 
of the rest of the informants. 
As can be seen from the content analysis, Table 1, the same por­
ti'on discussed above did not include the GPeC's professional s'~aff 
people. (At this point, I am only discussing the representativeness of 
the -first 29 responcients indicated on the analysis table.) It seems to 
me that this sample is adequately stratified and representative. With 
·such a high proportion ·(38 pe.r.ce,nt) of the orgaryization's active parti-. 
'cipants being in the sample,' it fits Coleman's (1959) definition of a 
"dense" sample,. in which data are gathered from a large number of mem­
bers of the releva~ structure (informal organization). 
Incltlded in the total, expanded sample were twelve staff members 
from the GPCC's own executiv~ offices, together with staff from the 
Church-CAP's and other program divisions., Not count·jng secretaries, the 
accountant and audio-visual librarian, all but two of all professional 
staff rrembers were in this part of the sample. (When all, or almost all, 
members of the relevant social structure are surveyed, Coleman calls 
the procedure a J'saturation" sample.) 
The seccnd problem with the content analysis has to do with the 
very purpose for which I used the analysis. Early in the study as I 
tried to interpret the interviewing data, I began to use the analytic 
tool to lip~"ovell there was some conservative reaction present within the 
GPCC. I found I was in the process of placing an increasing importance 
upon quantifying mY data (through the use of the content analysis) in 
order to verify the casual relationship which I had been unintentionally 
transpos·ing ilito the hypo_thesis.. It n0W appears that I was trying to 
J 
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verify that causal relationship in order to justify my transformed 

n,ypothesis, but the hypothesis really did not say that. 

Of course, the original intent of the hypothe$is was not to verify 
a theory, but to explore and "shed sociological light" UpGA what had 
taken place in the GPCC·s organization when it abruptly broke into 
socia1 action involvement. The intended purpose of the content analy­
sis 'was not to establish strict quantitative accuracy for verification, 
but primarily to decipher. the major categories of controversial social 
issldes--on the basis of , the negative reaction each one generat~d. That 
. is to say, accurate quantititiveness applied to the content analysis here 
is not to be despised, but on the other hand, I need not have become as 
preoccupied as I dt~ with that analytic method's degree of quantitative­
ness. I was much too concerned wi th the standard of "sci enti f; cness II it 
added to the study. 
This unnecessary emphasis upon quantitative measurement is illus­
trated in the essenti~lly non-directive style of interviewing used. 
Because I· used this interviewing method as much as possible, there was a 
great unevenness to the quality of information obtained. Subject material 
varied; reliability and accuracy varied; language and style varied. 
However, as my information grew ~ore specific about the different issues 
and their importance, so did the directness of my questions about those 
issues. It worked out, therefore, that the interviews slowly changed 
from non-dir€ctive to more focused interviews. Yet, if analysis Table 1 
\'Jere to begi n to approach some stati sti ca1 ·accuracy, the data fed into 
it from the start would have had to come out of a structured interview 
questionnaire, universally administered~ Many of the early i~formants 
were not given a chance to express their attitude about all of the nine 
I 

l 

...~,. 
....0 
issues ultimately defined as the most substantive for the comparative 
analysis. Although I drid go back to several of those early ;·nterviewees 
to obtain their opinions about previously undefined and unmentioned 
issues, the overall analysis was not a's uniformly applied as a fully 
scientific 'instrument should b~. On the contrary, however, the origina1 
and, hopefully, recovered purpose of the study is not to verify a 
theory, but explore the sociological reasons behind the GPee's abr~pt 
social change. 
Another ,illustration of the difficulty with this method's less 
scientific analysis is that each interviewee's response was s~bjectively 
interpreted by the researcher in classifying the responses. It would 
have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to apply some form of 
objective criteria to measure on a sliding scale the degrees between 
liberalness, and conservativeness. In the exploratory interview, a wide 
latitude of freedom must be allowed informants to communicate their own 
experiences and subjective views, especially about deep-felt insecuri­
ties stemming from politico-religious problems. Although the data were 
not gathered by a structured questionnaire, administered to achieve 
, quantifiable statistics, the analysis also lacks a high degree of quanti­
fication. 
Content analyses have been used most frequently to analyze mass 
media, or various kinds of recorded material: newspapers, magazines, 
specialized articles, radio-TV, ~istorical journals and docUlnents, etc. 
In so doing, specific indices can be adopted for coding the material, 
such as: the number of times a word appears; amount of prominence given 
to a subject in headlines or prime viewing time; the style of the author-­
phrases and wor~ing.l By focusing on such specific references, a high 
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L: Liberal U: Undecided 
Content Analysis of 41 Interviews 
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level of systematic analyses have been confirmed in these studies. In 
this study, however, personal spontaneity had to take precedence over 
limitation (quantification) of the' subject material. Consequently, anal ..v­
sis of the material only allowed for the researcher's relatively subjec­
tive interpretation of the interviewee's subjective V'jews into simple, 
codified symbols. In order to prevent over-subjective interpretations 
at this point of analysis, two simple.categor'ies are used: lie" - con­
servative, and "LI! - liberal. Two additional categorfes-- Il W' - neutral 
(due to lack of 1nf9rmation or personal involvement in the issue) and 
nU" - undecided--helped to eliminate much prejudicial speculation in 
interpreting unclear answers. 
The final problem is the list of issues itself. The nine issues 
may be considered as not necessarily exhaustive of all possible contro­
versial social issues engaged in by the GPCC, as reflected by informants. 
Since a thorough content analysis should 'classify and analyze as much 
relevant material as possible, I made a special effort to include all 
such significant issues faced by the GPeC in the ten year span. For 
instance, there were two issues I did not include in the analysis which 
were on the border line. The first one was the GPCC's vigorous leader­
ship in the 1965 state legislative fight against capital punishrr~nt. 
GPCC leaders had actively lobbied for such a bill in the legislature and 
then led a state-wide campaign to pass the public referendum to abolish 
capital punishment. Mostly because only four informants ·said that this 
issue had raised a mild reaction within the GPCC, and two were not too 
sure of that much reaction, I did not include it. 
Another issue not included in the list but seriously considered wa 
the GPeG-'s active participation in the peace movement against the war in 
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Vietnam. It was mentioned spontaneously by about six respondents. 
Almost always, however, it was mentioned as a comparative issue in rela­
tion to SQme other onec In retrospect, though, I think this may have 
been due to the fact that at the beginning of interviews, I emphasized I 
was interested in the GPCC·s abrupt movement into social action through 
the Church CAP's. When.! pursued further questions about this issue 
if it was mentioned, respondents most often answered that the GPCC did 
finally take a stand against U. S~ participation.in the Vietnam conflict, 
but only in general terms. It never d·id _call for United States withdrawal 
of its arme9 forces, nor did it sanction participation in an anti-war 
demonstration. Two respondents (one clergyman) say they had partici­
pated in such demonstrations in downtown Portland, and had incurred 
negative reacti ons from church members for thei r personal act; vi t-j es. 
They also said several other active GPCC members (about 10) took part in 
some of their anti-war activities in Portland. These same respondents 
added that the GPCC's Board still had too many people who were lion the 
fence" ~bout the GPCC's "right," as a church organization, to take a 
political stand about such a controversial issue. Minutes of the Board 
of Directors have indicated that the issue was debated several times, but 
gave little more information; yet, there is no indication that the 
GPCC forced the issue into the public eye. No significant public contro­
versy appeared to have arisen· about the issue against the GPCC. Because 
of the few respondents who spontaneously reported the issue and the lack 
of conservative reaction to the issue, I did not include it in the con­
tent analysis. 
The question naturally arises--what were the specific criteria for 
determining those issues that \'lere used in the analysis? The most 
.. ~ ~ ~" ~ t,. 
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important standard was that which has been discussed at length pre­
viously--tRe degree of conservative reaction generated by the issue. T J. 
weighed the, amount of reaction by: (1) the number of people who spontane­
ously mentioned a particular issue, (2) the importance or degree of con­
troversialness which the respondents placed on each issue they described, 
(3) the amount of debate, time and importance each issue appeared to be 
. ­
given in the organizational records, and (4) how well the descriptions 
of the issues' controversial ness fit with the information about the other 
issues. 
The technique I used in applying these four criteria goes back to 
the method I used to analyze my interview notes. Following each inter­
view, I tried immediately to rewrite and fill in my brief notations. 
Usua,lly it was duri n g the i ntervi ews themselves that I fi rs t detected 
new properties, which hinted at newer, separate categories for contro­
versial issues. In the post-interview writing, the new properties were 
separated out and not~d. 
First, I ,coded the new properties with abbreviations in the margin. 
Second, I searched for simi 1ar ki nds of references , and compared the 
newer properties for possible emerg'ing categories of controversial 
issues. Third, I made special notes of the number of similar refer­
ences and their possible connections with new issues. The third step 
was essentially a process of evaluating and combi~ing the new properties 
into new, relevant categories, which applied the four- criteria above by 
measuring the members· degree of conservative reaction, generated by the 
GPCC's involvement in the new issue. This is mY own version of what 
B.. G. Glaser and A. L. Strauss have called lithe constant comparative 
method of qualitative analysis. 112 
• -' j;,' "~,' 
· ~r 
Of COllrse, the pragmatic applicat-jon of this three step procedure 
of constant comparison 'was not a1ways smooth. An example of the diffi­
culties in ,assembling enough valid properties to construct an imP9rtant 
category is illustrated in the events leading to my discovery of the 
spec's dispute over House Bill 1307 (1965, to equalize educational 
opportunities through busing), and the following re?lction, led by Robert 
Pampiin (viz. Chapter 6). I had heard two or three slight references 
to·this controversy during· the first seven or eight interviews. Each of 
the early references to, the dispute were so vague that I did not grasp 
.that the r'eferences were to the same issue until much later. When I 
interviewed the most active Roman Catholic priest in the GPCC, Father 
Griffin, he said that he did not know the details of the fight, since 
it was well before his time, but he had discovered mOf'e latent strong 
feelings about the "Pamplin affair" than any other event in the GPCC's 
past. Griffin knew only the bare outline of the issue--that it had to 
do with the GPCC's activity in lobbying the legislature over an issue 
and that it developed into a larger dispute about the GPec's rightness 
iR taking sides on political issues. He said he had heard that ,Pamplin 
had quit the GPCC's Board over the disagreement with the Board. Conse~ 
quently, that one interview from a relatively new participant in the 
GPeC led me to pursue the issu.e in further interviews, and forced me to 
do much back-tracki'ng by rei ntervi ewi ng previ ous respondents and re­
exam; ni ng further records.' I found through .. thi 5 effort that the earl i er 
controversy was the real cri sis po; nt ; n the GPec' s pl~ocess of changi ng 
to social action involvement. I had come close to missing this major 
turning-point controversy. 
;.~ oil 
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Since classification into categories of the content to be analyzed 
must have clear definitions in order to compare, analyze and test them 
in the future, a brief definition of each of the nine issues used in our 
content analysis now follows. The'first issue on the content analysis 
in Table 1 is the GPCC's original decision to sponsor the first Church 
CAP in the Albina area. As the table indicates, there was less negative 
reaction against this social action move than against all other nine 
issues. 
The second issue was the dispute over House Bill 1307 (1965), which 
called for busing of disadvantaged school children, mostly black, to 
qualified schools where classes in music, art, theater and other cultural 
s~bjects were offered. One of the Board of Directors, R. Pamplin, 
vigoroLJsly opposed the GPCC taking an active part in lobbying the legis­
lature for this bill. When it was passed, Pamplin became even more 
adament about the GPCC·s own organizational means of deciding to become 
involved in a controversy over a "political" matter • .He accused the 
Executive and Social Concerns Committees of by-passing the Board of 
Directors. 
The third issue was the GPCC's undefined and loose organizational 
authority over the CAP's. Ultimately, who was to have authority over 
the CAP's: the CAP's own local Boards and .staff, or the GPCC? It was 
never really resolved until the financial squeeze of the Seventies 
dictated practical answers; 
The fourth issu~ was East-CAP and its aid to the S.E. Portland poor,' 
especially its low-cost housing programs. Of the three Church CAP's, it 
carried on, by far, the least controversial social action program. 
1 
1 
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The fifth issue \\'as the local Grape Boycott, which was a IIsecond­
ary" boycott, supporting the Uni ted Farm Workers' stri ke, led by Cesar 
Chavez. The GPCCls Board never voted to support-the Boycott directly, 
but did vote to affirm, publicly, the farm workers' right to organize, 
bargain collectively and strike. This liberal vote caused great dissen­
sion within the Board. 
The -sixth issue was the downtown nYouth Ministry," centered 'in a 
cof.fee house, The Charix, and a 24-hour drop-in medical center, the 
Outside-In. The program sympathetically assisted runaways and other 
youth in all kinds of trouble. Because the city police accused the Youth 
Ministry program of harboring runaways and allowing drugs to be exchanged 
at the coffee house, the "youth ministry" made front page headlines and 
motivated immediate public reaction. 
The seventn issue was C-CAP's (Albina area, 1968) special summer 
program of varied social actions for the black people to meet the "black 
crisis" following Martin Luther King's assassination. A young, contro­
versial black leader, Colden Brown, who was accused in the press of being 
a revolutionary, was hired to oversee the program. 
The eighth issue was the internal reaction, led by a new Treasurer 
of the GPCC, against the over-use of funds in the 1968 Summer Crisis 
programs, chiefly in Albina's C-CAP. This led to further conflicts 
between C-CAP and the Executive Director . 
. The ninth issue was the relative fa'i1ure of a financial funding 
campaign in 1969. The GPCC badly needed income to meet the large deficit 
still hanging from the SUfllmer Crisis programs. A professional financial 
campaign company was hired to lead it, but less than one-sixth of the 
total $250,000 was achieved. It led to a lawsuit with the campaign 
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company and the feeling of some members that it was a reaction against 
the GPce's recent over~involvement in social actions. 
To what EYrE9~e does the content analysis serve the investigation? 
Although it has difficulties of exactness, the analysis permits an over­
view of the conservative-liberal spectrum within the GPCCls internal 
organization. It lays out with fair objectivity the pattern of atti.­
tudes which the· org.anization's core group had toward commuflity action 
involvement. The analysis serves to give some concrete, empirical evi­
dence that, unlike the general membership of most mainline Protestant 
cnurches, the GPGC, ~ an organization, was consistently supportive and 
directly involved with ·socio-political issues. 
The purpose of the overall content analysis is to determine the 
relative amount of conservative reaction each of the nine controversia1 
issues developed. The proportion of the conservative attitude toward 
each issue is compared to the relative degree of liberal support each 
issue r'eceived. By comparing the results of each issue, I \'Ias originally 
attempting to find some sociological pattern in the different conserva­
tive reactions. However, it is easily seen that no issue came close to 
generating a significantly large conservative opinion. Looking at the 
column for conservative opinions' percentages, all but two issues are 
similar in size. The first issue, the GPCC1.s decision to begin the first 
Church CAP, ;s significant in its extremely low degree (2 per cent) of 
conservative reaction. The fourth issue, East-CApls activities, is also 
relatively low at 10 per cent, compared to the others at 15 to 20 per cent. 
The real variations are seen ;n the other two percentage columns, 
the liberal opinion and the undecided-no opinion columns. Most of the 
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issues' high percentages of liberal support may be more instructive than 
the conservative percentages. It is noteworthy that the eighth issue, 
the downtown youth ministry to the drug scene, runaways, etc., received 
the highest proportion (71 per cent) of liberal support. It coincides 
with the largest amount of coverage given any issue by the press and 
with the opinion of many respondents that this issue generated the most 
public reaction. Three more issues had a high (66) percentage of liberal 
support: . the fi rst, thi rd and seventh issues. In connecti on wi th the 
first issue, the sixth issue, the ]968 Black Summer, Crisis program in 
Albina, reached its apex at the same time as the downtown Youth Ministry, 
and received some press coverage along with it. It also stirred extra 
'public reaction, because of such publicity. The strong liberal support 
for the third issue, the organizational difficulties between the CApls 
and the GPCC's main office, probably ref1ects L the internal tension that 
was still unresolved at the time of the interviews. 
.;:;- ~ ...~~.e ~ 
The last imp(}rtant point to note on the analysis table is the 51 
per cent recorded for the second issue's undecided--no opinion. The 
second issue'was the 1965 controversy over HB 1307, which led to whether 
the GPCC properly should be involved in socio-pol'itica1 matters at ail. 
Over half of the interviewees either did not have first hand knowledge 
about the issue, or had forgotten the bi tterness of the fi ght a'nd its 
import,ance. It seems that the di stance of time and the turn-over of 
personnel had made the diffe'rence in this issue's significance. 
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A New Strate9l. 
What follows is a brief description of the where and how a basic 
alteration in mY research procedure took place--from straight data 
gathering about variables over t~ deciphering the interveni~g influ-, 
ences between independent and dependent variables. As noted before, I 
, -_.­
found mY expectations for conservative reactions from interviews taken in 
the GPCels higher structure were largely iefuted. I thou~ht that there 
would have been a good dispute among the GPCCls Board members over their 
starting (f €ommunity (action program in the city·s black residential area. 
In preparing the study's proposal) I had interviewed the Rev. Pau1 Schulze 
two times. He was the GPCC's first organizer and administrator of the 
first three Church-CAP's. Now later in the research I was plagued by the 
question, "Why?" Why no di spute? Why didn I t the Board at least have a 
\... 
vigorous debate about such a radical decision to become directly involved 
in social action work? So I went back to Schulze and asked him. In a 
very concise statement, Schulze answered: IIThree things were involved. 
First was an ad hoc com~ittee of mostly white churchmen, calling them­
selves the Albina 'Community Concerns Council. I They were trying to 
organiz~ some kind,of local social action. Second was the United Metho­
dist Church Women of Oregon, interested in social causes and wi~h about 
$10,000 to spend. Third was the Greater Portland Council of Churches. 
William Cate (Executive Secretary of the GPCC) got all three together and 
performed a three-way marriage. II 
Schu'lze ' s analysis became the key for mY understanding the multiple, 
interacting,elements that went into making that originally uncontested~ 
but ultimately radical, change of goals for the GPCC. Schulze gave me 
I 
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naw~s of others who could fill in more details about,the Board's first 
decision to go into Albina--people from the United Methodist Church Women 
and the former Albina Community Concerns Council. With these extra 
interviews, I concluded there were five distinct organizational elements 
that prevented any serious criticisms by conservatives on the Board. 
(l. The United Methodist Women, Oregon Conference--their progressive 

effort and 1 arge sums of money; 2. The Commun i ty Concerns Counci 1 of 

Albina; 3. The GPCC's Social' Concerns Comm'ittee; 4. William Cate, 

- Executive Director of the GP·C~; 'and 5. ,The pervading "secularized" atti-, 
tude of the majority active member churches of the GPCC. See Chapter 9.) 
Out of these five organizational elements c~me the properties which later 
became the sociological categories that are the theoretical keys to the 
whole research, viz., Chapter 11. The first and most important category 
to emerge and unlock the other categories waslorganizational oligarchy. 
It became the key, because it opened up the way to mY seeing the other 
categories and seeing ·them in a sociological whole--together. More and 
more bits of information added to mY' conclusion that the GPCC leaders 
usurped and continued to use more and more authority than was formally 
constituted in their offices. In the process they increasingly avoided 
challenges from within the organization to change its goals. The insight 
led to an origin'ci'lly unproposed investigation of the GPCC's organizational 
structure-process~ 
As I continued my planned research, I found a minimum of negative 
reaction within the GPCC against those issues derived from the GPCCls 
three Church CApes activities. Although I found a la~ger proportionate 
reaction was stimulated by the CAP's controversial activities than by the 
" 
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Boardls initial, December~ 1963, decision, the later negative reactions 
toward the CAP's ~ere still much less than 1 expected. Of course, it 
was during this time my investigation intensified on answering the why 
for this low degree of reaction against the CAP's social action programs. 
vJhy were my data continuing to shovl a minimal rea.ction? Not real izing 
it at the time, I was then attempting to interpret what was going on 
between the variables. Retrospectively, I see mY sear'ching them to make 
sense out of the clues which pointed to some kind of interruption of 
those normal reactions by conservatives within the overall' organization. 
: Si nee- the same muted reacti on by conservati ves followed each succeedi ng 
controversial issue examined, an increasing number of the same accompany­
ing social patterns--relevant categories--became more uniform in my 
analysis of the growing data. 
Before starti ng thi s paper, I had r'ead (some of Gl aser and Strauss I 
book, THE DISCOVERY OF GROUNDED THEORY, but at that time I did not have 
enough practical research "hooks" on which to hang new charts for later 
methodological storms. During much of the work on this study, therefore, 
I did not make the association of mY own problem back to Glaser and 
Strauss· "grounded theory" method. Because of the indefiniteness of 
nondirective interviewing, I was more plagued by the real accuracy of my 
own data ," ra ther than genera ti ng some new theory.. Gl aser and Straus s 
maintain that instead of verifying someone else's theGries, more socio­
logical research should be aimed at generating theory. Obviously, in 
order to yerify theory, emphasis must be on accurate quantitative data. 
Because the generation of theory forces the researcher to evaluate what 
goes on between the variables, qualitative data becomes much more 
important. Yet, Glaser and Strauss say: 
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Our position in this book is as follows: there is no fundamental 
cla,sh between the purposes and capacities of qualitative and 
quanti tati v-e, methods or data. -What cl ash there is concerrlS the 
primacy of emphasis on verification or generation of theory--to 
which heated discussion on qualitative versus quantitative data 
have been linked hi~torically. We believe that each form of 
data is:useful for both verification and generat1Oi10fthe'OrY,
whatever the primacy of emphasis. Primacy depends only on the 
circumstances of research, on the interests and training of the 3 
researcher~ and on the kinds of material he needs for his theory. 
Gl aser and' -Strauss" employ a form of camparati ve ana lys is a s the 
foundation of their method for generating theory. ' They recommend the" con­
stant comparing, of information taken from many contrasting soc"ial groups, 
, data and conclus'ions from parallel and contrasting studies--all to gain 
the patterns of their sirrlilarities and differences. In this way, more 
and more abstract categories and their properties emerge from the data. 
Essentially, hypotheses are generated in the same manner, moving from the 
tentative, substantive to more formal, abstract hypotheses. By comparing 
(
the differences and~similarities between emerging categories, the general 
relationships bet\~een the categorie.s soon appear. Multiple relationships, 
and therefore, multiple, suggested hypotheses are often pursued simul­
taneously. The researcher must cons~antly analyze his new field data by 
comparing them with his previously gathered data and with material from 
studies by other sociologists. Glaser and Strauss emphasize the need to 
be open to seeing while in the 'act of field work the II real life" rela­
tionships of social Uthings," occurrences, people, data, etc. 
In the beginnings one1s hypotheses may seem unrelated, but as 
categories anq properties emerge, develop in abstraction, and 
, become related, their accumulating interrelations form an inte­
grated central theoretical framework--the core of the emerging 
theory. The core becomes a theoretical guide to the further col­
lection and anarysis of data. 4 
Applied to my own effort to answer the evaluative question, "Why no reac­
tion to the GPCCls rea'l controversial activities?", I look back and see I 
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was comparing and putting together many lists of properties and cate­
gories to try to'come up with a plausible social pattern for an answer. 
My organizational analysis of the GPCC was the beginning of my own. '·"com­
parative analysis" 'of reasons I found for' the lack of conservative reac­
ti on.. When I reread G1 aser and Strauss' .book, I rea 1 i zed .thei r method 
·was a systematic treatment of what I was fumbling to do in mY search fo~ 
a ~thod~-in my attempt to evaluate or interpret .the data I was getting. 
By comparing the several major controversial issues immersing the GPCC 
dur'ing .the 1960's, I. found·that the properties., c~tegories. and concepts 
. emerged slowly into a whole, which served as an "answer," or a tentative 
theory for this particular group, for this particular time and place. 
I have mentioned before that the organizational analysis I was 
"forced" into resulted i~ ITlY conclusion about the oligarchic nature of 
the GPCC's governing process. When I compared its particular form of 
oligarchy w'ith Paul Harrison's study of the Southern Baptist Convention, I 
found that constitutionally the organizations were very similar and led 
to the same legal powerlessness in the leadership of both organizations. 
This condition in both groups, combined with membership apathy, Wil1aim 
Cate's special qualities and ex-officio membership on all committees 
(viz .. , Chapter 9), allowed Cate and executives of the Southern Baptists 
both' to ta'ke strong practi ca1 control of thei r respective organi zations. 
Through this comparison, it was apparent that the GPCC's oligarchy 
simulated Harrison's description of IIgrasped,II'or rational-pragmatic 
authority. This added set of properties, illuminated by Harrison's 
grasped authority, further defined my first category of a deve1of)ing 
theory, and opened the way for mY seeing most of the other six major cate­
gories of the social insulation theory. 
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In fact, at the conc1usion of my organizational analysis, I thought 
I had found the fundamental answer to my over'a11 qual i tati ve questi on. 
felt then that the special form of the GPeC's rat'ional-pragmatic oligarchy 
was the basic sociological reason for the GPee's ability to control its 
own reactionary critics. Although it was a IIl og jcal" independent variable 
,by itself, it was not, a historically sufficient on~ \'Jhen I looked ,into 
some of the later GPCe controversies. Instead of becoming the answer in 
itself, oligarchy became one of the major categories of the paper's inclu­
sive theoretical answer--social insulation. 
The discussion about the GPCC's organizational processes (Chapter 
9) largely describes the emergence of othe"r major categories. Membership 
apathy became so visible and important ~o make the organization funct:ion 
as an insulator that I listed it as the .first form, or category, of the 
GPce's insulation. Another category which appeared at the same time 
during the working out of the analysis was the necessity of an adequate 
source of money to implement the new social action programs. The data 
showed the basic power of conservative reactionaries against liberal 
religious organizations is the withholding of finances. This becomes more 
evident when compared with all highly voluntary organizations. 
Together with oligarchy, the above two categories first appeared to 
me as indicators of a dependent Variable, which I was visualizing as 
"causing" the low-level reaction. Another category that a1so emerged 
during this same, time of analysis wa·s II structural insulation. II However· 
as I compared the concept of the "structural" quality of insulation with 
the other categories, I realized that insulation was much more than a 
static set of ot~ganizational forms," but a dynamic process. I found that 
the process of managed communication between insider-leader-activitists 
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and the rest of the organization was the constitutive category of insula­
-tion. From there the other categories began to fit together into a part 
of the larger process of social insulation. Insulation was more than a 
category. It embraced' ·all -of the ..other·-.categories.- It was a dialectic 
process in which the leaders' (notably, Cate and Schulze) used their 

. peculiar grasp of organizational authority to foc~s a' major movement 

\'Jithin Western. rel igion--secularizati-on--into .. local social activism. 
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CHAPTER III 
A COMPARISON OF SOME CLASSICAL THEORIES 
OF RELIGION" $ ROLE IN SOCI ETY: 
A PARADOXICAL IMPACT 
I 
,j 
In developing a working hypothesis for this study, two separate i 
'points of vie~ are considered. The first views religion as,befhg pre-' 
dominantly a conservative influence upon society. The second also views 
religion as being conservative in some instances, but at the same time, 
an important prodder and stimulator'toward social change--a liberalizing 
,influence. Fo~ the first view, several outstanding writers in the 
sociology of religion have said that religion contributes more to the 
conservation of the social status ~ than it encourages social change. 
Some of the best known people who have expressed this point of view are 
Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl Marx and more recently, Kingsley Davis 
and Will Herberg. Obviously, all these people have not stated this point 
simply and categorically in the same manner, but each one has concluded 
with some form of this view, accompanied with their evidence supporting 
religion's conservative influence. 
Emile'Durkheim's sociology of knowledge greatly determined his view 
of religion. He was convinced that knowledge is mediated most funda­
mentally by S()cial categories. All II coll ective representations" are 
appropriated by men through their common social relationships and social 
I 
structures. Social consciousness or conformity is developed within moral 
I 
I 
I 
and logical categories through the social representations. Durkheim, 
l 
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consequently, went back to the "primitive" religion of the '&.ustralian 
! ' aborigines 'to find out 'how their collective life. style helped form the 
I' collective representations 9f, rel;gion~ 
~ 
Because of his s~rong disagr~ement with the socialistic theory of 
the inevitability of class conflict; Durkheim continued to base even his 
.' 	view of religion. upon "organic solidarity." Durkheim',fear,ed the politi­
cal and social conflicts of his ,time as a general moral breakdown 
related to the breakdown of religion. Religi9n's purpos~, as he viewed 
,it, was to solidify and conserve the order of its soc"iety. He concluded 
that ,all societies since the primitives have ha,d religions and divided 
their society into distinct "sacred and profane ll rea1ms. Religion and 
the sacred are absolutely necessary to the profane part of society to 
give it unity, or·solidarity. Religion, then, plays a very important 
role in conserving each society's own social order by binding the members 
of society together in a collective interaction that is qualitatively 
different from that of daily life. Religion becomes a necessary and 
permanent part of society, because it performs this necessary conserva­
tive function for society--the solidifying, or integrating, of society. 
Max Weber wrote a long essay, which in substance agreed very much 
with Durkheim'& view of the conservative role of religion. 2 Weber's 
thesis was that religion in-general, but especially Christianity, 
placates those people who are frustrated and disappointed by their 
plight in this world. The same concept of religion's social function is 
the basis of Karl Marx's conclusion that religion helps to stymY "class 
consciousness ll and social revolution by being an opiate of the people. 
Kingsl~y Davis' views on religion also closely parallel Weber's essay on 
the conservative function of religion. 3 
;.' 
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Without denying his analysis of religion1s overall conservative 
role, Weber, however, took an oPPos,ing view in his THE PROTESTANT ETHIC 
AND THE SPIRIT OF, CAPITALISM. ,In ,thi~ work, he tried to show that the 
Calvinist, Church of th'e eighteenth century (not Ca]vin's own teachings) 
",promoted the idea that econdmi c success, hard work ,and frugal i ty were 
, , proof of" di'vine election, i.e., pt"edestined salvation. 4 Directly due to 
, this motivation, Weber argued, Protestant asceticism,sanctio~ed profit 
ma,k; ng as a moral duty. ," As ~eber I s defenders have since poi nted out, he 
was not trying to depict, the Protestant Reformation to have been the 
"cause" of modern capital ism. ' 'Rather" Weber was demonstrating the strong 
correlation between Calvinism's new ethical norms ,and the psychological 
requirements of the new economic system. In other words, Weber saw 
that Calvinism was not providing the lower 'classes with any comfort to 
assuage their problems, but complimenting the successful. 
In two separate works, Weber presented arguments on both sides of 
the question, whether religion has a conservative or liberal influence 
upon society. In his PROTESTANT ETHIC, however, it seems that Weber is 
presenting Calvinism as an exception to a more general rule for world 
religions. Weber, indirectly then, suggests the insight that religions 
play an ambivalent role in society. To supplement this idea, S. N. 
Eisenstadt in a recent. essay defends Weber's Protestant Ethic theory and 
amplifies it by showing Protestantism's more conservative influences upon 
society. Eisenstadt shows how the new Protestantism had various kinds of 
effects in different cultures and countries. Depending upon their 
style of government 'and cultural background, his findings illustrate 
the ambi va1ent i nfl uence Protestanti sm 'has had upon its varyi ng soc; 0­
economic environment. 5 , In some cases, its religious influence has been 
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towa rd changi n9 the old order into new patte rns, whi ch corrob.orates 
Weber's 'idea that the P~otestant Ethic stimulated the new capitalist 
economi.cs. . I n other cases, Ei sens tadt. holds, contrary to Weber, tha t 
Protestantism has had a ~onservative influence to maintain the social 
status 9..!!Q. in certain areas .. 
On the progress; ve side, Ei sen$.tctdt says Protestanti sm has had a 
_.Utransformative c;apacity to legitimize, in religi9us or ideological 
terms,. the development of ne~ motivations, activities and new institu­
tions which' were not encm)1passed by their original impuJses and views."6 
Eisenstadt defines "transformative capacities" in terms of three aspects 
of Protestantism: (1) a combination of "this-worldliness" and trans­
cendentalism; (2) emphasis on individual activism and responsibility; 
. a.nd (3) direct re1ationship of the individual to .the sacred, minimizing 
! the institutions. When these three characteristics interacted with those 
conducive socio-political conditions which freed the transforming 
capacities of Protest~ntism, significant social changes resulted. 
Eisenstadt says the key condition was autonomy in cultural, political 
and economic institutions, which was present more in some Western Europe 
countries than others, e.g., Spain and France. Protestantism1s trans­
forming powers varied in degree and quality from country to country, 
dependi ng' 'upon the di fferent area' s abi 1i ty to absorb ·the· re 1 i gi ous 
transformative ideology. 
Eisenstadt admits Weber did.not.pay. too much attention to Protest­
antism's transformative effect upon the political sphere, but says it 
was one of the most impor'tant, because it substi tuted the idea of 
covenant and contract as a new view of "natural ll law. 7 It freed natural 
law from magical c()ncepts and capl"iciaus gods. It made nature and rnen1s 
" . 
m!!!""! L 
57 
own interrelationships subject to rational order. In contrast to 
countries which remaine'd· predominantly Roman Cathol ic, Protestant rulers 
had to find new sources of legitimation other than the. church. This 
caused their developing new,· independent symbols for national identity 
and the restructuring of central. legal institutions. Consequently, when 
there already existed a .potentia] openne.ss or flexibility in the p61iti­
Gal and cultural ceDt~rs of a.country, their'interactions wi~h the 
religious innovations of ~he. new Protestant groups. allowed various 
.degrees of institutionalizing of the, new socio-e~onornic forms. 
Protestantism's transformative capacities were smallest where 
Protestant groups attai ned full. powers--hence, restri cti ve, 1ega1is ti c 
atti tudes were acti va ted, e. g., the Geneva experi rnent--and paradox; ca1ly, 
also where Protestants became the "downtroddenminorities ll of a.country. 
In between the extremes of this socio-economic continuum, in some 
countries Protestants came to occupy in sufficient numbers the social 
category of "secondary elites" (close to but not identified with the 
central elites), so that they had the greatest ability to influence the 
social movement toward new social changes ..Similarly, Protestant groups 
were also successful insofar as they were integrated into wiQer national 
communities that had an autonomy, which had developed out of prior 
estates. -These young autonomous groups,. saturated by Protestant ' 
secondary elites, developed without attaining full political powers.8 
As Eisenstadt describes it, Protestantism's influence upon Western. 
society was an ambivalent one. It may be made more graphic by mapping 
it out upon a simple continuum. 
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PROTESTANTISM'S TRANSFORMATIVE CAPACITIES 

Smallest Greatest Smallest 

(Where and \'Jhen Protes·t~nts became): 
ControllersL ;S' Sec?ndary <' ' ~ ,Do,:,ntr~d~en 
of Power ~ --=::JIIII"'" Elltes ~ 7' Mlnorltles 
Protestantism had the greatest influence to bring about social changes 
where it became close to, but not identified with, the central elites of 
. " 
its society. This influence diminished where the Protestants climbed, 
or declined too far on the socio-politico-economic ladder. 
- . 
Eisenstadt gives several illustrations of the paradoxically similar, 
along with contradictory, results that carre put of Protestanti,sm's inter­
action with whatever socio-political structures which existed in each 
area. South Africa is an example \vhere the Calvinist influence became 
extremely powerful, and at the same time, extremely inhibiting to the 
socio-poli~ical life of ~he country. Protestant transformative capaci­
ties have been minimal in this country. Lutheranism, for another 
example, has also had different effects on different countries. In those 
German principalities where the rulers were autocratic and became 
Lutheran, religious practlces were more conservative'and more restrictive 
on the growth of socio-economic institutions. In Scandinavia, Eisenstadt 
says, there was greater prior autonomy in the Estates, and Lutheranism 
was integrated into these wider national communities. Sweden's political 
development was subsequently in a more pluralistic direction than other 
9European states. political, economic and social freedom developed faster 
and earlier in those moderately strong Protestant European states. 
Eisenstadt's analysis deals specifically with Weber's Protestant 
Ethic thesis. As mentioned above, Weber later wrote an essay, IIReligious 
iii' 
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Rejections of the ~lorld and their Directions," pointing out the socially 
conservative nature of world religions in general. Eisenstadt has 
tried to show hO"1 Protestantism itself has 'been' a conservative agent in 
certain societies, as 'well as.a .liberalizing force, demonstrated by 
Waber; Eisenstadt's research is greatly broadened and up-dated by the 
inclusion of examinations into newer emerging states in'varying 
geographical areas throughout the globe. 
However, it must be remembered that Max Weber a,lso later did a 
great amount of sociol~gical research into the religions of China~ 
India, and ancient Israel. In these writings, Weber t'eported both- sides' 
of these religion's social influences--both their conservativism and 
liberating influence for change. Particularly in his study of 
Judaism1s ancient prophets, Weber found in their charis'matic leadership 
the ingredients which were so important to bringing about the socio­
political changes that made Judaism such a distinctive religion. 
Weber classified world religions into two groups: (l) the reli­
gions of ritual, or legal pursuits, and (2) the religions,of conviction, 
which are actively oriented toward salvation. The first kind places 
great emphasis on traditional, conventional order and laws. The la\'J is 
"sacred" and must be obeyed in its greatest details. It is often 
characteri zed by a bu'reaucrati c form of moral i ty, as ; t progi'~ess i ve ly 
loses its concept of transcendence. The religions of salvation, accord­
ing to Weber, are controlled by sacred conviction--or faith--instead of 
sacred law. Inner tension develops in the believer due to the dissatis­
faction with worldly manners of life and his intensive search for a 
transcendent meaning to this world. Out of,this radical 'separation 
between religion·s transcendent,standards, as against worldly standards, 
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came the charismatic prophets, who came into direct conflict with 
economic and political 'life. 
Weber described the charismatic leader as one \'./110 se.izes leader·· 
ship by reason of his own conviction that he is an agent of a higher 
moral authority than, that ,of the present order. He always' leads in ,a 
break, with the established normative order. The break is legitimated 
and given rational support by appealing to a higher mora] order. 
The greatest contri buti on ·of the prophets, ac;:cording to Weber, was 
thei r ra ti ona.l i'za ti on of all ·.areas of 1 i fe, due ,to thei r effol"ts to 
bring about the IIdisenchantment of the world. II Because of the 
prophets' unending war against magical and orgiastic practices, they 
emptied the Israelites' natural world of magic, demons and mYthological 
powers. They said God is the God of all of life, and therefore he is 
completely dependable. This made life rationally sensible. The 
prophets over and over pointed to what God had accomplished for them as 
a people, taking them out of bondage from Egypt, giving them their land 
and consistently giving them victory over their enemies. God's actions 
were rationalizing, because they called for a rational response to serve 
and worship their God of action. The prophets' rationalizatiml was a 

direct attack upon others' efforts to coerce and please a fickle god 

, or pantheon bu; 1 t around vague promi ses. Thei r 'God had already acted. 

He had already delivered them out of bondage, and time and again given 
them victory over thei'r enemies! This rational l"elationsh'ip created an 
ethical obligation that bound the whole Jewish people as a IIsecular" 
society to their God. 
The purpose of this chapter ,is to expose the strong theoretical 
support for both sides of the dilemma in which L~estern religion has 
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played its dual l"oles. During the greater amount of time, the religious 
instituti-ons have lent "their support ,to upholding th'e social status guo, 
but at other ,times in' some societies, these,same religious groups have 
been critical and creative in forcing changes in their own social 
worlds.' In the first paragraphs of.'thts chapter', Durkheim's fear for 
the fragility of his society·'s moral standards is described as being 
based.Dn his great perception that social order ,and interrelationships 
are determined by each society's own representation collective. He 
di scovered' that the standards and, patterns 'of each soci ety have thei r 
,sources in the human group, and because of'this, he was aware of the 
tentativeness of all moral standards. As noted before, he was fearful 
of the breakup of Western morality, along with Western re1igion~ which 
upheld that morality. 'For this reason, religion was to him most neces­
sary to conserve the 'soci also1 i dari ty. Although Durkhei m di d not see 
the role of religion to be the critic of established social and moral 
practices, he identified the source of all social order as being con­
structed by human beings, co11ectiveiy. 
This is at base'what Weber wrote was the effect of the ancient 
prophetic effort to IIdisenchant" nature and the world of humanly con­
structed myths and mag'ic, in order' to let God be completely God over 
all aspects of society; By applying its transcendent law, the prophe­
tic tradition became i.conoc1astic of each of Israel's new ru1erships 
which tried to deify itself. Weber showed that this kind of rationalism­
in Western religion periodically re1ativized its humanly constructed 
soc; a 1 norms \~then it has held up the propheti c, transcendent val ues 
against current social practices. Using Weber's Protestant ethic thesis, 
s. N. Eisenstadt has amplified it to show that Protestantism has worked 
'" 
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both ways in different social contexts. As descl"ibed above, Protestant­

ism in some cases did i~iticize and transform'its own social order (when 

"Prote~tants became, the secondary ..e 1 i tes), and in other cases,', it accom­
modated itself to the socia-political status ~ (when Protestants 
became either'the dominant contr_ollers' of power" or the downtrodden 
minorities) .. . , 
In the last analysis, this paper also intends to demonstrate that 
,within the context of tne,GPCC and its cOJll.m~nity, this re1,igious group 
has, s.imul taneous ly, played both roles. The GPCC has paradoxi ca 11y 
given support to traditional practices of the city government and the 
local business community, while at the same time, it turned to becnme a 
leader in 'severely contradicting the norms and values of these power 
structures with its own social action"programs. 
-' 
CHAPTER IV 
MOTIVES ~OR SOCIAL INVOLVEMENT 
Because a fundamental change in the GPee's organizational direction 
and structure occurred within a relatively brief period, the question 
I ,immediately 'presents itself: ' What social conditions were present to 
l 
prod the unusual initi-al change from relative uninvolvement to a full­
1 
i 
time" di rect socla 1 acti on- program? What we're the i ni ti a 1 moti vati ng 
factors that overcame the traditionally conservative posture of a recog­
nized religious group? This chapter attempts to answer that question. 
Before the Greater Portland Council of Churches made 'its big jump 
to a community action program, it VJas carrying on some limited social 
service type of work such as helping to fund the chaplins at the city-
county jails, juvenile detention homes and specialized hospital 
chaplaincy. Founded in 1919, the history of the GPec's pre-1960's was 
Written in conventional ~ooperative church work such as the widely known 
(1,200 attendance) joint, annual two-week school to prepare SWlday school 
teachers, as well as the cooperative, released-time church education 
program with the Portland grade 'schools. A typical help-the-congrega­
tions type of program-was the GPCe's broadly supported, city-wide church 
membership census in 1960. However, the GPeC had remained uninvolved 
from the conti"oversial social problems of local poverty, racial inequities, 
and other social injustices. It was -in this context that the' GPCC departed 
from all its previous policies and voted to hire a fu'l1-time man to begin 
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in 1964 a "community action program" within the black residential area 

of Albina .. 

. What brought about this momentous decision, which, was later to 
change the direction of the GPCC's main stream? In actual fact~ it 
appears' that the deci sian whi ch. the GPCC I S Board of Di rectors made was 
not fought out by two sides .of.strong or angry opposition .. No conserva­
. tive group, .indeed, no individual, rai.s.ed any real opposition to. the. 
pt~posa1 of.this social action project \'1ithin the city's b1a.ck community . 
.	Thi s researcher anti cipated that the. beginning efforts of the GPC'C· to 
move in this totally new direction should have been marked by conserva­
tive resistance within the GPCCls membership against such a liberal move .. 
None of the interviewees could recall anyone who had openly opposed the 
decision .. According ,to three re~pondents, many Portland people outside 
of the GPCC gave vocal support to the decision: "Finally our churches 
are going to do something constl"uctive in our community .... AnotherII 
respondent mentioned that the GPCC's first year in Albina with a fu11­
time, salaried worker was given strong popular support by member churches 
of the GPCC, as well as by many parts of the city.. Why? 
The reasons behind this smooth transition have their foundation in 
the overall change which had its roots in the Social Gospel movement in 
the America of the 1800's, and.before 'that in the European theological 
liberalism of the iate 1700's, exemplified by Friedrich Sch1eiermacher .. 
Washington Gladden and Walter Rauschenbusch gave fervent expression to 
the Social Gospel in the United States, which strongly influenced the 
socia 1 thinki n9 of the Federal Coullei 1 of Churches in its famous "SOC; a 1 
creed of the churches 1/ of 1908. Fo11 owi ng Wor·l d Wa r I, the neo-orthodox 
movement overshadowed the Social Gospel,' but also incoi"'porated much of 
.' 
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it. The present National Council of Churches is a reformulation of the 
old Federal Council, and ·most of the mainline Protestant Churches which· 
belonged to the fi rst are· now· members of the Nat; ona1 Counei 1, as ''Ie11 
as of the GPCC. These· are the same church bodi es, mostly, who have had 
a strong theo 1ogi ca 1. :heri tage. of the 1; bera1 movement and the· S.oci.a1 
Gospel. These local congregations of the GPCC, especially parts of the 
.Congregational, Methodist and Presbyterian bodies, were expressing. a 
.bas i.c assumpti on pf the Soc; a1 Gospe.l-..;that the church shoul d be 
111 nvo 1ved II in "Socj a1 , .. economi c . and pol;. ti ca1 sectors of the. liworl d. II The 
conservative tendencies of these churches to maintain the status ~ were 
·there, but were diminishing beside a growing concern for the secular 
problems of their city. Ironically; the clergy led in this secular coo­
cern. 
The GPCC's December, 1963, decision to take on social action full 
time was not, then, a cataclysmic event, but a kind of "natural ll turn to 
make. The change was almost uneventful. Apparently, the GPCC membership 
did not foresee the long-range difference it would make in their own 
goals, philosophy and practice as an organization. There were several 
other important factors which preceded the December~ 1963, decision: 
(1) The United Methodist l~omen, Oregon Conference, (2) The "Community 

Concerns Council" of Albina, ("3) The GPCC's Social Concerns Committee, 

(4) William Cate, Executive Director of the GPCC, and (5) the above­
mentioned pervading attitude of the majority member churches of the GPec. 
Chronologically, the United Methodist Women, Oregon Conference, 
became seriously interested in performing some kind of social action in 
the A·lbina area· about the same time that the local gl"OUP of Albina­
churches. organized into the Community Concerns Council, the Fall of 1961. 
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HO\'Jever, well before that time, the United f~ethodist Women had ser-iously 
discussed their desire ·to use their own funds on·a social action project 
s'Omewhe're in Oregon .. They were looking for- a worthy place to spend 
their money in this f~shion, because ~hey were convinced, that social 
action on .thei rhome grou'nd \Alas. the. proper work of the church. Mr-s. 
Elizabeth Watson, who lives on .the .edge.of the Albina area, was president 
of the United Method.ist Women, Oregon Conference. Early in 1962, the· 
Rev. Courtl.and,·a black pastor of Cambrick Methodist Church· in Albina, 
called Mrs. E.·~~atson, and asked her.i-f the United .Methodist Women \~ould 
consider sponsoring a "community center" in Albina. Mrs ..Watson related 
the series of events following. She brought this proposal before the 
govern i n'g board of her state-wi de group. A commi ttee of four; wi th Mrs. 
Watson as chairman, was formed'to study Albina's socio~economic problems 
and the feasibility of utilizing the Methodist Women's assets to meet 
these problems. The Women's study committee thoroughly analyzed the 
great changes which had taken place in Albina, economically and socially, 
over the preceding fifteen years. The committee concluded that the need 
for socio-economic aid was so great that it was too big for trreir group 
·to administer. Yet, they wanted the administration of their financial 
.aid·to be done by a religiously based group. During this time, her 
acquaintance 'with the GPee's Executive S'ecretary, William Cate, a fellow 
Methodist, led Mrs. Watson to discuss her committee's findings and con­
clusion with Cate. Cate told' her how much he wanted the GPCC to' become 
involved in social action work within a local area with just such great 
needs. Through this contact, the committee decided to ask the GPCC to 
administer a community action type of project in Albina, using the 
Methodi st ~~omen I s funds of ten to fi fteen thousand doll ars, over a three­
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year period.· 
From their investigation, the committee concluded that, as a black 

cormnunity, Albina had no voice, no center of .. power or authority, that._ 

could speak to the white groups of th~ city and be taken s~riously-"by 

the wh i te po"wey- structures ·of Po.-rtl and.. Al b.i na I'S prosperous Union .Aven ue 

business area- had been destroyed fi.fteen years .. be·fore when the Interstate 

5. Freeway was constructe.d through one side of A 1bi na, .together .wi th the 

construction .of the.Lloydls Shopping Center and the Portland Civic 

Center. These major construction sites had involved the permanent· 

removal of hundreds of homes and business buildings. Albinals Union 

Avenue business area was disetted into p.ieces and separated. The commit­
tee saw that there were already several ch~rch sponsored, social-help 

type of programs goi n'g on inA1bi na. However, none of these church 

action programs was aimed at the real problem. These church programs 

were all small: Menonite playground program, a Roman Catholic nursery 

for welfare mothers and a small fundamentalist church1s day-nursery. The 

Portland Urbah League set up an office in Albina for three or four months, 

but pulled out to place it somewhere else. Even the Oregon Welfare 

Department did not have an office within Albina. None of these little 

IIhel p" programs, chut"ch or secul ar sponsored, was geared to the more basic 

need of th~_black ~eople. Both Mrs. Watson ahd Sthulze em~hasized.that no 

group was physically situated inside the community to help the black 

. people organize themselves 	into an on-going, self-help organization that 
would have-a representative'lIvoice,1I respected and heard by the power 
structures of the larger city. Probably because. fu·ndamentalist churches 
are exclusive by the nature of their strict legalistic morality and high-
pitched 'emotional wo}"ship practices, the fundamentalist, black clergymen 
.1 
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in Albina were so str'ongly individualistic that they at that time \a/ere 
'mutually exclusive socially.:l Usually, fundamentalists consider s'ocial, 
economic and political probl~ms outside of reJigton's prerogative. This 
religiously conservati've view" automatically conserves and legitimates 
-those established "outside" structures. Therefore, the' black fundamenta­
list churches in Albina did not serve as 'a rallying po-'int to organize 
into ~n effective organization.' The Methodist Women's committee decided 
its social action job in Albina would be organizationally too big for 
their resources.' The GPCC ,appeared to be ,an excellent vehicle to 'develop 
Albina's needed voice. 
The second factor which led up to the'GPCC's decision to sponsor 
the action program in Albina was the Albina "Community Concerns Council 11 
(CCC). In 1961 the Rev. Jack Engermalls, a white Baptist pastor in 
Albina, invited all the Albina churches to form an informal group to dis­
cuss and plan some kind of com~unity action work in Albina. Engermalls 
had just returned from a Baptist conference about church social action 
programs and their practical methods in local communities. He was con­
vinced that the black and white 'congt"egations in Albina could and should 
organize an independent group of pastors and laymen to plan and begin 
some form Qf community action effort which would deal with AlbinaJs own 
problems. 2 According to common testimony, the "cecil met almost monthly 
for over two years, but never moved beyond the talking stage. The group 
was never able to consummate any ~lans 'for specific actions.'­
According to those interviewed who attended the Albina "Community 
Concerns Council ," the purpose of their group was eventually to develop a 
program to alleviate Albina's racial and poverty pr·oblems. ~1r .. Robert 
, I 
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Nelson, who participated in this Council from the start, said that about 
.- 25 1oca1 congregat-j ons wer'e i nvi ted to send thei r interested 1ayJre.n .afld 
pastors to meet with the group_ ~ince Engermalls and- the other leaders 
of the ad hC)c "CCCU group were aiming·at non-relig"ious goals for the­
grriup,' the groupls ~ecular_p~rpo~es had a negative effect an the five 
-black chu~che s whi ch responded· to th.e i nvi tati on. Because -of thei r . 
fundamentalist background, the five participating black churches soon 
dwindled to t\-JO. It can be seen from this beginning of the local 
churches to be directly involved in social action within Albina, the 
black churches generally would not ally themselves with social action 
purposes. This fact becomes more and more important in the evolvement of 
the 'GPCC I s CAP IS, as we shall soon wi tnes-s. 
A . th i rd factor was the sma 11 group of peop1 e \v; thi n the GPCC' s 
own policy-making structure. It was the GPCC's elite Social Conc~rns 
Commission. Members of the Commission were elected at the annyal meet­
;ngs by -congregations! delegates, but it became an el ite group because 
it developed so much independent powel" under its aggressive chairman, the 
Rev. Dr. Robert Bonthius. He was the pastor of one of the large urban 
Presbyterian Churches, and strongly dedicated to the whole church's 
involvement in social action. Bonthius encouraged and led his sub­
committees under his Commission into investigating the social implications 
of many bills before the state legislature and proposals before the City 
Council. Consistently, this group of people introduced social action 
plans and statements' on socio-economic pol icies to the Executive Commit­
tee alone, or to the Board of Directors, to"be approved. Most often' 
these statements would be approved, and then presented to the public as 
the "pos'ition" of the GPec. A very few times the Social Concerns Commis­
. ~ 
. 
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sion's recommended statements drew some real reaction from the Board of 
Directors, resulting in vigorous debate and counter moves. (The major 
reaction of this kind will be taken up in a separate chapter, Chapter 6.) 
, , Immediately foliowing the 'approval of sever'al of the- "position statetnents ll 
by the Bonthius Commissi'on in the early 1960 I s" members of the Commission 
went down to the State Legislature, and lobbied in the GPec's name for 
and against specific 'legislative bills., During- that time, for instance, 
the Commission rallied the whole 'GPGC to put great'pressure on the 1e9is'­
1ators to eliminate the death penalty. Shortly after, the Commission 
met much internal reaction to its support of a bill to finance busing 
of economically disadvantaged children to suburban schools. 
Thi s researche r has never met Bonthi us, s i nc€ -he 1eft Port1 and for 
another parish before this research began. Several respondents charac­
terized Bonthius as a successful, appealing pastor; however, three of mY 
conservative respondents considered his activities and words in the 
interest of social action for the GPCe as too aggressive, even abrasive. 
There was a broad consensus among respondents that Bonthius had spoken 
forcefully at some meetings .for his Commissionls suggested social actions. 
Some thought that Bonthius~had done a disservice by alienating some 
moderates on the GPCC Board. 'Yet, 'one Episcopalian member of the GPeC 
Board (an Oxonian Ph.D.) attested that at one meeting concerning,the race 
and school busing issue, Bonthius and himself sat near each other, joking 
and kidding each other that they were soon 'to make strong opposing pre­
, , 
sentations to the meeting. This respondent said that he knew that some 
GPeC people were offehded by Bonthius l strong liberal views, 'but the 
respondent thought it \A/as not Bonthi U,S I abras; ve manner as much as the 
threat Bonthius represented to their conservative inability to understand 
.J 
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his liberal proposals.' Apparently, then, for Bonthius, and others, the 
\ 
new Social Concerns Commission, which· was created in the GPCC·s 1961 
reorga~ization and consolidation ,of a wide variety of committees into· 
'.teJ:l "commissions',.", became an excellent vehicle to marshal the pr'estige 
of,a larger church. organization behi'nd the.ir,.socio-economic,convictions •. 
It allowed them as churchmen to bri~g a new sty1e·of.power to bear upon 
the. leaders of city and ,.state,. , , 
Two other respondents who had served wi th Bonthi us on ,thj ~ commi s­
sion arid wer~ econom.lcally upper-midd1e,'class, stfll defended the public 
stands their commission and· the GPCC had taken. They were proud of their 
public participation in recent struggles to win acceptance of several 
controversial issues: the state's death penalty was eliminated in 1961, 
school busing' for' the disadvantaged was adopte'd in 1964,' GPCC members 
participated in the peace march on city hall, the grape boycott had been 
successful in 1968, etc. Both respondents claimed to have supported 
the liberal side of these issues on religious grounds. One woman 
respondent, who had held several offices of national importance in her 
conservative Baptist denomination, said that she gave her support to 
these GPCC liberal efforts~ knowing that her church was not yet in accord 
with them. 
Accordi ng to the mi nutes of the 'GPee I s Board meeti ngs, the Soci a1 
Concerns ·Commission regularly submitted proposals for social issues to 
be considered, leading to proposed ~ctions. This Commission began to 
play an ihcreasingly important role in ·the activities of the GPCC from 
the time it was created in'1961. In the late 1960·s, by far the majority 
of the business and ~ct;ons of the GPCC were proposed by this same 
Commission to the Board of Directors. ,The Commission played a decisive 
..J 
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role in formLtlating -the GPCC's major concerns and streng activity in 

social issues, manjl of which were politically controversial in the city 

and state. _It is .s.ignificant. that this group of people within the 

_structure of the GPCC was the source. of the ideas and motivation which 

led to 'most of the -GPCGls inv.olv,ement. in its socio.-political activi'ties 

during the sixttes. All of the members- of this-committee, both laymen 

and clergy, w~re middle anq upper-mjddle class, economically •. ~Jith toe 

pos~ible exception of Bonthius, of the three respondents who had served 

on the Soci a 1 Conc~rns Commj ~.si on, none had prev; QUS ly taken any act; ve 

.part in social or political· action types of programs--neither in other 

organization~, nor individually. Some oth~r respondents thought that 

one or two of the women on the Commission had been somewhat active in 

the League of Women Voters. By and large, however, the members of the 

Co~ission were not normally activists, nor especially political acti­

vi~ts. Yet, within the setting of the GPCC and the Social Concerns 

Commission, it appears that these church oriented, non-activist people 

have taken on new roles and new social action purposes. 

The reason for the innovations in their roles and socio-political 

activities seemed obvious to me. The vast movement of secularization 

de-~l i enates ~ or removes re 1 i gi on-I"s symbols,· insti tuti ons and taboos from 

·.·society, including their new roles. Through the GPCC, the strength of 
this liberal movement was being focused upon them as individuals. and 
strengthened by the new group action· of the GPCC. The question, however,­
that was beginning to force itself out of th-ese innovations was why they 
could do these activiti~s in their own locale without incurring negative 
reactions. 
I' 
I 
I 
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What. part, then, did the GPce's Social Concerns Commission play in 
brih'ging about the ·posftive deci·sion of the GPCC to sponsor the first 
CAP ·in Albina? Bonthius was important at this poi·nt, because he ·-was 
'Iclose frie~ds with several activists 'in the Albina, ad -hoc Community I 
t 
. . 
Concerns Council during the two years of its eX'istence before·the.GPCC's 
1963 decision to go into Alb-ina with its CAP. Bonthi'us 'had visited. .'the 
Al bi na group IS. meeti ngs, and .. he had. become interested in havi ng the ·.GPC.C 
hGlp them get some kind of concrete social action program going. He· 
-furthered .this· c-ause· by inviting his own Social" Concerns. Commission ·to 
visit the meetings of the Albi~a group. With this kind of convincing 
preparation, Bonthius and his Commission became a strong positive force 
in· preparing the GPCC Board of Directors for their acceptance of the new 
CAP venture in Albina. 
The fourth. factor is the Executive Secretary of the GPCC, William 
Cate. He is an ordained Methodist minister and Ph.D. from Boston Univer­
sity, School of Theology. Over a period of several interviews and dis­
cussions, Cate mentioned more than once that he deliberately stayed out 
of the limelight of the GPCC's gro"wing new·programs. He felt it important 
that he work behind the scenes during the first few years of his office 
since 1959 at the GPec. His method, he said, was to work through the I 
,!GPCCls Commissions, the elected officers 'and Board ·af ·Directors,·and let 
·them take the center stage ••• and the c~edit. It was during this time 
tha·t he' was trying to convey- hi sown pe·rsona1 concept 'of the gaa1 s the 
SPCC should be seeking. Cate said'he had two main goals for the GPCC: 
(1) To' get the ecurnenica.l concept into the life and actions of individual 
congregations. (2) To get the individual congregations out of their own 
provincial IIboxes ll to become lIinvolved" with their wider community. 
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Cate's proposed means ·to achieve these t,,,o goals was the application. of 
social action, but the first goa.l would'still remain ecumen'ics. Cate said 
he dealt with these two questions in his Ph •.D. dissertation, IIPractical 
and Theoret.ical Aspects of Ecumenical Communication. 1I In summary, it is 
"church soci~l ?lGtion ~ooking for a.. methodology. II Cate. s~aid tha.t. the 
different CAP's, developed and now. located in various geographical ·areas 
of the cj ty by. the GPCC., be,came the IImethod II whi ch turned out to. be the 
"key that unlocked the door ll to his own .basic goal-questions. In Portland, 
the CAP's became the method to bo.th ecumenics and local.involvement. Cate 
kept emphasizing the local congreg"ations. He said, liThe CAP's gave the 
means (method) to the congregations to help thems~lve~ to help their own 
communities together .•. 11 
'William Cate's great importanc~ was as a "mid-wife" in the giving 
of birth to the new Church CAP's under the GPCC. However, as mentioned 
above, Cate's contribution was within the context of the interaction 
between sympathetic leaders and activists in the various leadership posts 
of the GPCC and church related groups, viz., Elizabeth Watson of the 
United Methodist Women, etc. Since he knew that he was dealing with an 
essentially conservative element of society, Cate said that he "went slow" 
and did not "push" these church people. Rather, he tried to communicate 
hi s vi ews and encouragement for servi c.e in 'the GPCC to a' re 1 at; ve few 
potenti·al leaders, especially laymen. He found and cultivated those 
churchmen who '\"ier'e interested in both ecumenical work and s·oc;'al action. 
Then his method was to work with and through them, letting them become 
the· center stage advocates in the' GPCC for. soc; a 1 act; on. Close assocl­
ates of Cate agree that .he worked for social acti.on goals from the moment 
he arrived to take over his job at the. GPCC. However, Cate readily 
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admitted that preceding the GPCC original decision to take on the first 
. CAP in Albina, there were many ·other people, inside and out of the GPCC, 
who laid the foundation and worked for the Church1s new Community·Action 
Program. Cate gave special credit to the United Methodist Women of 
Oregon and the 'Albina ~ommunity 'Concerns Council,..as,'well as many particu­
lar individuals .. Yet, it was Cate himself ~ho u~ed his influence and 
,the power,of his exec~tive position to guide,local individuals onto the 
GPCC Board of Directors,and onto key "elected" GPCC offices. (Please 
refer to Chapter 9 on organization, apathy and oligarchy in the ,GPec ..>.. t 
From the above account,· it is evident William Cate was liberal in 

his own goals and practical application of the kind of work he wanted 

the GPCC to be doing as a portion of the "Church." On the other hand, 

three respondents--intimate but liberal friends of his--referred to 

Catels very conservative background and that he demonstrated it in many. 

ways through his administration of the GPCC. Cate was insistent on his 

defense of t~e institutional church and its structure, and he consistently 

demanded that the GPce's social action be tied to the local traditional 

congregations. Cate himself made a point out of telling me that he was-­
and practiced--a moderate-conservative' theology and view of the church. 

He said that he was raised in a very conservative Methodist family in·a 

, small, rural, southern Idaho town, and' he attended' a, church-supported 
college, ~lillamette University, Salem, Oregon. Therefore, he, admits, his 
emotional ties ar'e .to conservative economics and politics·. However; 
intellectually, he changed and is committed to the 'liberal application 
of lithe Christian soc'ia-l ethic to 'dislodge the ingrained social injus­
tices .. 11 He emphasized that the pf10ple who are "casualtiesof society· 
cannot speak for themselves . because of their lack of power, and the 
.1 
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churches' social action must stand behind these people and give them a 
new dimension of their own power." 
The fifth. factor was a growing attitude, fostered by many of the 
larger, mainline Protestant theological seminaries) among these churches 
that they should be "involved ll .in the socio-economic problems of their 
local communities. "This idea had been slowly filtering down to the lay­
men over the past two decades since World War II. The pastors of the 
more liperal denominations, therefore, have been more in the forefront 
of leading their'congregations into social involvements. Significantly, 
the local congregations of these mainline, liberal denominations make up 
the bulk of the memb~r congregations of the GPec .. The people from these 
congregations are the most active in the GPCC, and hold the key commit­
tee posts. It is important to note in connection with this factor that 
when the initial proposal was presented to the Board of Directors to 
become directly involved in social action work, no one:of all those I 
interviewed could remember anyone else seriously opposing the GPec's 
becomi ng the sp'onsor of the A 1 bi na communi ty acti on program. 
This chapter and those following through Chapter 8 are somewhat 
historio-graphical in reviewing those actual events most crucial to the 
birth and life of the GPCC's new commitment to social action. However, 
it is necessary to examine the "raw ll historical 'evidence before interpre­
ting it in terms of the hypothesis. The evidence presented attempts to 
expose the dialectic tension between the conservative and liberal forces 
within the GPCC, and thereby throw more sociological light upon the 
organization's radical transformation. In the later chapters, I propose 
that enough evidence focuses on II soc ial insu1ation" to interpret it as 
the theoretical means by which the GPCC neutralized the conservatives' 
1 j 
l 

I 

I' 

I 

I 

1 

1 

I 

I 

I 

II 

CHAPTER V 
STIFLED REACTION IN THE FIRST 
COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM 
This chapter deals· directly with two major controversiei which 
developed in the original C-CAP in Albina. The first dispute was over 
C-CAP's 1968 Black Summer Crisis program. 'The second was the conserva­
tives· strong cri·ticism of the over-expenditure of funds' for. the Black 
Summer Crisis and 'the failure of their big funding campaign ~hich 
shortly followed, the IIGenesis Campaign." The chapter's purpose is to 
document both sides of the conservative--liberal interaction, which was 
I . 
represented in the two controversies. The question constantly asked 
\ 
here is: What was the quality and degree of the conservative reaction 
that C-CAp·s activities stimulated, and how did the reaction affect their 
Community Action Program? 
After Paul Schulze moved his family into tfie Albina area, he began 
to talk with as many black people as he was able to contact, especially 
all kinds of organizational and community lead~rs. Of course, the black 
... "" . - ­
- . churches, as'well as. the area's white congregations, were his primary 
contacts, at first. Schulze operated out of an Albina realtor's office, 
and used his phone for the first six months. Even though Schulze asked 
the local churches' cooperation) generally the black .clergymen gave him 
and his project a cool receptio·n·.. -They we're being. threatened by an "out­
side" organization; a "white" organization, i.e., an organization the 
I 
I 
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blacks could not control. Schulze arranged several meetings with local 
church leaders to make contact and interest laymen. Two of my respondents 
told of how the black pastors responded ~o Schulze's presence by working 
harder than ever to develop their own kinds of evangelistic efforts to 
reach out into their own black constituency. 
As mentioned before, there was already something of a base of sup­
port established in this community: the Albina Community Concerns 
. Council. However; it was first organized by a white Baptist clergyman, 
I 
i 
and the group never did succeed in enlisting a popular support of black 
people, let alone ,black clergy. There were two or three black people whoI attended somewhat regularly, but by this time the group had met for two 
years without resulting in any kind of community actions. The main,, 
I 	 black pastor, T. X. Graham, who had taken a leading part 1n the "Commis­
sian," had recently been transferred to another. town by his A.M.E. ChurchI
. 
body_ This ad hoc IlCommission" was dwindling; yet~ the small group had; 
I been in on the planning of the "N.E. Project" with the GPeC from'the 
beginning. 'The new Project was achieving their 'goals anyway, so they 
I 
I were loyal and helpful to' Schulze. It was out of this group that Schulze 
I 
was able to obtain several people to begin a II steering committee ll forI their IIChurch-Community Action Program, II as Schul'ze then renamed it. 
Schulze and others reiterated that the "how" 
, 
of the new program wasI 	 . left completely up ·to ·Schulze ..There .~I/as no. precedent or known program 
I to follow for a church-backed social action effort. However, the GPee 
.and Schulze agreed upon some basic goals. First and most basically,I 
the black people of Albina had no access to a platform from which they 
1 could speak and be taken seriously by the power structures of their own 
1 
I 
. 
I 	 immediate (Albina area) community, city or state. C-CAP was to provide 
! 
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this platform. The program was ultimately to be the black people's own 
program. Secondly and more practically, Schulze was to begin by identi­
fying the more specific problems of the black community which could be 
dealt with by their kind of social action effort. Thirdly, Schulze was 
to enlist black individuals and churches into their project and give them 
a responsible part. Finally, Schulze was to organize some specific social 
action actions. 
In dealing 'with the final goal, Schulze lost no time in recruiting 
help from the black neighborhood. Many respondents commented on Schulze's 
ability to identjfy with the black people, to understand them, to win 
their confidence,·and most of all, to recruit able black people to work 
in his program. The first person Schulze recruited into the C-CAP work 
was a black woman, who worked at a menial job at the nearby hospital, but 
who soon proved to be a very capable teacher and able leader. In the Fall 
of 1964, with the help of the same woman, Mrs. Jessie Varner, Schulze 
started a pre-school program, free of charge, ;n a black Episcopal church 
basement. Soon their program was expanded to f;'ll the education rooms of 
two other local black churches, a Methodist and a Baptist church. The 
program continued for two years. The second year, some federal authori­
ties learned of their pre-school program, and asked Mrs. Varner to 
demonstrate their methods to teachers and the school board members. The 
federal education program wanted to begin a model Head Start Program in 
Oregon, and saw th'j s C-CAP pre-schoo 1 .program as a ready-made effort. 
Consequently, their pre-school program was then taken over by ~he Head 
Start program. 
About this same time in 1966, Mrs. Varner and Schulze decided to 
start a school for retarded children of low income families in the Albina 
.1 
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area. The C-CAP staff 'noted that many Albina low income families with 
retarded children had no access to training for their children. Mrs. 
Varner said that three and four college age Vista Volunteers worked for 
two full years with C-CAP's pre-school and school for the retarded. 
The C-CAP Children's School (for retarded) still operates with some 
trained teachers and a professional: director in the basement of the 
Highes Memorial Methodist Church in Albina. 
For the first six months of her time with C-CAP, Mrs. Varner 
volunteered her time freely, but then Schulze hired her as the first 
staff person on C-CAP beside ~imself. Early ~n 1966, Schulze was able 
to get the Portland Juvenile Court to assign one of its black counsel­
orS to work full time with C-CAP in Albina, but his salary was paid by 
the court. The counselor, Mr. Frank Fair, was in his 20's and had a 
college degree. Schulze convinced the court ,that this man should be on 
the streets of Albina as a street worker. Schulze wanted to meet and 
counsel and develop a means of helping the black, "deviant ll youth before 
they were apprehended and taken to court. Mr. Fair worked for three 
months at C-CAP under the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction. C-CAP then 
hired Fair as a full-time staff member to continue the "street ministry," 
which ne had begun: This second C-CAP program, Operation Contact, had 
Mr. Fair on the streets, contacting the black, hard-core, high school 
drop-out youth. Schulze and Fair also devised a constructive side to 
their rehabilitation program with a small monetary profit to the youth. 
The first project was to cut up 'Jogs donated by a local church member, 
and sell this firewood to the local neighborhoods. Later, C-CAP obtained 
use of trucks, etc., for the youth to do local moving jobs and other odd 
jobs. From these jobs the first work-study courses emerged. Three or 
- I 
82 

four capable teachers were obtained, and courses were offered to the 
dropouts each'half-day in basic high school studies: English, math, 
history, etc. Although taught in 'the C-CAP's own store-front facili­
ties, after a few months of operation, the work-study courses were tied 
into the local high school. Some PSU seniors helped teach, and later 
two certified teachers from Jefferson High School were added to the 
staff. Full high school credit was given to the courses. The Operation 
Contact was renamed the Opportunity School, and still functions with 
seven certified teachers, counselors, ind work administrators. Portland' 
School District No.1 now partially supports this specialized school at 
$20,000 per year. Most of their' courses, are now accredited high school 
courses, and it is a regular occurrence for Opportunity School (dropout) 
students to move back into one of the local high schools. 
In the Summer of 1965, C-CAP staff members' recalled that they had 
been aware of a growing, outspoken dissatisfaction in Albina. During 
·this time, the black people were being especially affected by the lack 
of jobs due to the mild economic recession. With the summer came the 
'extra free time without employment for black 'teenagers. Large numbers 
of these young people, as well as white teenagers, gathered in bunches 
on the streets and around hamburger stands. The city police were also 
becoming increasingly uneasy. What appeared to amplify the tension 
was'the news of the' riots in other la~ge cities, Detroit (1967), and 
Newark (1967). The-Watts riots were in 1965. 
Schulze's awareness of the blacks' economic situation motivated him 
to speak with many black business men and leaders. Schulze became the 
prime organizer of the Albina Citizens' Committee, which appealed for 
a federally funded Ti tl e Four IIWa r on Povertyll program for A 1 bi na. The 
. ! 
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government made the grant to them, and out of this local Citizens' Commit­
tee came the administrative leaders for.their own new agency. Scbulze 
and C-CAP had aided their Albina community's people to come up with 
their own leaders and speak for themselves. 
In the following Summer of 1966, the same economic and social ten­
sion remained in Albtna. In response to this situation, the C-CAP staff 
planned and organized a series. of weekly summer dances on the I'black­
top" of Irving Park. The dances were free and accompanied by live, 
black bands in a park which is central to the Albina area. The dances 
attracted large crowds, but were peaceful ,and considered successful in 
providing a social and emotional outlet for the black youth. Both black 
and white observers.who were our respondents agreed that these dances 
helped to defuse the situation that summer. 
For C-CAP, however, there was a nega~ive reaction. The black 
churches were critical of C-CAP for sponsoring the Irving Park dances. 
Because most of the local black churches are fundamentalistic and there­
fore very conservative, the black pastors could not understand how a 
church-supported organization such as C-CAP could sponsor public dances. 
The Irving Park dances confirmed the alienation of the black churches 
from C-:-CAP. 
E~er sin~~ ~~~ulze h~d Dired Frank Fair to 'be a permanent staff ' 
member, the local black pastors were very critical of the fact that Mr. 
Fair was not a church member. They pointed out to Schulze that this 
person's non-church status demonstrated the· further fact that C-CAP was 
not really a IIchurch centered ll program. These conservative churchmen 
said that Mr. Fair's work with the black youth would not be helpful to 
the youth in ultimately bringing them back to the churches. The C-CAPrs 
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staff workers should be church oriented if any of their programs were to 
be supported by the black churches. The black churchmen felt that the 
C-CAP goals were not the same as their II spiritual U church goals, but 
purely social and economic goals. 
To offset this criticism and to begin to restore some grass-roots 
support of C-CAP, Schulze -looked for and found a man who was a strong 
churchman, yet interested in working on the streets with youth and people 
outside of the churches. He hired Sam Johnson, who was in his 30 l s and 
the pastor of a small, black fundamentalist church. Johnson was working 
full time then as part of the Urban League staff in Albina, and he took 
care of his pastoral duties in his spare time. With his previous experi­
ence in the Urban League work, Johnson was hired to assist Frank Fair in 
the same programs in which Fair was involved: "the street ministry,U 
counseling, Opportunity School, job placement, etc. The following spring, 
Johnson went out to attend a session of the Urban Training School of 
Chicago. Wh~ri he returned at the beginning of the summer, all of the 
positions at the Opportunity School and C-CAP were filled. He soon 
found a job with the white Highland United Church of Christ, which hired 
him to conduct a summer recreation program that would be especially 
directed to reach the black youth in the area. Since this congregation's 
.' 
white pastor had recently left, the congregation hired Mr. Johnson 
temporarily to fill .the pulpit. Johnson set up both a recreational and 
educational program, geared to the lower income, unchurched children. 
It attracted a large number of children, both black and white, throughout 
the summer. The congregation decided they would like to continue the 
program through the rest of the year._ Johnson asked C-CAP and the GPCC 
for financial help. The GPeC a'llocated funds, ahd Johnson's continuing 
......I 
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program of education and recreation was renamed the Highland Center. So 
the Center then became part of the C-CAP program. Shortly thereafter, 
the congregation called Johnson to be their permanent pastor. 
In the next couple of years, Johnson expanded the Highland Center's 
program to'include adult education. Out of the sewing classes has come 
a small garment industry, now named "Highland Fashion Enterprises, Inc." 
The nationally known, locally based Jantzen Co. has given several of 
their large, reconditioned industrial sewing machines to the ne~ garment 
" 
company. Some of the city's large, downtown department stores market 
the young company's garments; the company has gro~n enough to rent its 
own building. Another small company, Highland Center Industries, was 
formed to sub-contract the packaging of specialized electronic equipment 
for another large, local company, Tektronics, Inc. The Highland Center 
Industries employs seven men and women, and rents its own separate 
building. On a different level, the Highland Center has maintained a 
large house with "foster parents" for boys under 18, who are delinquent 
or wards of the court. By 1972 eight youth had completed their proba­
tion ("rehabilitation") through the Highland Boys' Home, and regularly 
there are about six who are in residence. In a parallel work under the 
Center's administration, a second home for 18 to ?2 year olds now 
operates on a completely self-sufficient basis. It is called the Highland 
Young Menls Home, and its residents are in job retraining or school. The 
Highland Center's widely varied program now provides some strongly 
established social actions for the Albina black people. 
In 1966 the Executive Secretary of the GPeC spent the summer tour­
ing Europe and the Holy Land. During this time, Schulze, in consultation 
with Robert Menzel, a college instructor and clergyman, laid the plans 
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for two II spin-off" CAP programs in different geogr~phical parts of the 
city. They were later organized and called East-CAP and Hub-CAP. When 
the GPCC ExecU,ti ve, Dr. ~Ji 11 i am Cate, returned to the ci ty, he hea rti ly 
approved of the plans for the new action programs under the GPeC, and 
he promised to support the work to organize them through the GPCC. 
Schulze helped the local churches in each of the two areas get t~eir 
steering committees working and helped organize the two new CAP's. 
Following, in agreement with C-CAP, each of the two new CApis purchased 
some of Schulze's time, and he split his time three ,ways, directing the 
two new CAP's in their first months of programing. In the next couple 
of years, more church-CAP's were added, under the GPCC's guidance. Now 
there are seven CAP's in the larger city area, started under the GPCC. 
On January 1,1968, the Portland City Council hired Paul Schulze 
to be the first director of Portland's new, federally funded Model 
Cities Program. Since Schulze had been splitting his time with some 
other CAP's, the black C-CAP staff members were given partial administra­
tive responsibi1ities. With Schulze's recommendation, the GPCC's Board 
of Directors chose Mrs. Jessie Varner to be the new C-CAP director. 
C-CAP had its first black leader. (With the difficulties in America's 
predominance of matriarchial black families, this decision portended 
.. 
some later problems.) Then two months 1ater, the GPCCls Board hired 
Mr. Robert Nelson to be Mrs. Varner1s assistant. Mrs. Varner said she 
soon found out that Mr. Nelson's salary was $300 a month more than hers, 
even though Nelson was her Jl ass istant. 1I She said she never mentioned it 
to Dr. Cate, nor to anyone at the GPeC, but she always understood the 
implications. A white person was needed to watch over the real problems 
of C-CAP's administration. After Mrs. Varner resigned a year later, 
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neither C-CAP nor the GPCC was able to recruit a male, black director for 
C-CAP. Mr., Ne 1son became the IIi nteri m di rector Jl after Mrs. Varner 
resigned in February, 1969, and he still holds that post. Although Mr. 
Nelson is white, he is strongly committed to the black people, to under­
stand their culture, to work for them, but, as he say~, "not be paternal­
istic. 1I Ironically, Mr. Nelson was a real estate dealer in Albina, but 
he was also one of the original members of the IIAlbina Community Concerns 
Council II and the original C-CAP Board of Directors. 
On April 4,. 1968, Martin Luther King was assassinated. This event 
was the trigger to set in motion the GPCC and C-CAP to attempt a special 
summer program for Albina's black people. William Cate, head of the 
GPCC, was strongly convinced that King's assassination would likely 
precipitate some violent black reactions in Portland. On the other 
hand, Cate also saw the effect of King's violent death as the opportunity 
to capitalize on building an energetic C-CAP summer program for Albina. 
The GPCC leaders sensed there was a lot of IIwhite. guiltll in the wake of 
King's assassinat;'on, and therein might be enough momentum to motivate 
a large funding campaign for C-CAP's special summer work, if not for the 
whole GPCC's budget. 
'The proposed Albina summer program was tabbed the IIBlack Summer 
Crisis!l program. Cate and the C-CAP staff decid~d they should have a 
special leader for the Crisis program, who would be able to communicate 
with the more militant and revolutionary blacks. Mr. Colden Brown, 
originally from New York and then a student at Reed College, was known 
to be a mild revolutionary. Mr. Brown had given some lectures at the 
C-CAP Opportunity School, and Schulze and Cate felt that Brown was an 
unusually capable leader, but moderate enough to lead their propo~ed 
~ 
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program. Brown consented to take the ,job, but Scholze and Cate had to 
make more than one persuasive presentation on Brown's behalf before the 
GPCC's Board approved Mr. Brown as the special director of the Black 
Summer Crisis. Brown was hired that spring. 
In the following months, an extensive campaign of speakers from 
C-CAP and the GPCC, 1ed by Cate, Schul ze, and Brown, went to all the com­ ' 
munity organizations and churches which would listen to their pleas for 
the "Summer Crisis ll funds. One respondent described Brown as a master 
1 
at building fear and apprehension in his white audiences and then reassur­
, i 
ing them he would be able ,to handle the "Black Crisis.1I On one day 
during that campaign, Brown and some cohorts walked through the downtown 
and college area park blocks with guns on their shoulders. Brown 
succeeded in making the white "establishment!! uneasy, and, in effect, 
stimulated awareness of the "crisis ll and the need for a IIBlack Crisis" 
program. Brown was an excellent speaker, and his efforts,obtained cash 
gifts. In the n~xt few months, about $48,000 poured into the GPCC·s 
Black Summer Crisis fund from churches, individuals, businesses and 
groups. The national publicity of King's assassination and the sympathe­
tic feelings, throughout the country had, in a way, "paid off." 
That Summer of 1968, the IIprogram" which Colden Brown conducted 
for the_ Black Summer Crisis was not well coordinated, but a loosely 
related series of Glasses and black cultural demonstrations and enter­
tainment. One young black junior high school teacher, Paul Dixon, did 
not like Colden Brown and what appeared to him as Brown's arrogance. 
However, after working on the Crisis program with Brown, Dixon said, III 
found out I was black." Dixon came to respect his own black cultural 
heritage. Dixon was thus motivated to teach a summer-long course on 
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handicraft and its black cultural roots to. grade schoolers·in the Iris 
Court housing development. Also a recognized local black artist, Issac 
(Allen) Nomo, taught some adult art classes. Many other black'culture 
courses were taught, which included b1ack hi~tory, literature, art,and 
accomplishments in science. Two day long "Black Festivals" during the 
summer presented plays, art and dances, and attracted much of the Albina 
community. Mrs. Varner, then head of C-CAP, said that before then the 
black people of Albina had not even talked about being black, nor wanted 
to be black. It was just not discussed, because the assumption was that 
trying to be IIv/hite ll was better. Mrs. Varner said, "Colden Brown at 
least taught us to begin having some self-respect. 1I 
As far as the GPCC was concerned, the result of the Black Summer 
in Albina was a different story. Although he worked out of the C-CAP 
office, Colden Brown soon found out that the purse strings to C-CAP and 
the Black Summer Crisis were held by William Cate at the GPCCls office. 
So whenever Brown wanted to add on another member to the Summer Crisis 
staff, rent a'building, purchase more materials; etc., Brown would drive' 
across the river. to the GPCC office a.nd obtain the money from Cate. 
Mrs. Varner commented that Brown built the paid staff for the Black 
Crisis program into fifteen people, besides the regular C-CAP staff. 
." 
Several other respondents confirmed this fact. By the end of the summer, 
most of the $48,000 given to the GPCC in earlier months had been expended 
by the Summer Crisis program. By that winter (January, 1969) most of . 
\ 
the money in the overall joint CApls accounts was exhausted. Conse­
quently, the GPCC's Board of Directors became angry at C-CAP in Albina 
for its wholesale use of, what many Board members considered, a nice 
nest egg. Several respondents, both inside and outside Albina, said that 
j 
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the GPCC was disturbed because they thought Colden Brown1s Summer Crisis. 
and its lavish spending had not accomplished any significant goals. The 
stated purpose of the Crisis program, when sold to the GPCC~ churches, 
etc., was to avert "trouble and violence" in Albina~ The Crisis program 
was to keep the black community 'Icool. 'I The result was successful by 
this standard. There had not been the slightest black provocation of 
incidents, nor ·violence. Yet, many church people felt that there was a 
gross misuse of funds~ because they could not see anything accomplished 
at the end of the summer. Some (white) people in the GPCC Board openly 
doubted if there really had been any threat of black militancy or 
trouble. Other respondents have said that Col~en Brown1s program may 
have succeeded IItoo well. 1I 
The further reaction in the GPCC's Board of Directors resulted in 
its vigorous demands for a more concise and consistent accounting of the 
joint CApis money each month--and how each CAP spends its ,money. In 
retaliation at the following GPCC Board meeting, Mr. Nelson, then interim 
director of C-CAP, got up and asked if the GPCC was now going to Hrunll 
C-CAP. Following this experience, the GPCC's Board soon decided to 
devise a whole new method of allocating and spending funds given and 
designated for the different CAP's programs. 
Certainly this was a documentable internal Ureactionll to the 
C-CAP "Summer Crisis" effort for the people of Albina, and indirectly, for 
the people of Portland. However, this limited reaction to C-CAPls use of 
finances was not a conservative negativism against the social actions 
program, ~~. There is inconclusive evidence in five of the respond­
ents' statements, who were, or still are, on the GPCC's Board, that they 
have some real misgivings about the validity of C-CAP's social actions 
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for the black people in Albina. Out of 24 respondents who were actual 
GPCC Board members, however, only two ,respondents outwardly stated such 
misgivings. Apparently the GPCC's real criticism was directed at 
C-CAPts liperal use of funds, not at its over-zealous social action 
efforts. Many (eight) respondents of the GPCC Board mentioned this 
concern about the glibness of the printed--and lack of printed-­
financial reports for the CAP's fiscal accounting at the GPCe's regular 
Board meetings. Several respondents openly questioned Caters extremely 
free use of the money allowed Summer Crisis programs at C-CAP and Hub­
CAP. Yet, they hastened to say, they did not question or imply Catets 
own use, or misuse, of funds. 
An Analysis of C-CAP Activities 
In the foregoing pages, some of the major C-CAP activities in the 
Alblna area are recounted. There were some conservative reverberations 
throughout the, ci ty in response to these Ilchurch sponsored" acti on pro­
grams, but the unexpected result of the more daring programs was a 
mi ni rna 1 amo.unt of reacti on from the GPCC I S member churches thems,e1 ves. 
The efforts of Paul Schulze and his black staff members were IIliberal ll 
in that the C-CAP programs were not designed to' uphold white, middle­
.­
class, or Protestant ethic values. 
An important a~pect of the C-CAP educational programs and job find­
i ng servi ce was its effort to prov; de these servi ces "free 1I of cha rge to 
the Albina people. One pastor, who had been an officer of the GPCCls 
Board, but had dropped out of the GPCC membership, complained about· 
Schulze's appearance 
. 
at the church-sponsored hospital, which lies within
. ~ ~, 
the black Albina area. Schulze had come to the 'hospital IS governing 
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board meeting in 1967 to "demand ll that the hospital hire forty black 
people as a fair representative proportion of their working force. The 
pastor referred to the former C-CAP leader as a urabble rouser" for 
acting in this and other offensive manners. The respondent did not 
like a church-sponsored organization placing economic pressures upon. 
I 
Iany part of society, let alone a church-sponsored hospital. The same 
pastor also said that black people should be hired on their merits to 
hold a job, "just like everyone else. 1I The pastor was, ther~fore, com... 
plaining-about C-CAP fostering in its black constituency a II something for 
nothing ll attitude. 
Another respondent, who is a business man and still a GPCC Board 
member, criticized the C-CAP program on similar grounds. He said that 
the C-CAP treatment of the black people has often given them too much. 
He sa i d., IIG-CAP and the other CAP t S are di rected toward poverty, and we 
should help these people get jobs. But we shouldn't give,things to them 
free. . Other cultures have family ties, but Negroes don't. They 
don't have self-pride." This respondent thought that the Black Summer 
Crisis program and some of C-CAP's other t1give-awayll projects to the 
blacks had caused a negative reaction -in- the GPCC. He said, IIPaul 
Schulze was and still is out of touch with the GPCC. They (GPCC members)' 
don't want the tired, welfare-style of over-involvement with poverty 
problems. We don't want to keep giving everything free 'to these people." 
Both of the above GPCC respondents have reacted conservatively to 
the C-CAP methods. Their criticism is based on the familiar Protestant 
ethic--laissez faire theme: When everyone has a free and equal chance 
to education and to buy, sell and,own prop~r~y,.. as .opposed t~ ,birth, i.nto 
feudal slavery, then work and the individual industry of each person 
.£.. 
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will lead to the good of all. The.fr~e enterprise system and honest work 
lead to wonderful rewards, as concluded in Ben Franklin's words: "Early 
IIto bed and early to rise/Make a man healthy, wealthy and wise .. 
Two other respondents expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the 
C-CAP work, along with the above two criticisms. Consequently, four out 
of 33 respondents (interviewed up to this point) gave critical or con­
servative reactions to C-CAP. Approximately one-eighth of the inter- . 
viewed sample is not ~ significant amount of conservativism within the 
GPCC itself. 
However, the GPCC did record a definite, specialized, internal 
reaction to the executive leaders' 1I1 av ish ll use of the'special fund of 
about $48,000, collected specifically for the Summer Crisis programs in 
1968. (This reaction is discussed extensively in Chapters 7,and 9.) 
But a few conservative GPCC BO.ard members carried their 'criticisms 
further, saying that the 1968 Summer Crisis had not achieved any 
visible goals at the end of the summer. The leaders' stated goal of 
. . 
the Crisis program was to keep the black community "cool ll (peaceful) in 
the wake of Martin, Luther King's assassination. Cate and other GPCC 
leaders maintained that the Black Summer Crisis had successfully ful-. 
fiiled tts goal of preventing any racially motivated riots with destruc­
tive violence reminiscent of Watts, Detroit.- ,Because of the invisibility 
of accomplishing this goal after the summer was over, the GPeC was not 
able to appreciate in "hind-sight" what the large expenditures for the 
Summer Crisis had purchased. 
The man who had become treasurer of the GPCC during the 'Summer 
Crisis reacted very negatively to the manner in which the GPCC Executive 
Df rector had permi tted C-CAP and the Cri s; s pr'ogram to tap free ly the 
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CAP I S funds. Thi s respondent, the treasurer, is .an insurance executi ve, 
which is reflected in his demand for a precise accounting. He said 
there was no realistic budget submitted by C-CAP, nor by the other 
CApls. But he placed the blame on the Executive Director, as much as . 
on C-CAP, because, he said, the Director had used his complete authority 
to delegate the ,monies without restraint. "The end was used to justify 
the means," he said. Apparently many members of th~ GP~CJs Board were 
uneasy about the vague financial reports given out at meetings during 
thi s, ti me. Several of the respondents menti on'ed thi s fact. The GPCC 
treasurer said that the Board members saw" finally, that C"'CAP had 
greatly over-used its account .during and following the Summer Crisis'. 
He, therefore, thought there was at that time a definite loss of respect 
for C-CAP by many on the GPCC's Board and other groups which give regu­
lar financial support. However, I think'that'the reason the treasurer 
included, monetary givers among those reacting against Summer Crisis 
programs Was due to the fact that at the time I was interviewing the I 
then formey'treasurer, Mr. Lowell Steen, he was looking back at eventsI 
I 
 with the benefit of seeing the failure of the funding campaign, the 

"Genesis Campaign," which had followed in 1969~ If the conclusion of the I 
majority of knowledgeable respondents is rig.ht" the Summer Crisis prog·rams 
.­I and associated events did not have a dominant effect on the failure of 
I that campaign. It was due more to other factors. (See Chapter 9 for 
I further discussion.) 
I From several other respondents who had served on the GPCC Board 
l during the Summer Crisis, they gave evidence of a growing dissatisfaction 
j , , 
specifically with the excessively free use of finances by C-CAP and 
Colden Brown for the Black Summer Crisis projects. Also, it must be 
~----------------~ 
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admitted that although the GPCC hired a professional fund-raising 
company to lead the Genesis Campaign, by the end of 1969, the Campaign 
had gathered pledges and gifts totalling only $46,500 out of an expected 
goal of $250,000. However, since then, executive staff members have 
maintained that the regular, committed supporters of the GPCC--churches, 
denominations, groups, individuals, busfDe~se~J etc.--have continued 
their monetary support, and some had increased their regular giving in 
1969. 
The former treasurer, Lowell Steen, based his judgment that there 
was a definite reaction against the GPCC upon the failure of the Genesis 
Campaign. Yet, only three other respondents gave similar views about. 
the meaning of the Genes; s Campai gn. As the reseal""cher, I was personally 
very anxious to find as IIhard" evidence as pos'sible to support reasons 
on either side of the question--why the funding campaign had failed. Was 
its failure an authentic sign of strong negative reaction against the 
GPCC·s program in the preceding Black Summer Crisis 'and its lIirresponsible lt 
use of money? Eleven respondents, three of them very conservative, gave 
specific, positive answers to my question about the meaning of the Genes'is 
Campaign's failure. They all agreed that its failure was not the result 
of a significant reaction. The, most common answer given was that the 
professional funding company, Campaigns West, had told the leaders of 
the GPCC that the great untapped resevoir of money in the city for the 
GPCC was the large, big businesses, represented in downtown Portland. 
When the results were in, no new large big businesses or compan1es pledged 
any significant amount of money to the' campa1gn. In other words, the 
professional funders had directed the campaign at the wrong clientele, 
and they were unacquainted with the realities of church giving, according 
~----------------------~------------------_/ 
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to the same respondents. (Immediately following this campaign, the fund­
ing company collapsed, declaring bankruptcy. At the same time, the 
company accused the GPCC of refusing to reimburse it adequately for 
services rendered, and sued the GPCC. Later, a compromise settlement 
for a small amount of money was made out of court.) Along with this 
reason, the same respondents- described the professional funding company 
as having done a very minimal job of organizing the campaign, "expecting 
the printing of the one brochure of pr9paganda about the GPCC's good 
social services to work magic among the business people" (prospective 
givers). Other reasons given for the non-reaction theory about lack of 
contributions include: the special funding, campaign (for same essential 
purpose) of the previous summer had preceded too closely to the Genesis 
Campaign, and the recent economic recession had cut the margin of 
gratuities from downtown businesses. 
In both the disputes about the Black Summer Crisis program itself 
"and the financial criticisms associated wlth the over-spending for the 
Crisis program together with failure of- the Genesis funding campaign, 
the overall conservative reaction recorded from the interviewees was 
very minimal. Three points stand out: (1, Although several respondents 
were articulate in their strong criticisms of the C-CAP program, especi­
ally the Black Summer Crisis, the majority (66 percent) were quite 
complimentary of the C-CAP's total effort. (2). There was a relatively 
small proportion of respondents (20 percent) who reacted negatively to 
C-CAP's excessive use of finances for the Crisis program. (3) The ques­
tion arises more' sharply: Why is there a minimal conservative reaction 
over these unusually controversial activites in the GPCC?· 
i 
i' 
I 
! 
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CHAPTER VI ' 
A ONE MAN REACTION 
Early in 1965 'a lay member of the Board of Di rectors became very 
unhappy with the GPCC's liberal policies' and how they were arrived, at. 
Soon he made two proposals for serious changes, specifically directed" 
at cancelling new policies and practices of the GPCe's leaders. First, 
he cha11 enged the very val i di ty of the; r soci ali nvo1vement pol i ci es. 
Second, he challenged the organizational methods used to obtain contro­
versial policy decisions. As described below, this challenge was concen­
trated in the vigor and influence of one man. Considering the general 
acceptance of the leaders' increasing liberal changes in the organization, 
why was one mp,n able to lead such a significant conservative rebellion' 
against th~ ne\'( val ues and practices? More important, 'why was this 
religious group rejecting traditional conservative values? On the first 
point, the events reveal that the essential nature of the lI el ec ted" 
Board of Directors and its' 'officers' was cast ·into a'-rlberal maJo'rfty by 
1965. The second part of the events demonstrates that the leaders used 
an oligarchic method to by-pass notmal procedures for policy ,decision 
making. However, we find'the liberal leaders do overcome this aggressive 
conservative challenge, initiated from within by members of the organi­
'zation. Because it firmly determined the libe~al course of the GPCC's 
future, the successful defeat of the pri mary part of, ,the conservati ve 
cha11 enges was an- enormous, turn; ng poi nt for· the 'GPCC.'· The·1 i,bera1 '. ' ..... H ,,' 
leaders won the essential part of the overall battle. 
J_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Paul Schul ze called it a none man tour de force. II The series of ­
events which led to this "showdown" revolved around a -'powerful ~ 
Presbyterian layman, Mr. Robert Pamplin. He is the executive president 
and chairman of the board of the Georgia-Pacific Co., one of the largest 
iumber and paper companies in the United States. Gate knew of Pamplin's 
conservative leaning', but'-did not -re-attze hbW ·strorY~rh;s religious can'" 
servativism was. Cate told how Pamplin was invited to become active in 
the GPCC. Paul Wright, Pamplin's pastor at the prestigious, downtown 
First Presbyterian Church, together with Cate went to see Pamplin in 1963 
to ask him to head a financing campaign for the proposed Int~r-Church 
Center building. Their plans for the building were not small. It would 
house offi ces for the GPCC, the Oregon Counci 1 of Ch·urches, rentable 
office space to several other church groups, various sized meeting rooms, 
visual aids rooms, etc. Pamplin consented to be chairman of the building 
campaign. For his work, Cate heaped praises upon Pamplin.' Cate said~ 
IIWe knew of his unusual executive ability, and he certainly exhibited it 
during that campaign. With typical efficie-ncy, t~r. Pamplin carried out 
the job with great dispatch. 1I He also contributed a large sum of his 
own money to the new building, and now the building's largest meeting room 
carries"his name, The Pamplin Room. The next year Pamplin was elected to 
the-GPC-C's Board of-D;-rectbrs.--' - ­
Early in, 1965 during_Oregan,s biennual legislative session, the 
1 egi s 1 a ture was cons i der; ng a b.i 11 to remove cap; ta1 puni shmen t from the 
state's penal code. The GPeC's Social ,Concerns Commission prepared a 
strong IIposition paper ll against the death penalty and in support of the 
bill. Without sending it to the Board of Dir-ectors, it was adopted as 
GPCC policy by the Executive Committee. Stating this GPCC position, 
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letters were sent and Social Concerns Committee members actively lobbied 
members of the legislature at the state house for passage of the bill. 
When Pamplin found out how the posi.tion paper was established as policy 
for the whole GPCC by action of the small Executive Committee, he became 
very upset. 
The legislature did pass the bill to repeal-capital p~nishment 
that year, and the GPCC received a good share of the credit for its 
passage. Robert Pamplin, however, was unalterably opposed to the GPCe 
.having anything to do with the passage or defeat of this, or any, legis­
lative bill. 
Shortly thereafter, another bill was introduced in the legislature 
that would increase the quality of education in those· public schools 
situated in depressed and poverty areas. Its purpose was to rectify 
the racial, as well as economic, inequities steadilY multiplying in 
Portland. Portland's Superintendent of Schools, Dr. Barnes, had chaired 
the committee which drew up the bill, recommending over one million 
dollars fO~ enactment of the "compensatory" education. Although the 
GPCe's Social Concerns Committee agreed that the bill, HB 1.307, was good 
in its intent, it was much too soft on racial equality in cultural edu­
cation--music, art,. drama, etc. The bill plainly did not have any safe­
.' 
guard to provide "equal" educational opportunities for black children. 
The bill did not go far enough. It could easily circumv-ent the inequ;-· 
ties to the black children. The GPeC's group felt.that·HB 1307 did not 
, live up to the guidelines set down in the previous year's extensive 
study on equal education in Portland. A special committee, appointed by 
Multnomah School District No. 1 (Portland)~ and chaired by Judge Herbert 
Schwab, specifically reported that Portland'.S black and white children 
j 
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living in the poorer areas were receiving the use of inferior educa­
tional facilities and inferior education generally. The "Schwab Report" 
strongly recommended that children in the depressed areas have the' 
quality of their education raised to be equal with that of the suburban 
schools. More specifically, the Report outlines some new, effective 
desegregation policies to be implemented in Portland schools to insure 
equal educational ,opportunities. ,When the Schwab Report was revealed 
the year before" the GPCe had hi ghly endorsed it. 
The Social Concerns Committee again chose the same route to 
obtain support for its recommendation that the GPCC be opposed to 
HB 1307's insufficient "equal" education. Instead of submitting their 
recommendation to the Board of D-irectors to'oppose HB 1307, the Social 
Concerns Committee gave it to the Executive Committee, which quickly 
adopted it--on behalf of the GPCC. The Executive Committee's adoption 
also included that GPeC members would actively lobby the legislature 
against the bill. 
Pamplin told this researcher that he received a phone call from a 
legislator at that time. The legislator had received a letter from the 
GPCC,- with Pamplin's name on the letterhead as a GPCC Board member. The 
legislator wanted to know if Pamplin'supported th~ letter's criticism of 
. the inequities in HB 1307 1 s compensatory education. Since the GPCets 
Board'had never made any policy decisi.ons a~out the-bill, and especially 
because he, himself, did not ~elie.ve the GPeC .should he involved with 
trying to. influence· the passage of the bill one way or the other, he 
became incensed about the issue. Pamplin then began a campaign in ,the 
GPeers Board of Directors against the Executive Committee's policy deci ... 
sian about the bill, and he also attacked the very right of th~ Executive 
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Committee to speak for the GP~C without the Board's own consideration .. 
and vote on an issue. In this first round, Pamplin won. On March 10~ 

1965, the Board voted to reverse the Executive Committee1s decision, 

and not oppose HB 1307. 
The center of this dispute over HB 1307 climaxed at a special 

meeting of the Board of Directors, which Cate called at the requ'est of 

Robert Bonthius, Social Concerns Commission chairman. Pamplin said that 

he received a phoned message in the morning, notifying him of the 

special meeting to reconsider HB 1307 that same evening at the' African 

Methodist Episcopal Church in Albina. Pamplin said that he thought that 

"something was Upll for this hastily called meeting, so he 'broke his 

appointment for the evening to attend the special Board meeting. He 
also immediately phoned Dr. Melvin Barnes, Portland Superintendent of. 
Schools, and Dr. Martha Shaull, a city school administrator,. to be 
present at the meeting to defend the bill as written. As he expected, 
Pamplin conti"nued, the special meeting was packed with black "preachers ll 
and others against the bill, whom Bonthius had invited. 
According to Father Robert Greenfield, Oxonian Ph.D., several 
clergy spoke very harshly against the arguments of Pamplin and others 
supporting the bill as it stood. However, he .said, the Rev. John Jackson, 
. . 
a black, pastor, gave a rational and very -effective·speech against the 

bill. Greenfield added, liThe tension (at tt,1e meeting) became terrific. 

Most of the oppositiqn tuned .out Pamplin and his guests." Similarly, 

. Pamplin said that both the black and white clergy acted badly, and did 
not want to listen to their arguments. The main issue boiled down to 
whether there should be funds for busing of students, both black and 
\vhi te, to make for "equa1 educati on II in th is Mode 1 School program. The 
d:J­
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black pastors' position was that HB 1307 was only tokenism, and it was 
better not to have the bill at all unless real steps were taken toward 
desegregation in the schools. Greenfield said that he was for the bill, 
because the legislature was then anti-education anyway. He wanted to 
get what they could as a beginning effort to help the disadvantaged 
schools. Greenfield felt it was Ita foot in the door" for more educa­
tional benefits for the disadvantaged later on. 
The vote by the Board members at the end of the meeting was close, 
'but Bonthius and his Commission had swung enough votes to reverse again 
the previous decision of the Board. This time, however, they voted to, 
work for the amendment of the bill, trying to keep the funding intact for 
th~ disadvantaged area schools. They voted to lobby ,for three kinds of 
provisions for more equal education (instead of "compensatoryll education): 
(1) busing of black children from schools where blacks outnumbered whites 
by more than 50 percent to ,other scho01s, (2) the exchange of teachers, 
especially for cultural typ'e of courses (music, art, etc.), \'Ihich were 
not offered in the populated black schools, and (3) the changing of school 
boundaries to reduce the black student concentrations. 
Clay Myers was on the GPCC Board, and present at the meeting at the 
AME Church in Albina that evening. He told the writer that he and other 
Board and staff members personally and quietly began to contact legis1a­
tors, urging them to inc1ude in HB 1307 several provisions (suggested at 
" 
that heated Board meeting) which would insure gr~ater equality of public 
education--busing of children for special courses at other schools, 
exchange or adding on specialized instructors, and the changing of school 
boundaries. When HB 1307 was passed in May, it included the fir'st two\, provisions, along with implementing funds of $1,750,000 over the following 
'/l---~---------~------
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two years. 
The action of the Board and the amendments of HB 1307 were a double 
defeat for Pamplin. However, he soon was mounting a broad attack upon 
the' whole general policy of the GPCC's direct involvement with secular 
society, politics and business. Pamplin criticized the undemocratic 
method of the Social Ooncerns Commission in its by-passing the Boar-d of 
- - , ~ - ... 
Directors to get quick "rubber stamp" decisions fram the exclusive 
Executive Committee. He said that no policy statements or position 
papers should be issued in the name of the GPCC without the consideration 
and vote of the full Board of Directors. Policy statements should not 
come out of hastily called, unrepresentative meetings. 
The second prong to Pamplin's attack was the fundamental propriety 
of the GPCC's involvement with the secular, socio-political world. 
Pamplin's heritage was in the southern Presbyterian Church--in the, funda­
mentalist tradition of the church's southern, conservative wing. Pamplin 
.told the writer that neither a clergyman nor anyone else who claims to 
speak for a church organization has the right to take a position before 
the public on political, or any secular issues, because those fields are 
outside of the church's spiritual competency. "Churches," he said, 
"should c:mly speak to those issues which are clear1y spiritual or moral 
problems. Clergymen are not competent in the specialized responsibili­
tie~_of government. II When the GPCC was trying directly to influence the 
legislature, it was, to Pamplin, a violation of the principle of separa­
tion between church and state. In a formal proposal to the Board of 
Directors, Pamplin asked that: (1) no policy statements be made in, the 
name of the GPCC without a fully representative meeting of the Board of 
Directors; (2) the GPCC remove itself from all social and political issues, 
~--------~------------------~-----------------------------------/ 
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I except in clear religious and moral problems. 
\ Because Pamplin is such a powerful person, his proposal represented 
I a major challenge to the social action goals toward which the new leader­
ship was turning the GPCC. To make an independent study -of both points 
in Pamplin's proposal, the Board of Directors appointed a special blue 
ribbon committee, as Cate referred to it. It consisted of about ten out-­
standing local laymen and clergy, chaired by Clay Myers, presently 
Oregon's Secretary of State. 
Early in the legislative session that year, 1965, Pamplin and a few 
other church laymen, whom I have been unable to identify,' had already 
_begun vocally to criticize the GPCC's Social Concerns Committee's lobby­
ing activities at the State Legislature concerning other current legisla­
tion. In defense, the Social Concerns Committee, -led by BODthius, mimeo-. 
graphed a five page, carefully worded defense .of the principles upon 
which the Church and GPCC carried on its activities toward the legisla­
tive ·process. The Study Committee was instructed to examine this state­
ment, as well as all the political and social statements issued by the 
Social Concerns Committee. It was to look at the whole principle behind 
the GPCC's relationships with social and political life, and then submit 
its recommendations to the GPeC in answer to Pamplin's double proposal. 
After deliberating through the Summer of 1965, the Study Committee 
mailed its one page recommendation to the Board of Directors. On 
September 5, 1965, a public panel debate about the Pamplin proposal and 
the Study Committee1s recommendations was held at the downtown First 
Christian Church. On the platform representing the two sides-of the 
question were Pamplin and two colleagues, opposed by Bonthius and his 
two colleagues. On September 8, at the Board of Directors' regular meet-' 
~ ~ " I _________....__----------------------------------------~~---------t..-----~----~----~----------------------------r----------------'~ 
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i ng, the Study Comm; ttee I s recommendati ons were adopted in tota1., except 
for changes of a few clarifying words. ConsequentlY;t the Study Commit­
tee and the Board disagreed with Pamplin on what the GPCC's ·leadership 
knew was the crucial issue--whether the GPCC had a II right ti to speak to 
public social issues, or not. The recommendation states that the GPCC 
should "speak to our member churches and to the public about· the 
Christian implications of contemporary social, economic and political 
issues. 11 On Pamplin's second point, the Committee's statement agrees 
that the GPCC's former procedures must be reformed, and lays out four 
specific points of procedure. 
Myers said he thoroughly agreed with Pamplin's second criticism. 
The GPCC's procedure of by-passing the Board and having short notice 
special meetings were methods that did not allow both sides of policy 
questions a fair hearing. It was unrepresentative and undemocratic. 
MYers wanted this practice changed to insure future representative dis­
cussion within the Board. During the Corrmittee's hearings, as chairman, 
Myers said that he made special effort, as· chairman, to have the Commit... 
tee hear people representing both sides--from both within the GPeC and 
from without. Myers did not want the unrepresentative manner in which 
the GPCC had previously developed policies to be repeated by the Study 
.-
Corrunittee..He said, 1180th the 'Pamplins' and the 'Bonthiuses' must be 
heard and not alienated; it was an extremely sensitive thing to decide. u 
After hearing everyone out, .Myers said he told the Committee: liThe Church 
is not going to be what you or I say it is going to be, but it is gqing to 
continue bein~ and acting relevantly to its society The church has 
always spoken to current social issues, and it will continue to speak out. II 
Myers emphasized that his Committee was II substantial1 y ll in favor of the 
.. 
I 
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policy recommendations they submitted to th~ Board. 
When asked about how the GPee responded to his requests for policy 
changes, Pamplin answered, "We reached a compromise on those proposals 
made to the Board. 1I Although the adopted Study Committee report was a 
compromise, the crucial issue at stake--whether the GPee was to be 
directly involved in its own society--was decided favorably on the side 
of the progressives and -against Pamplin. After the Board adopted the 
report, Pamplin attended only one or two meetings, and submitted his 
resignation prior to the annual meeting. Through this series of chal­
lenges, debates and decision, the GPeC affirmed its new, -liberal direction, 
and 'at the same time, eliminated Pamplin's conservative influence from 
within the Board of Directors. 
Robert Pamplin's reaction against th~ GPeC's efforts to influence 
the legislative powers of government apparently is a classic example of 
the conservative opinion held by the "silent majorityll in mainline 
Protestant'churches. Testifying to the majority attitude of present 
church members against their churches' and their leaders' active involve­
ment with socia-political issues are two national polls and several other 
studies, quoted in Chapter 10. What is not typical of Pamplin's reaction 
within. the GPCC is that he reacted overtly almost single handedly. He 
had a relatively small amount of support from within the GPee's Board, . 
and ultimately the Board defeated his most important proposal--to return 
the GPCC to conservative uninvolvement. 
From the Pamplin episode, it appears that the opinion of the 
GPCC's Board members did not coincide with the national majority of-lay 
church members. If this were true of the se1ected Board members here, 
was it also true of the GPeC's member churches and their majority 'of lay 
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members? From the way the Board of Directors finally handled the Pamplin 
challenge"the evidence seems to indicate that the people on this Board 
are untypical in relation to the organization's general membership. If 
this is also true, how to explain the liberal attitude expressed in the 
vote by the Board of Directors? 
, ! 
1 
Knowing the procedures used by the GPCCts leaders to push through 
quick policy decisions, the same leaders may have used oligarchic' methods 
to predetermine somewhat the climate of opininn within the Board. This 
possibility will be further investigated in Chapter 9. 
In the continuing conflict between conservative members and the 
liberal leaders·, efforts to reform the GPec into a socio-political 
activist organization, the liberals demonstrated the ability to overcome 
strong opposition from conservative lay, members with high social status 
and 'economi c power. The 1 i bera 1 s I cruci a 1 vi c'tory (1965) di scussed 
above was undoubtedly the turning point,' which allowed the leaders 
ultimately to 'guide the GPCC into changing its formal statement of pur­
pose ;n the new (1969) constitution to include social action. 
With powerful leadership supplied them by Robert Pamplin, however, 
why were 'the conservatives in the GPCC soundly defeated on this far­
reaching issue? It is more and more evident that the large percentage 
of lay conservatives in the member churches have little influence or com­
munication with the GPeC's policy makers. 
, I 
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CHAPTER VII 
.\ 
HUB-CAP: DOWNTOWN INVOLVEMENT 
AND PUBLIC REACTION 
Hub-CAP's Youth MinistrY-Charix Coffee House worked with runaways 
and those in the drug culture in S.W. downtown Portland. This activity, 
stimulated a greater amount of ~ublic reaction than any other single GPeC 
action program. Yet, there was a relatively.minor· reaction from th~ 
GPeC's own member churches. Since churches tend to .be one 'of the most. 
conservative .groups in society, this 'evidence defies the general social 
pattern. Why.had the GPec's churches reacted so mildly in the face 'of 
strong public reaction? This chapter explores the facts of the dis­
'crepancy. 
Hub-CAP, the second of the GPCC's community action programs to be 
started, had it? real beginning in the initial actlon taken by the strong, 
downtown First Presbyterian Church. In the Spring of 1966, this congre­
gation's Session (Board of Directors) decided they should finally take' 
action to meet the pressing downtown social prob~ems, which they. had dis­
cussed' duri ng many prev; ous meeti ngs. The pastor of the church sai d they 
were motivated by their growing awareness that their o1tJn church should 
be lIinvolved in the mission to the wor'ld immediately around them." Their 
Session called a special meeting of the congregation to consider what and 
how much social action the congregation should take on. They s·tarted the 
meeting by listening to the presentations of several community author;­
ties on the needs of the downtown area. So large were the problems I 
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presented that the congregation decided,that they should begin the tasks, 
but that the social actions needed were too great for one congregation to 
undertake alone. Shortly, the First Presbyterian invited seventeen down­
town congregations, including a Roman Catholic Church, to participate in 
an experimental community action program to the Southwest dowDtown section 
of Portland. 
Of the seventeen churches invited, six congregations joined 
together to take the first steps toward real social action. In order to 
narrow down the important social problems of the inner city within the 
purview of these congregations, and to discover which problems they could 
adequately handle, the congregations started a laymen's volunteer listen­
ing ministry. It was to last six months, after which the cooperating 
churches would decide whether to continue their work. Their "listening,1I 
convinced th~ six churches that there were, indeed, some urgent needs for' 
their social' action, 'as a 'group. The pastor .of First Presbyterian 1isted 
the "needs" they:discovered most demanding: the IIhomeless tl men on skid 
row; many elderly people living in the area, often in poverty; runaway 
children and youth; inadequate child care; inadequate education and inade­
quate recreation for all ages. 
During this time of assessment and IIlistening,1I Paul Wright, the . 
First Presbyterian pastor, constantly consulted with Paul Schulze. Wright 
and Schulze had become close friends sihce the time Schulze'was hired to 
initiate the GPGG's social action project in Albina. Soon after G-CAP 
began, Wright and Schulze began discussing the needs and possibilities of 
a similar GAP in the Southwest downtown area (where Wright's church is). 
Wright said that he had long been convinced of the "soci~l Gospel ll and 
that the cnurches should apply it.' He had been a leader in the GPCC for 
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many years, ~erving as president of the GPCC during the 1950 l s and 1960's. 
Wright was an early backer of the idea that the GPCC should begin a com­
munity action program"in Albina, and was most instrumental in obtaining, 
the, Presbyterians' first grant of $10,000 for C-CAP. 
Although the GPce's Executive Secretary, William Cate, was on an 
extended vacation in Europe during, the Summer of 1966, Schulze was writing 
out plans for more church-CApls possible to operate in other problem areas 
of the city. The downtown churches' initiative for such a CAP in their 
own area provided Schulze and those churches an excellent opportunity to 
coordinate their plans. Many of the respondents who spoke of Schulze con­
curred on one of his many abi·lities as being a udreamer,1t an "originator,1J 
of ideas about methods for churches' social involvement. ,According to 
Schulze's close friend, Robert Menzel, he and Schulze worked out the final 
details in writing (on Schulze's front room cof'fee table) of the organiza­
tion for two new church-CApls during that summer. One was to be the new 
downtown CAP and the ntherwas to be in the old Southeast business dis­
trict. The downtown churches involved agreed that their own social action 
project be under the administrative wing of the GPCC. It was soon called 
Hub-CAP. Upon returning from Europe, William Cate fully supported 
Schulzels plans for the two nevI CApis to be incorporated into the GPCets' 
"sponsorshipll of community action work. The GPCe's Board of Directors 
soon adopted with little opposition the proposal for adding two new CAP's 
to the GPCC. In the Fall of 1966, Robert Menzel was appointed to be the 
head of Hub-CAP, effective June', 1967. At that time, Menzel was an instruc­
tor in a small, private college and a Lutheran clergyman. 
The new Hub-CAP began to develop as an organization with several 
specific programs for its own area. Although Menzel wa~ still teaching, 
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both he and Schulze, Pastor Wright and some interested laymen of. down~own_ 
churches gave much time to help organize the new project. From 1966 
through 1969, Hub-CAP developed a variety of social action services to its, 
own inner city environment: several programs for children, one for elder~ 
ly, one for the' lI~omel ess II men. on ski d row,' a di vorce counsel ing program 
and the best known of all Hub-CAP serv;'ces--the downtown Street ·Youth 
Ministry and the Charix Coffee House for youth. 
Two separate children's programs, called the "After School Program," 
served on two sides of the downtown. Both were designed to reach 
children from the first through the eighth grades. Both programs were 
run almost completely by volunteers from thei-r local church~s. Some of 
the directors have been paid professionals. Handicraft is provided for 
the uoung, and photography, woodwork and cooking are taught to the older 
children. In' 1969 the After Scho01 Program handled 80 children in the 
Terwilliger area and 45 in the Couch area. 
·1 
In 1968 'H~b-CAP set up a four-week summer program 'for the children 
in the same two areas as the After School: Program. It was called liThe 
Best Days of the Week,it and operated each summer through 1972. The same 
low-income family children were being served in this summer program as 
the school time program. It was in 1968 that five Roman Catholic 
parishes joined the GPCC, and so from the beginning of the Best Days of ' 
the Week, Roman Catholic nuns and seminarians have been the directors and 
teachers, along with volunteers. Cla~ses were non-religiously oriented, 
teaching arts and crafts, and'providing recreating and educational field 
trips. 
One of the main Hub-:-CAP concerns since its beginning are the IIhome­
less" men in the Burnside, skid row ar·ea. The "Homeless Menls Committee ll 
.\ 
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has tried to provide a detoxification center, where men can get medical 
assistance as an alternative to a stay in jail. 
In 1969, Hub-CAP began a summer series of meetings for low-income, 
elderly people to aid them in their particularly pressing proolems:, 
recreation, leisure time (boredom), legal aid, medicare, nutrition and 
housing. Hub-CAP called the program "Summer Spokes." Nuns, pastors and 
volunteers planned and carried it out, and the meetings averaged 55 in 
attendance the first year and 95 in 1970. This effort is considered one 
of the more "successfulll so far. 
In past years, Hub-CAP has provided a community service project to 
help people face divorce or separation. It has sponsored an Education 
Action Committee, devoted to the integration of city schools and its 
early implementation. Hub-CAP also has a Housing Committee, which has 
" 
worked as a lobby to the City Council for low-income families and been 
on the Interfaith Housing Commission. 
Most of 'the separate programs under Hub-CAP have changed format 
freqaently. Some have b~en completely disbanded, some drastically 
changed, some merely modified. The reasons were reflected in the extreme 
volunteer nature of these church-CApls: (1) new and unusual problems-­
experi menta1 programi n9 for the drug users; (2) loose orga ni za ti o~a1 
conimi tment by supporti n9 churches to such 1 i bera 1 ness of programi ng; 
(3) uncertainty of financial support; (4) uncertainty of maintaining 
qualified staff in volunteer programing; and (5) the other organizational 
problems that also accompany more conservative volunteer groups. 
In February, 1969, Robert r~enzel, the first full-time dir'ector,of 
Hub-CAP, resigned to teach, at an out-of-state college. Three months 
later, Father Gil Lulay, pastor of the Roman Catholic Downtown Chapel, 
'-iIIIiII 
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was .hired on a h~lf-time basis to coordinate t~e Hub-CAP activities. A 
"staff council II of ~astors from the Hub-CAP churches suppli-ed guidance 
to the individual' Hub-CAP programs. The Roman Catholics-bought t~e old 
Burns; de Hotel, and in November, 1969,. opened it to provi de a 1onge r 
term detoxification center, along with -food and medical help-. Fathe'r 
Gil Lulay directed the Hotel and overall program for the homeless men .. 
Volunteers from the Hub-CAP churches helped the Hotel's program, but-. 
resident men of the Hotel supplied most of the cleaning, laundry work, . 
maintenance and cooking. Hub-CAP churches, individuals and community 
agencies gave financial support to the Hotel's detoxification center. 
In March, 1970, a large, one-room Drop-In Center was opened in. the 
same block as the .Hotel. Essentially, .it provided a place for inen 
temporarily to get inside, off the street and have coffee or milk. It 
was open twenty-four hours a day, and staffed by' some of the more 
I . 
I permanent Burnside Hotel residents. 
In recoun.ti ng the above events and programs whi ch have developed 
in the history of Hub-CAP since 1966; the account has deliberately left 
out the program which held Hub-CAP's center of attention from 1967 
- through 1969. This was the ministry to Portland's alienated youth 
colony. None of the Hub-CAP programs previously discussed here has 
.. 
caused any significant change in the social structures of the community-­
religiously, politically or culturally. None has threatened the estab­
lished community. The one Hub-CAP program that did, however, was the 
Youth Ministry. 
When Hub-CAP began to organize 1n 1966, one of the downtown churches 
which strongly supported the formation of the new CAP, First Congrega­
. tional Church, was already involved in developing a youth style coffee 
..
""'­
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house. In 1966 a Congregational seminary student, John Randledt, was 
employed by F;'rst Congregational Church. The pastor of the congregation 
said that Randledt was hired to develop a coffee house in the basement 
of their church building lito update our congregation's youth ministry .. II 
'That first summer the coffee house was called the "Catacombs. II It, was 
considered successful for the first summer, but the Congregational base­
ment was 'not suited to the purpose and Randledt had gone back to school. 
The Congregational' youth committee asked other downtown churches to 
take part ;n running the new coffee house. A few other churches close 
by, also involved in organizing the new Hub-CAP, accepted the invitationi -- ;I 
The coffee house was moved to the more adequate facilities of the First 
Un; tar; an Church near Portl and, State Universi ty" and renamed the ,lICharix 
House." 
About ~h;s time, Hub-CAP was in its first months of organizational 
life. Robert Menzel was just coming on as the first director of Hub­
CAP. The relationship of the Charix Coffee House, as one part of the 
several Hub-CAP "programs," was one of relative freedom given it by the 
Board of Directors of Hub-CAP, which is made up of representatives 
from Hub-CAP churches. Although concerned about what was going on at I, I 
the Charix in its early stages, the_ GPGC's Youth Commission and Hub-CAP I 
Board'members apparently (according to respondents) saw the need for a j 
certai n amount of freedom of express i on in mus; c,. ski ts, presentations, 
program; ng, etc. Smok,; ng was allowed by youth (j uveni 1es under 18), even 
though against Oregon State Law. Miss Margo Maris was hired as director 
of the Charix and its programing. She was convinced ,that, a.certain 
amount of "openness" to the kinds and conditions of youth who would 
frequent the coffee house was needed, in order to reach those youth who 
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really needed such a place. Menzel was not immediately responsible for 
the Charix, and was then developing the administration of other Hub-CAP 
projects. However, Menzel kept a close eye on the Charix, and was in 
sympathy with Miss Maris' approach to the Charix. 
I 

In February, 1967, the GPCG, through. its Youth Ministry Committee, 

hired a young layman, Mr. Eugene Horn,. to carry 6n a II street ~inistry" 

to youth in the dowr~own ,area, especially around th~. Charix~ .Mr. Horn 

was hired ~eparatel.y rro~ ..t~~ H.ub-CA.P'.? Charix,. and .paid separately by
I the GPCG. He was directly responsible to the GPCCts Youth Ministry Com-
I mittee; however, Horn was instructed to work in conjunction with Hub-CAP 
under Robert Menzel. Horn was to coordinate his work with the Gharix, \ 
and report regularly to Menzel and the Hub-CAP Board.I The GPCG's Youth Ministry Committee had become well aware of the 
growing numb~r of runaway, or "alienated," teenagers hanging out ;n this 
same part of downtown. Horn was directed to make contact with as many 
of the runaways and other youth "dropping out ll of society as. he was able 
to counsel ..and help. Horn rented a street level room for an office near 
the Charix. It became a drop~in place for· runaway juveniles~ varying 
widely in age. Many of the young people were seriously sick. from poor 
food, exposure and-:o-sometimes--drugs. Menzel, reported,that Horn 
deserves ~he ~redit for cont~cting ,the UnJv~r~fty Medica1 School and 
obtaining the free services of interns and other interested doctors to 
the youth "drop-in center.1I The demand for the free medical aid increased 
steadily, so that a separate set of rooms was rented for a medical drop-in 
center;l named the IIOutside-In.1I A private medical doctor, Charles Spr~y, 
M. D., voluntarily took the directorship of Outside-In. The medical· 
.: ~ + • ~ •• • • 
drop-in center came to be open all week, with twenty-four hour emergency 
______ 
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service. 
On August 16, 1968, the Charix Coffee House and Horn's "street 
worker mi ni stryll broke onto the newspapers' front pages. At a regul ar 
meeting of the Ci ty Counc; 1 the, ni ght before, the head of the ci ty 
police's Women's Protective Division, Capt. Elizabeth Mumford, accused 
the GPCC youth ministry and Gene Horn of "harboring" runaways (and 
therefore delinquent) children. Capt. Mumford's second charge was that 
the Charix was the site of regular and heavy exchange of,drugs. She 
charged, ". . . youngsters fi nd easy access to narcoti.cs at the Char; x 
Coffee House." It turned out that "undercover" agents, working for the 
Narcotics Division of the city's Police Bureau, posed as IIhippie type" 
young people, and found out many of the places (parks) where drugs were' 
exchanged in Portland. One of the places where the agents claimed 
easiest access to narcotics was at the Charix. 
Newspaper articles in the following days carried the strong 
. rebuttals to Capt. Mumford's accusations from William Cate and Robert 
Menzel, as well as from the elected officers of the GPCC and Hub-CAP. 
Ca te and Menzel both 1 a uded the po 1 ice and the Women r s Protecti ve' Di vi ­
sian, and both told the press that the GPeC and'its Youth Ministry 
tried to'work- in cooperation with the law at all times. At the Charix, 
they said, there were stringent rules against narcotics use o~ possession, 
and that staff members and vo 1 unteers enforce rul es lid; 1 i gently. II How­
ever, both Cate and Menzel, along with Horn and the president of the Hub­
CAP Board, Robert C. Shoemaker (also an Attorney) agreed with, Mumford's. 
accusations to a certain extent. They conceded that there undoubtedly 
was a certai'n amount of drugs passed at the coffee' house, but no more so 
----~--------------------------~~--------------------,---------/ 
than any other public gathering place for youth, such as any Portland 
L­
117 
high school. They pointed out that drugs were available almost any place 
where youth are free to gather. Horn contended that if he spent too 
much effort excluding possible pot smokers and other drug users from the 
Charix, it would "eliminate most of the young people we .are trying to 
reach. II William Cate, Robert Menzel and attorney Shoemaker defended· 
Gene Horn and the Cha ri x I s program of try; n g 'to reach the a1; enated youn 9 
people. 
On Capt. Mumford's first charge that the GPCC1s youth ministry pro­
gram was opposing her Women's Protective D,ivision by IIharboring lJ runa­
ways, Horn, Cate, Menzel and others connected with the GPCC program 
specifically denied the charge. Dr. Cate revealed that early in the 
summer a new set of guidelines was worked out with the Multnomah County1s 
Juvenile Court and the Multnomah County Welfare Department. Due to an 
oversight, the city pofice1s Women's Protective Division' was supposed to 
be called in on the'earlier consultation, but was not. The Court and 
Welfare Department had approved the GPCC's alternate program for helplng 
runaways. Horn said the new program required that parents must give 
their permission for a runaway to be placed in the program's care. Horn 
explained, "When a kid comes into mY office, he has to call his parents 
and tell them he's all right. Then I get on the phone and tell the 
.~ 
parents who I am and what the program is all about. If the parents 
approve, we take respons; bi 1i ty and ·go on from there ~ II Horn sai d that 
some of the runaways are referred to welfare caseworkers who counsel 
with them and their parents. Some others went to one of the fifteen 
private volunteer homes, which had agreed to be part of the program and 
had been approved by the GPCCls Youth Ministry Committee. ,If a young
, 
I person would refuse any of these alternatives, Horn was free to allow the 
l. 
! 
I 118 youth to leave without being put into custody. In some cases, the latterI 
I had happened. The Women1s Protective Division had come in contact with 
I a few of those youth who had left the Youth Ministry program as known 
runaways. . Capt. Mumford had ci ted the case of one fi fteen year old gi rl 
from Wa~hington State whom their Protective Division had found in a 
local park .late at night, IIhigh on drugs and in the company ,of four older 
males. 1I Understandably, Capt. Mumford's accusations, illustrated by the 
case of th~ fifteen year old girl, had aroused the immediate anger of 
some City Council members. 
In the months that followed the 1968 Summer Crisis Program for youth 
in downtown Portland, an internal str~ggle began within Hup-CAP and the 
GPCC's Board~-whether the Charix shoul~ be further supported financially, 
and whether it should continue at all, at least with the ~ame program 
format. Behind all the problems at the Charix; of cours'e, was the, 
principal problem: 'narcotics., The question was how to maintain a 
coffee house, which would reach the "alienated" youth, and yet provide a 
climate which was free from the presence of drugs. How as the Charix 
going to continue with a program of freedom, without catering to the 
"hard-corell drugs users? In September, 1968, Robert Menzel said that he 
informed the Charix staff that it would have to go off financial support 
.' 
from Hub-CAP, because the Charix was a·lready incurring a large debt. 
Menzel said that· Hub-CAP did not have 'the income to maintain the Charix 
at the expense of Hub-CApls other programs. The Hub-CAP Board did' not, 
however, cut the Charix off immediately. It was not until April 3, 1969, 
that the Hub-CAP Board authorized the formation of a separate Board of 
Directors for Char;x with the full responsibility of supplying its own 
financial resources. During the six months between April and September, 
J 
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1969, the Charix continued on a more restri'cted schedule. The~ Hub-CAPI 
I 	 Board and the Charix staff experimented with different modifications of 
the wide-open, loud music coffee house of the summer before. It isI 
obvious that the wide public reaction to the uexplos;vell publicity about 
the drug scene at the Charix was having a tremendous negative impact on 
the Hub-CAP Board and the Hub-CAP congregations whi ch ·supported the pro­
gram and the GPCC's Board~ 
In a'memorandum dated September 9, 1969, from Robert C. Shoemaker, 
Jr., then chairman of the Hub-CAP Board, to Hall interested persons" 
(widely distributed to Hub-CAP churches, GPCC Board members and CAP's, 
Charix staff and young people, etc.), Mr. Shoemaker draws up a list of 
"points of consensus" which developed out of a meeting of interested' 
Charix people six days before. The first point is that the Charix should 
not continue as presently operating. Shoemaker says, lilt has developed 
into little ·more than an acid rock dance hall ·and has probably become 
fairly ineffective in serving its original goals.11 In the next section', 
entitled IIGoal~," Mr. Shoemaker lists five revised goals under which a 
new Charix should operate: lI(a) ... provide ... relaxation in an 
environment •.. with a minimum of harmful elements present.' (b) 
outlet for creative expression . . . as a subst~~ute for the release now 
offered by drugs. (c) ... a window to the community to the problems 
of alienated youth--and what the youth are trying to say to the community. 
(d) ... a place where kids in trouble may seek help and where help may 
seek kids in trouble. (e) ... a representation and assurance to young 
people that all of society is not opposed to them and that many 'square' 
elements of soci~ty care about their welfare. II 
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I In the face of all the criticism about the Charix, Shoemaker's ver­
t sian of the suggested new goals still appears to be a strong statement of 
I faith in the possibi1ities--even necessities--of a continued coffee house 
for lI alienated ll youth. Despite the fact that Shoemaker was ca11in.9 for 
the closure of the Charix, he also said that the established society of 
this community can benefit from the "window ll it provides society to see 
"the problems of aJienated youth--and what the youth are trying to say 
to the community.1I He said it was not only a place where society can see 
and hear, but also a place where II straight ll , (conservative) society can 
meet the alienated youth and actually help them. 
In the following months, many great changes took place in the Hub­
CAP staff, its Board of Directors, in the Chari,x and in the Youth Minis­
try. Under pressure from Cate' and GPCC officers, Gene Horn resigned 
from the Youth Ministry directorship. Two months lat~r, February, 1969, 
Robert Menzel resigned as director of Hub-CAP to take a teaching posi­
tion. Nine members of the Hub-CAP Board resigned, three of them officers 
of its Board, including Robert Shoemaker, during the following spring and 
summer). Five a1t.ernates on the Hub-CAP Board also resigned and were 
replaced. That number amounted to the major part of the Board. On 
June 15, 1969, Father Gil Lulay was hired as IIStaff Council Coordinator ll 
for Hub-CAP, which amounted to a half-time replacement for Menzel's job. 
The big change formally took place for Charix on April 3, 1969. A ' 
separate Board of Directors for Charix was set up at that time. It con­
sisted of over 50 people from the community a't large. This Board became 
responsi b 1 e for the supervi sian of Charix, as well as for' its fi nanc; a 1 
support. Later, however, Father Lulay said that Hub-C~P always remained 
the legal entity responsib·'e for the Charix. In July of 1969 the two 
n 
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Boards of Directors of the Youth Ministry of the GPCC and the Charix 
were merged into one Board and into one program, the Chari x-Youth ~in­
istry program. After Menzel resigned at Hub-CAP, Gene Horn was hired 
as director of Charix. Six months later in July, following the merger .. 
of the Charix and the Youth Ministry programs, both Gene Horn at Charix 
and Margo Maris Horn (married the previous winter) resigned their 
directorships, effective August' 1, 1969. 
August through December, 1969, marked the last phase of the Charix­
Youth t4inistry. Since the programs had been consolidated organization­
ally under its own governing Board of Directors, the program was then 
completely on its own, financially._ From then on, the new Board was 
unable to generate any consistent sources of new money income. Soon 
, 
I 
after the Horns left, the several pastors to Portland State University j 
t 
students (PortJand Campus Christian Ministry) at the nearby Koinonia I 
House offered to take on the direction of the C-YM program for four 
I 
months--until ·the end of 1969. It was agreed that a complete evaluation 
of the program and finances' of the C-YM would be carried out during those 
four months. Hired for this task was Mr. Lewis Durham, consultant for 
the Urban Young Adult Action, Incorporated, and the Glide Foundation of 
San Francisco. Following the evaluative study, the decision was reached 
that there were insufficient resources and motivation in. the downtown 
churches to provide an adequate service for such a fast changing youth 
culture. The Charix was closed in early 1970, and the Youth Ministry 
also ceased to exist then. 
Two of the former Hub-CAP Board members who resigned during 1969 
were interviewed for this study. Both are still very much committed to 
the idea of the churches' CAP's--the necessity of the churches· actual 
n 
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involvement in social actions. Both respondents defended the past work 
and accomplishments of Hub-CAP. They had each served on the Board for 
over two years, through Hub-CAP's most tumultuous years, and they had 
grown weary of the enormous amount of time and energy it took from them 
to maintain the on-going administrative life of their Community Action 
Program. !lEach Board meeti ng ni ght, whi ch was almost every week, was a, 
battle," one respondent said. Significantly~ both men spoke spontane­
ously at some point during their interviews about the possibilities of 
accomplishing social change through the Hub-CAP. ,(Both interviews were 
conducted separately and without the knowledge of the other taking part. 
The'similarity of their views rray be due to their being good friends, 
although one is an active Roman Catholic, and the other is an active 
Presbyterian.) Because the two men felt that the time had come in 1969 
when the actual chances of accomplishing some sotia1 change through Hub­
CAP had greatly declined, each realize'd he had becorre ineffective, and 
so each decided to quit. 
One of these two respondents, Mr. Withycombe, said that Hub-CAP 
had the potential of becoming more than a Ilband-aid n operation on the 
downtown social problems. He felt that their CAP could have become a 
catalyst to open the way for other social structures--business and 
, government--to begin to take part in making positive changes. , The fact 
was that Hub-CAP had lost its effectiveness in his view. He said that 
the Charix could have been an illuminating rtwindo\v to alienated youth," 
but due to mismanagement and over-permissiveness, Charix had become 
bogged down in unnecessary problems. It beg'an to take too much' time and 
ene.rgy to make it go, he said. 
The other former Hub-CAP Board member, Mr. Ni eberga 11, s'a i din 
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effect that the churches and their individua1 members had lost their will­
ingness to continue, to support such a radical program as the Charix and 
Youth Ministry. He said that he had found so many of his own church 
people and those of other Hub-CAP churches who were deeply repelled by 
the idea of their church getting down and participating in the actual 
programs to help alienated youth. Mr. Niebergall was very specific in 
stating that the rejection of the "success ethic ll by this youth culture 
itself causes strong reactions 'among middle-class, church people. He 
defended the Charix as presenting a,valid program much of the time, but, 
he said, it was extremely difficult to keep out the presence of hard 
drugs and still reach those who needed the Charix. It ~eeded stronger 
management and surveillance, but that took more money and people, which 
depended on the churches. The churches were backing out, because they 
were afraid to take the chance of repeating the Charix experience-­
'leading to another explosive reaction from the community. The middle­
class churches' of Hub-CAP were afraid of the consequences of failing 
agai n wi th such, an acti on program for IIdi fferent youth. II 
What becomes apparent from the above two 'interviews is the subtle 
effect of the reaction within the great ,number of members of the congre­
gations which make up downtown churches and sup~ort the Hub-CAP programs. 
It is important to note that one of the above two respondents said that 
there was no noticeab1e drop in money contrib~ted by those congregations 
which make up the Hub-CAP membership. One congregation later did with­
. I 
draw in protest to the Hub-CAP over-involvement" but its contribution was 
small and offset by the addition of three more congregations into Hub­
CAP. 'The concrete measurement of, negative reaction, therefore" by 
financial giving, or congregational participation" would seem to say 
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that there was little or no reaction from the churches involved to the 
Hub-CAP program. On the other hand, there was a re~l and significant 
reaction, which was registered in the Hub-CAP Board and their unwill­
ingness to continue to carryon some kind or progressive 'ministry to 
"alienated ll youth. Mr. Nie.bergall said that after Robert ,Menzel had 
left as Hub~CAP director and some of the key Hub-CAP Board members had 
resigned, the philosophy of Hub-CAP's purpose even changed. A form of' 
public pressure was exerted by the church members upon the Board mem­
bers. The conservative reaction by the unh~ppy church members resulted 
in "battles" at the Board meetings, which resulted in inaction by' the 
Board. After the withdrawal of nine Board members, five alternative 
members, the Executive Director and some members of the staff, the 
"threatening ll youth program was ultimately dropped. This evidence 
strongly suggests that the negative reactive of church members had a 
negative relationship (if not negative effect) upon the Hub-CApls actions. 
Mr. Withycombe thought that the purpose of the Hub-CAP and its kind 
of program was to be a "forerunner" of the church in that the tAP would 
help the church to understand the social needs of the community. Then 
the church could also act. But, he said,- the CAP would have to be free 
of the i'nhibition of conservative church people's reaction. In order to 
accomplish this freedom, the CAP's would have to become lIad hoc commit­
tees ... so that they could take the necessary social and political 
actions •.. without the stigma of church orierited and church organized 
programs ... " Nr. Niebergall had earlier said that Hub-CAP also tried 
to perforlTI an educational function for the people in its own member 
churches. Hub-CAP had tried to inform them about the churches' rationale 
for its particular social action approach to helping the youth in the 
·1 
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downtown, along with explaining some of the problems within the new 
"youth cu1ture. 1I Mr. Nieberga11 said that not enough of their regular 
church members understood the theological reasons behind their church 
social actions through Hub-CAP'. But, he said, they (Hub-CAP Board) 'had 
not started ea~ly enough. 
Robert Menzel emphasized that,Schulze strongly believed ~hat he 
could convince reluctant churches of the need and effectiveness of Com­
munity'Action Program methods--if only he could be permitted to demon­
strate them. Schulze thought the best way was first to put a CAP into 
action, ,and then the ,local churches would ~ee and respond with their back­
ing. Four years before, Menzel related, Schulze' had done' exa'ctly this 'by 
demonstrating the success of C-CAP in Albina, and the churches backed the 
other church-CAP·s. Menzel said that that tactic doesn't work anymore, 
because the congregations have now been through this th~ng, an~ they have 
experienced the conservative reactions from some of their influential 
people. Menzel said his experience since (he now lives in another state) 
has shown that conservative reaction to local social action has spread to 
churches and communities where active social action programs have not yet 
been tried. 
Analysis of the Hub-CAP Program and Its Theoretical Meaning 
,I 
In analyzing all of the 41 respondents' statements from interviews,' ! 
conducted specifically for this study, only 14 people did not spontane­
ously mention something about the churches' conservative reaction to the 
Charix-Youth Ministry program. Eighteen respondents, 'who would definitely 
be classified as IIliberals ll on the churches' social action involvement, 
gave fairly detailed accounts of how their own congregation, or some other 
i 1 
---
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\' congregations, had reacted negatively to Hub-CApls alienated youth pro­
gram. Out of the total number of respo'ndents, only seven expressed their 
own disagreement with ,the youth program, or displeasur~ with its purpose. 
(Many interviewees working on separate GPeC programs or CAP's', especially 
at different points in time during the 1960 1 s, did not know factual 
information about other GPCC programs, because the social actions were so 
disconnected. Yet, in several non-directive interviews, I found several 
who spoke spontaneously about GPCC soci a 1 acti on issues or prog·rams other 
than in their own expertise, revealing their ignorance of facts. I am 
sure some specific interviewees gave opinions about Hub-CAP based on 
hearsay, without personal experience. However, their opinions are 
included in this data.) Without doubt, the evidence for the strongest 
negative reaction to all the GPCC·s social action programs was recorded 
here aga i ns~ the Chari x-Youth ~li ni stry prog~am.' More congregati ons were 
defi ned by respondents as havi ng a'n element of outspoken, cri ti ca 1 reac­
tion to that action program than any other GPCC social action work. On 
the other hand, seven respondents out of the 41 interviewed is not a large 
proportion (17 per cent) within the GPCC itself to be considered a signi­
ficant negative r~action on such a sensitive social issue. 
Althou~h the conservative ~action brought to bear upon the Hub-CAP 
.~ 
Board by the individual church members of its constituent churches was 
quiet and even difficult to pin.-point, it was ~ effectively negative that 
the Charix and Youth Ministry program dwindled steadlli from lack of ~­
port, until fifteen months later the Hub-CAP Board admitted the program 
was dead. 
The evidence presented here about reaction against the GPeC I s work' 
in the downtown Youth Ministry is not hard evidence, but very subtle. 
'1 
1 
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The Chari x-Youth Ministry survived the first great public outcry about 
its involvement in drugs quite well, but as time went on, the GPCC and 
the congregations most directly involved organizationally and geographi­
cally did not want to take the future risk of being held responsible 
before the public for managing such' a difficult program. The GPCC 
literally washed its hands of the .program, and threw it back into the 
hands of the congregations sponsoring Hub-CAP. After a difficult 
struggle of assess~ng and again reassessing the program, the Hub-CAP 
Board of Directors finally voted in 1970 not to continue either Charix 
or the Youth· Ministry. The Board gave as its reason for suspending the 
downtown youth work: not enough money to provide the kind of quality. 
i 
ministry needed to meet such a difficult job. Father Gil Lulay, part­ I I 
! 
I 
time director of Hub-CAP at that time, as well as two other Hub-CAP I 
I 
Board members, admitted that their memb~rs were· afraid of not being able ·1 

to control the use of drugs by the kind of youth they were faced "/ith 

helping, and that the public's sensitivity to this problem presented too· 

great a probabi·l ity of conservative reaction backfiring. Translated, 

that meant for 'this researcher, the sponsoring church people had come to 

realize now the great bre~dth of difficulties accompanying their assist­

ance of the youth sub-cul tures into the drug scene, 'and they were now wi se 

enough to foresee further bad publicity and public criticism. They felt, 

as congregations, they could not withstand the p.rice of the accompanying 

negative reaction. 

It is my estimation that William Cate and other GPCC leaders did 
not want to pursue this aspect of, social action after the initial bad 
drug publicity the Charix-Youth r~inistry received in the Summer' Crisis of 
1968. Cate advised the GPCC's Board of Directors to give the program 
n 
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solely to Hub-CAP, therby disassociating the GPeC .from it. Cate was more 
concerned about the GPCC's overall future for its social action program. 
He did not want to endanger the GPCC's organizational change-over to 
social action goals. At that very time in 1.968, the GPCC·s committee to 
rewrite a new constitution had reconstructed the organization ~hiefly 
around three working divisi~ns with socia1 action purposes, and was get­
ting ready to present the new constitution to their members. Cate cer­
tainly did not want to endanger the adoption of the new constitution 
because of some high pitched public reaction·aimed at the GPCCls social 
action programs. 
Also, at this point in my research I was seriously asking the I 
" I further question, ,IIWhy?" Why had the downtown Youth Ministry program I 
incurred such a long lasting public reaction? .It appears to me that the 1 
I 
1answer lies within the process of legitimation; which religion normally ! 
performs for the socially constructed world. The conservative elements 
in the member churches of Hub-CAP thought the downtown Youth Ministry 
'I 
was causing a serious threat to their well-established social meanings, ! 
~hich their churches normally acted to legitimate. Because of new 
methods based on unusually applied values, such as disregarding punitive 
trea tmen"t for these devi ant youth in exchange for sympatheti c therapy 
and assistance, conservatives felt their church-legitimated values were 
threatened. When the press' headlines gave public notoriety to the local 
law enforcement1s attack upon the Charix-Youth Ministry's program, then 
the conservative church members of Hub-CAP had their fears and criticisms 
confirmed. In other words, institutional r~ligion, as represented by the 
GPeC, had stepped outside of its tfaditional role of legitimating the 
" " , 
local government and law and order. 
n 
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In the past, churches usually supported the police's crackdown on 
juvenile delinquents. In contrast, the GPCC's Youth'Ministry open1y' . I 

opposed the police's legalistic and depersonalized method of dealing 

with such deviant youth. The churches' program was challenging govern­

mentis law enforcement with a completely different set of values~ say­

ing the police's treatment was dehumanizing. 

·1 
I 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE GRAPE BOYCOTT CHALLENGE, 
Although neither the GPCC, nor any of its action groups, actually 
participated in the 1968 national Grape Boycott, the GPee did publish 
an official statement supporting both the United Farm Workers" right to 
.' strike and the consumers· boycott of local sales. By giving its verbal 
\ 
support to this Boycott, the content analysis shows the respondents gaveI 
one of the highest disapproval rates (20 per cent) and t,heir second 
1 
lowest rate of approval (39 per cent) from among the loyal group of 
\ activitists. 
Why did this issue result in the high degree of increased tension 
between the liberals and conservatives in proportion to the time and 
effort the GPCC committed to the problem? Did the financial-economic 
context of the issue have a deciding effect on the conservatives' reac­
tion? This chapter faces these questions and the facts surrounding the 
Grape Boycott situation. 
,In 1968, the Rev. Robert Burtner took over as chairman of the 
Soci a 1 Concerns Commissi on,. fa 11 owi n9 Robert Bonth; us I move to another 
ci ty.'- Under Burtner, the Soc; a1 Concerns group has conti nued to be 
aggressive on state legislation and local politico-economic issues. 
1968 was the time ot'the GPCC's IIbig summer,1I the Summer Crisis in the 
youth drug scene in Southwest 'Portland and the Black Summer Crisis in 
Albina. Under Burtner that September the Commiss~on drafted a strong 
statement condemning the United States' uninvolvement in the. Russian 
1 11 
I 
! 
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I 
invasion of Checkoslovakia, which was returned· by the Board to the Com­
mission for redrafting and toning down. In August, 1968, the Social 
Concerns Commission also had issued to the Board members a statement 
defending the nation-wide Grape Boycott, organized by the United Farm 
Work~rs, AFL-CIO of Delano, California~ At the Board meeting on 
September 11, 1968, the Board members also referred the Boycott state­
ment back to the Social Concerns Commission for rewriting. 
Proceding and 'during this time, the Social Concerns Commission 
asked the Board members to go hear Cesar Chavez, the union leader of the 
Farm Workers; speak at Portland State.University_ The Commission also 
set up special hearings of representatives from both sides, workers and 
growers, for the Board. A representative of the Farm Workers Union and 
local organizer of the Boycott appeared at a special Board hearing, as 
well as with the local secretary of the Independent Growers Association. 
Because the local boycott involved secondary picketing' at local super­
markets, the Social Concerns Commission set 'up a meeting with the local, 
grocers through the Grocers I Association representative. Th~ m~eting 
was at the Roman Catholic Chancery office building, but only one 
Grocers· Association representative showed up to defend their position 
against local picketing. Burtner said that fo~_ those. churchmen, lay and 
clergy, who were at the meeting, lIit was a real flub for the grocers. 1I 
, , 
Burtner said that the Grocers' Association representative was at a loss 
to explain why no other supermarkets felt it necessary to attend the 
meeting. 
The Social Concerns Commission ~hen called a special meeting of the 
GPCCls Board for September 23, 1968, at 4:00 p.m., to reconsider a new 
...J 
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GPCC statement on the grape boycott. All those present, including 
Monsignor Tobin, representing the Roman Catholic Archdiocese, voted to 
adopt a favorable· statement, defending the farm workers and their 
strike--with the abstention of ,Lowell Steen, the Treasurer. The GPCC's 
Executive Director, William, Cate, said that the· statement they adopted 
did not support t~e boycott itself, but defended the workers I. right to 
organize and bargain collectively. However,' the actual 'statement,which 
follows, does support the boycott, at· least locally. 
Whereas, the right to organize and bargain collectively long has 
been recognized as an important part of American workers, the 
farm workers of the U. S. A. have been denie~ this right under 
the National Labor Relations Act. For nearly two years now, the 
farm workers of California, under the leadership of Cesar Chavez, 
have been engaged in a certified strike with Delano, Coachella 
Valley and South Kern County grape growers. The issue is simply 
whether or not farm workers can legally organize themselves into 
a union, and bargain collectively with their employers • 
. , 
We hereby record our support for the Delano grape strikers in 
their consum~r boycott of California table grapes. 
Cesar Chavez has specifically sought the support of the churches 
to help them in their non-violent efforts, for justice among farm 
workers. We heed his call, and urge others to refrain from the 
purchase of all California table grapes in Portland stores. 
William Cate said in an interview in 1970 that he considered the 
GPCCls suppqrt of the grape boycott had caused the greatest reaction among 
church people against the GPCC itself, second only to the reaction over 
the Youth Ministry and Charix House treatment 'of runaways and drug users. 
Cate said more people called or wrote to complain and threaten their 
withdrawal of financial support to the GPCC for its I'unwarranted" sup­
port of the boycott and the farm ltJOrkers, than any other soci a 1 action by 
the Council~ except the Youth Ninistry. 
In one of the early interviews conducted for this research, the 
• I 
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respondent, who is the pastor of a strong urban ,congregation, said that 
he had formally resigned from his office as a GPCC B0ard member for 
several reasons, but the main reason was the GPCCls support of the Grape 
Boycott. The respondent, the Rev. Johnston, said that he had been 
personally connected with the GPCC--on its Board, or committees--for 14 
years until his r~cent resignation. He said that, generally, the GPCC 
had become much too unbalanced toward social action concerns. The 
Council should also maintain the other side, evangelism. Johnston also 
emphasized that the GPec should assist the congregations in their local 
work, rather than the congregations' spending so much of their means to 
assist the GPCC in programs which are so controversial that they detract I I
, I 
from the congregationts local neighborhood work. He thought that his 
own congregation and others in their own local area would accomplish 'more 
if they set up their own youth, low-income hOUSing, senior citizens, 
and similar programs. -
Following this interview, two other respondents referred to 
Johnston's resignation from the Board as an indication of their own 
strong feelings against what the Council had been doing recently. Both 
of these respondents are clergy, and having been on the GPeC Board in 
past years, they knew Johnston very well. Both criticized the same 
;" 
GPCC·s preoccupation with social actions as Johnston did. The Grape 
Boycott stand had caused reactions within their own congregations, they 
said: One of these men also resigned from the GPeC, following Johnston, 
but his chief'reason was his reaction to the Youth Ministry in Southwest 
Portland. His reaction is probably due to the fact that his congregation 
is situated only a couple of blocks from where the Charix House was 
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located. The other pastor did not resign; however~ he does not personally 
support the GPCC in his large Presbyteri~n congregation, situation across 
town. Yet, some of the lay supporters of the GPeC in his congreQation have 
. I 
continued successfully to pressure the congregation to give its-annual I 
$1,000 gift to the GPCC. The Presbyterian pastor said that IItwo very 
influential men," who regularly gave large contributions to the congre­
gation, told 
. 
him they wanted their congregation not to support the 
-
GPCC 
any longer, due to the Council's support of the Grape Boycott. 
In the interview, Johnston also expressed strong disagreement with 
the GPCC's "condoning the use of drugs" in the Charix House. He said the 
Chief of Police had told him personally that the City Council would not 
give the word to the Police Department to close down the Charix, because 
IIthere were too many important, politically influential people supporting 
the GPec's Charix and downtown Youth Ministry. 
Johnston's second criticism of the GPeC was the CApls financial 
irresponsibility to the GPce itself. He said that he asked the Board in 
September, 1968, if the CApis were responsible to report thei~ use of 
funds and if the GPCG had a veto power over the CAP's financial actions. 
I 
ITh~ Board discussed it at length then, but could not decide. I 
.j
Johnston felt that the financial drain by the CApis was the direct cause 
of having to withdraw support for the ch~plains to the Juvenile Delin­
quency Home and for the jails. Johnston pointed.out that these chaplains 
had partial support from the GPCG since the late fifties, but were now in 
danger of being withdrawn from their posts because of lack of support. 
Johnston admitted, however, that his decision to resign was affected 
mostly by his dissatisfaction with the Board's support for the boycott of 
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grapes. He felt strongly that the Social Concerns Commission "forced" 
the Board into this position, because the special Board meeting (Septem­
ber 23, 1968), which favorably adopted the boycott stand had only ten 
members of the Board present to vote. The old GPCC records happened to 
contain Johnston's letter of resignation~ to which he appended his 
reasons for leaving the GPCC's Board. It is obvious <that Johnston's 
most specific reaction is to the Grape Boycott approva1. He also con­
fided that several of his own church members had complained<about the 
Council's action on this, but one local businessman said he wanted the 
congregation also to stop contributing to the GPCC. 
In his resignation letter, Johnston mentions that he had recently 
made two trips to the California grape growing<area aroun~ Delano, 
California. He told the researcher that before he had studied for the 
ministry, he had been in business himself, running a plant nursery in 
the San Joaguin Valley. He said he knew the problems of the grape 
growers, most of whom are small growers. Johnston also said the Union 
was "forcing" the workers into the Union against their will, in many 
cases. It is interesting to note that in the information published by 
Chavez' United. Farm Workers, they give figures directly contradicting 
Johnston: IIIn California small family farms ar:e NOT the issue! Six 
percent of the landowners own 75 percent of the farmland--gigantic 
agri busi ness corporati ons. II. 
The Grape Boycott issue was the one dispute in which the GPCC came 
into direct conflict with the city's business community. Some respond­
ents used terms such as "meddling in business peoples' affairs ll to 
describe their criticisms of the GPCC. Other respondents critical of the 
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GPCC's participation said that the "secondaryll boycott of local stores 
was unfair and unjustified; the GPCC should not have "stuck its nose into 
i 
a problem they di d not know all the facts about . . ... 
The GPee was'challenging strong economic forces within its own 
community. Inevitably, numerous local lay members of churches which 
belonged to the GPCC had large invested interests in the supermarket be­
ing' picketed and hurt ~y the Boycott. Because the pragmatic intenSity of, 
the issue directly affected their economic well-being, many of its own 
members vi gorous ly questi oned the GPCC I S stand." 
.' 
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CHAPTER IX 
AUTHORITY AND POWER IN THE GPCC 
The GPCC·s forma1 organizational stru~ture ;s patterned after the 
Protestant, congregational centered structure of the national church 
bodies. Protestantism in the Unite·d States has traditionally placed primary 
emphasis on the local congregation1s purpose of preaching the Word and 
administering the Sacraments.' Constitutionally, in national church bodies" 
the congregation has been the real locus of organizational power and 
authority. However, a broad tendency in Protestantism has been the rise 
of informal control of the denominations by ~he ,different departments and 
special ~gencies within each denomination. Formally) all the parts of 
the· structure and efforts of the denomination continue to be instrumental 
to .the local purpose of the congregations. Informally, the power of the 
organization is in the hands of a few leaders, and the congregations are 
instrumental to the organization. 
Max Weber's definition of author'ity, as against power, is necessary 
at this point. Authority is the legitimate right (of the organization) to 
exercise power. Weber descrjbed three ways in which a leader may gain 
authority.l The first type of legitimation of authority Weber called 
"rational-legal" authority. A specific office of leadership possesses it 
because the group has established laws or rules which specify that the 
office legally embraces certain specific authority. It is based on the 
belief in rationally established laws. The second type is "traditIonal 
authority." Certain rights and powers come to be associated with an 
'--........ Ii In 
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 office after a period of time. A tradition builds up around the leader­

ship position. The office holder takes on authority more 'and more~I 
because traditionally the holder of that office has assumed authorityI with respect'to specific tasks., The third type of authority is called 
"charismatic. II Because an individual leader possesses traits which 
inspire, confidence and willingness i,n his own group to follow his leader­
ship, apart from any legal definitions or traditions, then that person 
has Jlcharismatic authority.1I In contrast to the other two definitions, 
, , 
charisma applies to the individual and not to the office of authority. 
However, a fourth type of authority, which especially applies to 
the Protestant, congregational form of organization, is described by 
Paul Harrison in his study of the American Baptist Convention. He calls 
it rational-pragmatic authority.2 Unlike Itrational-legal" authority, it 
;s organizational power that is not legitimately authorized. Harrison '\ 
says, rather, that it is IIpower grasped,1I since there is an undefined 
vacuum about key offices in relation to many other,parts of the organiza­
tion. Because of this IIvacuumll the office holder is able to exercise 
power, although not legally authorized. As Weber points out, these forms 
- I of authority are only "ideal-types," and not necess-arily mutually 
exclusive. They often overlap, or are only partly present in some 
organizational positions. 
The GPCC is a voluntary organization.. In. a sense it is a double 
voluntary organization, since participation in the decision-making 
Assembly, Board of Directors s or Commissions precludes the person's 
membership in and appointment by la congregation. Because of the inherent 
nature of a voluntary organization, it tends not to develop a strong 
rational-legal authority form of government. It tends not to have a 
J . n TTl ~ 
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highly elaborated system of 1egalistic specifications for performance and 

standards of' production. Paul Harrison describes the great difference 

between the theory and practice of the American Baptist Convention. 3 .The 

denomination's theory calls for the decision-making power to be in the 

hands of ,the laymen and the local congregation. In reality, the laity 

and congregation participate in the decision-making process in only a 

few perfunctory ways. The same is large1y true for the GPCC. Among the 

American Baptists, the real power of the national body rests in the hands 

of church executives, usually. clergy, who have little legal authority 

but have enormous pragmatic influence. Until the adoption of the new 

constitution in 1969, the same could be said about the GPCC. The GPCCls 

new constitution is still unspecific about the real powers of employed 

staff personnel, especially the Executive Secretary. Although the new 

constitution spells out in some general terms the working relationship 

·1 
of the three new major social action arms to the GPCC (Community Action 
. Programs, Center for Urban Encounter and the Metropolitan Ministries; 
viz., chart on last page of this chapter), almost nothing is said about 
the specific powers and responsibilities of the employed staff heads of 
these divisions, nor of the elected chairmen of the three Commissions. 
OligarchY and Insulation 
In analyzing the development of authority in the GPCC during the 
sixties, the most important place of authority is the office of Executive 
Secretary. Ye~, the'a~thority 9f the Executi.ve Secretary cannot be 
understood without considering it within the context of the GPCCls con­
stitutional, or formal, sources of authority. In the eleven years since 
William Cate took over as the Executive Secretary (1959), the GPCCts goals 
II. 
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have changed radically. From its beginning in 1919 till about 1960, the 
GPCC primarily served to reinforce traditional goals of congregations. 
It was a cooperative group of congregations, working to achieve common, 
congregational goals, like evangelism, education, youth progl~ams (for 
their own youth), etc. ,The GPee was centered· in the congregations. 
Because the goals did begin to change shortly after Cate arri,ved at the 
GPeC, and ~ontinued to change throughout his tenure, the inevitable 
question arises about the amount of influence Cate exerted on the GPCe 
to make this change possible. Does Paul Harrison1s description of a 
large church organization and the executives' development of "rational­
pragmatic Sl authority apply to the GPeC and its Executive Secretary? 
Under the~ old constitution (adopted 1959, revised 1960), the 
Executive Secretary's responsibility was defined as the Ilsupervision of 
the activities of the Council . . II The new 1969 cohstitution adopts 
the same broad definition. There is no real authority assigned to the 
Executive ,office in those words. It does not say he has authority over 
anyone or any other offices. It is more a statement of responsibility. 
Authority here is undefined, but wide responsibilities imply wide author­
ity. This consti-tutional 'statement is the first source of undefined 
power. The Oi r,ector is thus gi ven -the vast po.wer to make everyday pol i ty 
, . 
interpretations. This power to interpret goals into practical decisions 
a1] ows ,the O'j rector 'actua'lly to new policy--when he'is interested 
;n reinterpreting organizational goa)s. 
! ',' A'seco-nd source' of' undefi n~d authori ty ; s th~' ~ons ti tuti'ona1 pro­j 
vision which allows the Board to Ilauthorize any officer or officers, 
agent or 'agents' to enter fnta any"coritracf' .. ~Ir, 'ana to wr'fte 'checks on 
behalf of the Council (Art. XI, Sec. 1 &3). So the Executive Secretary 
, I 
'I 
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is able to control large sums of money from day to day as instruments of 
his decisions. 
The Executive's third level of inform<3:1 authority. is his ex-officio 
membershi p--wi thout vote--; n lIa 11 bod i es of the Counci 111 (Art. X). ' 
Through his ever-present influence, the Executive permeates the total 
power structu~e with his, interpretation of the organization1s purpose~ 
In the case of William Caters interpretat~on rif goals for the GPCC, ~t is 
known that he came to Portland with a very specifically defined philoso­ .~ 
phy of purpose for local church councils. Gate's Ph.D. disser~ation 
dealt with this very problem: kinds of IImethodologies" for social action 
by 1oca1 counci 1 s of churches. Whi 1 e in Portl and, ,Ca te wrote a short 
book, published in 1965, on this same theme, uSing illustrations from the 
. ! 
GPCC. 4 Of the 41 respondents interviewed by 'this researcher,' 22, or over 
harf, made some reference to Cate's positive ability to illuminate the 
possibilities of the new social action proposals for the ,GPGC and' the 
theological-moral necessity to be involved in social action. In the 
period of four lengthy interviews with Cate and several informal discus­
sions with him, he repeated his de1iberate efforts to try to influence 
both ,laymen and pastors--informally~ behind.the scenes--to support the 
local churches' increased involvement in social action. Gate said that 
he worked slowly in his first five years at the GPeC to I~onvert and 
train many key people in a wide number of 10c~1 congregations to become 
personally involved in social acti9n work. II He said, "People rally to 
your side if you are able to get them involved--to act on the idea. Many 
of the people who are now supporting our (GPeC) community action in the 
IIcity have developed a commitment to it in the years before. 
tn 
142 
Thi s thi rd i nforma1 , -undefi ned. source of authori ty f9r the Executi ve 
Secretary (changed to Executive Director in 1968) through his ex-officio 
presence on all committees, etc., has allowed him greatly to influence 
IIkey people" and help encourage these and other people to allow their 
names to be nominated for more politically important co~mittees, commis­
sions or the Board of Directors. 
It is a recognition of the DirectorJs use of undefined authority 
by his very presence--his personal, charismatic dedication to social 
action goals, and by the authority inherent in the status of his execu,,:, 
tive office. It is illustrated in Caters statement that he worked about 
five years to IIconvert and train many key people •.. to' become moreII 
involved in GPCC social action projects. In other words, by Cate1s con­
stitutional presence on all bodies of the GPCC, he was constantly pre­
senting his views before the people who were 'interpreting and deciding 
the administrative goals of the GPec. Cate's executive status, together 
with his expertise and commitment to social action goals became a per­
vasive influence upon the committee members; especially the laymen. 
Working in such small groups and on a one-to-one basls before and after 
such committee meetings, Cate's IIbehind the scenes ll efforts began to 
accumu1ate in numbers on the Board and committees. 
The fourth undefined source of the Executive Director's organiza­
tional authority is due to the GPeC's process of electing members of the 
Board of Directors ,and other ~fficers. A slate of nominees is carefully 
prepared by the Nominations ,Committee well in advance of the a'nnual meet­
ing of the General Assembly. Of course, the Executive Director is 
present on the Nominating Committee, exerting the informal authority of 
his office and person. But even more significant in this process is the 
"'_. 
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lack of democratic procedure by the delegates from the member congrega­
tions to the annual meeting. Rarely, if ever, do delegates nominate 
from the floor of the meeting any opposition candidates against the pre­
nominated slate of officers. Without opposition, the pre-determined 
candidates are, in effect, hand picked successors to carryon the pre­
vailing policies appr6v~~ by those already in'office. 
An illustration of this breach of democratic procedure within the 
I 
organization comes from an unusual participant observer, a Roman I
, I 
Catholic priest, who had not before been a part of any extra-Catholic, I 
ecumenical group. In 1966 he began to participate in Hub-CAP activi~ 
ties without, his parish becoming official member 'of that CAP program. 
His interest and activity in the GPCC·s CAP was to become the precursor 
of five Roman Catholic parishes officially joining the GPCC in 1968. 
At that time he was elected a member of the GPCC's Board of Directors .. 
·1In a formal interview and in other discussions with this respondent, he 
said that while in Rome for special studies during the Vatican II, 
Ecumenical Council, he had become very interested in the possibilitie·s 
of new ~cumenical relations at local, practical levels. Many Catholics, 
he said, were then extolling the democratic practices of the Protestant 
churches. However, when he first witnesse~ the GPCC's elections at the 
annual meetings and saw no opposition nominations, nor open discussion 
of nominations from the Assembly floor, as a new, outside observe.r, he 
was particularly struck by the absence of the democratic process there. 
He emphasized his amazement at his first experience within an essentially 
Protestant organization that there was no real contesting groups or 
arguments presented against the .established group's nominations. 
144 
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The General Assembly, according to both the 1954 and 1968 consti­
tutions, is lithe supreme governing body of the Council ,II and the 1968 
version further stat~s that the General Assembly nshall' have final 
jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to the Council" (Art. VI). The 
Assembly is also the GPCC's fully representative body of delegates from 
a1" the member congregati ons, whi ch has thi s ul ti rna te auth'ori ty over 
all GPCC matters .. Constitutionally, then, the congregations and their 
delegates are intended to be in direct contact with the governing pro­
cess of the GPCC. Both the old and new constitutions have kept intact 
the widely held Protestant principle that the individual person is the 
locus of authority, because he is personally responsible to God through 
his own faith. Since the individual receives the Word and Sacraments in 
the local congregation and renews his faith in God there, the congrega­
tion is the center of the individual's religious life and faith. The 
i ndivi dua 1 and the congrega ti on are the source of ,author; ty and power, and 
the GPCC's constitution recognizes this principle. As the first paragraph· 
of this chapter stated, the principle of congregational authority governs 
the formal structure of the GPCC. The appearance. that the delegates have 
the decision-making process in their hands is given to the congregations t 
delegates assembled at the two AS'sembly meetings each year~ . In reality, 
however, tre General As'sembly IS annua1 and semi -annua 1 meeti ngs pl ay 
little or no part in conducting the policy decisions for the GPec. 
Through the GPec's informal stru~ture) the actual working authority for' 
decision making resides, first, in the small (7 voting members, plus 4 
ex-officio) Executive Committee and then in the.Board of Directors. 
Throughout the 1960 1 s, the election of officers and new Board mem­
bers \'las the sum total of the IIdecis'ion-making H by delegates at the 
I 
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General Assembly's annual meetings, officers, entertainment ,and a special 
program, or "outside" speaker. For the past eleven years, the annual 
meetings' printed agendas indicate that no provision was made for dis­
cussi on, or deci sions about any spec; a 1, or press i ng ,problems faci ng the 
GPCC. Given to 'the delegates at the beginning of the meetings is a 
bulletin of mimeographed reports from most of the committees, commis­
sions, the President, the Executive Oirector, together ,with a financial 
report from the past year. The General Assembly·s business meeting has 
never included, according to the bulletins of reports of the past eleven 
years, the approval of a proposed budget for the coming year. Although 
the constitution provides for it, no one in the GPCC could remember the 
General Assembly ever being called into special session between regular 
meetings during the year to rule upon some critical issue facing the GPCC. 
Bec~use the mechanics of arranging the agendas for the two semi­
annual meetings fa'll into the hands of the Executive staff, subject to 
approval of the,elected officers, the control of what the representative 
de1 egates stia11 be all owed formally to cons,; der and vote upon in thei r 
Assembly meetings is largely determined by the Executive staff. Asked 
why there was no provision for a real business meeting on the agenda of 
I the Assembly's annual meeting, a staff member conjectured that it had 
.~I 
probably become "traditional ll a long time ago, because the delegates do 
not know enough about the issues to make' good decisions, and because the 
~eetings would get much too long. The staff re~pondent said that he had 
never heard anyone question the practice of having a brief business meet­
ing at the annual Assembly anyway. 
Although Robert Michels was dealing primarily with large voluntary 
organizations, his political theory, which he cal1ed lithe iron law of 
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oligarchy," has wide applications to the GPCC. Michels concluded that 
. , 
the very nature of a large organization gives its leaders control over 
the organization's machinery, which in turn gives them the necessary 
resources to exercise monopolistic power 'within the organization., -lilt 
is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over 
the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates 
over the delegators. Who says organization say~ oligarchY.uS The'size 
of the organizatio,n definitely has a great deal to do with its propensity 
toward oligarchy. Lipset, Trow and Coleman state that democratic pro­
cedure is usually directly proportionate to the smallness in size of 
the political association. 
Increased size necessarily involves the delegation of political 
power to professional rulers and the growth of bureaucratic 
institutions. The translation of this proposition to the level 
of private government is clear: The smaller the association or 
uni t~ the greater membershi p control. There can be 1i ttl e doubt, 
that this is true in the trade-union movement. 6 . 
The GPCC would not be considered a large organization by the 
standards of most international trade unions, professional and business 
societies, ~ooperatives, and other national voluntary organizations. Yet, 
the GPCC takes on the aspects of largeness when the total number of indi­
vidual people: who are represented to the Council are counted. In 1969 
there were 130 member congregations. The new 1968 constitution gets 
around the limitations to GPCC IImernbershi pll for certain churches-­
without holding to statements of belief in the' GPCC preamble, such as 
Jewish synagogues, etc.--by allowing "participation ll in the GPCC through' 
membership in a local church-community action program (CAP). In this 
way it is possible for a member of a synagogue to be a voting member of 
the Board of Directors, if he is elected the chairman of one of the local 
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CAP's board. According to the new constitution, each, CAP must have a mini­
mum of five C7ongregations as members, but none, of the congregations need 
be members 'of 	the GPCC itself. As members of a CAP, local congregations 
are in a working relationship to the GPec. The GPCC coordinates the 
CAP's programs 	so as not to compete, but assist each other in social ac­
tion throughout the city. The GPCC has also received into membership 
one more Roman Catholic par"ish ,(addJng to" the first five Catholic 
parishes received in 1968) and the Reformed Latter Day Saints denomina­
tion, plus several of their local congregations. , The GPCC ha's signifi­
cantly expanded in the last decade, and continues to expand its repre­
sentation of new denominations and new congregations, adding many new 
individual people. 
Of more consequence than numbers and size in the GPCC is theI 
principle of IIdouble voluntarism. 1I A local church is a voluntary 
\ 
~ 
1 	 organization to which a person ,must belong as a prerequisite to being 
l 	
elected or appointed as a delegate to the GPCC. The congregation itself 
then volunteers to become a member of the GPCC 7 and appoints delegates, 
together with the pastor, to represent it to the GPCC's General Assembly. 
The congregation has higher loyalties to its own national denomination, 
so the' GPCC is usually a secondat'y concern for most pastors' and laymen'. 
(It appears that laymen develop prior loyalties to the GPCC easier than 
pastors, probably because laymen have n~t had the seminary experience in 
which to internalize primary lDyalties to a denomination.) But lt is at 
the in-between level--between the congregations and the GPCC--that the 
congregation's delegates to the General Assembly become a layer of 
insulation, separating the church people from the inner circle of power 
within the GPCC. The GPCCls informal decision makers--Wil1iam Cate, 
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Paul Schul ze' (who returned to the Center for Urban Encounter) 'and a few 
elected officia1s--amount to about five people who really c~eate and 
mold policy. decisions. The formal power structure of the GPCC is still 
made up of a relatively small number of people who represent over 130 
congregations, or conservatively 35,000 to 45,000 people. The formal 
decision makers are 24 Board members, four officers,' plus chairmen of 
three, committees and three commissions. Taking into consideration that 
35 people held 38 elective positions for 84 per cent of the time ~~ 
ten year period, 1959-1968, and 30 other people held same of the offices 
one term or less during the ten years, the great majority of the congre­
gations" delegates do not break into the core group, "which makes GPCC 
policies. 7 These delegates and common church people never really learn 
the inside vocabulary of the GPeCts,decision making about ecumenical and 
social action work. Again, the Nominating Committee chooses people whom 
they feel will work for the goals they generally value--social involve­
ment goals. From an interview with one of the members of this Committee, 
he agreed that the nominees are screened to obtain Board members who are 
"somewhat sympathetic ll toward more liberal social involvement goals. 
Wh~n they are nominated, the nominees are also virtually assured' 
of being elected, since Assembly delegates have.· never nominated from the 
floor opposing candidates to the pre-nominated slate. ,Because delegates 
from member churches seldom know the candidates and their views, and 
because there is no opposion to the official'slate~'there is no floor 
discussion, nor information given, to enlighten th~ Assembly about the 
nominees' important views. The staff says it couldn't be done, because 
it would be "po liticing," "awkwar'd," Hembarrassingl' ..• In effect, 
church delegates become pawns--through their own apathy--for installing. 
. I 
: 
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hand-picked Board members. 
The' Itinsulation," or barrier between the congregation and the 
GPGG's. Board is with the delegates" because the General Assembly's 
delegates are representatives to perfunctory meetings and perfunctory 
responsibilities. This particular process 'is a, cl~ssical example of one 
factor whicn Michels described as a consistent threat to organizational 
democracy: apath~ in membership Earticipation~ The double bureaucratic 
autho'rity which effectively separates the congregation's delegates from 
the GPCC's governing process has the same effect that largeness does in 
national organizations. Michels demonstrated that largeness tends to 
make for increased bureaucracy and, therefore, for increased deleg~tion 
of powers to a relatively few professional, technical experts. 8 In the 
GPCC, the delegation of governing powers is also handed over to a small 
group, and ultimately, to the professional staff--the Executive Director 
and Directors of the Commissions for Urban Encounter and Church-Community 
Action Programs. Although the GPCC is smaller in size, compared to 
political parties and labor unions, it is not small in its representation 
I ' 	 of total membership) about 35 to 45 thousand (before Roman Catholic and 
\ 	 Reformed Mormon parishes entered). However, the GPCC's double voluntar­
ism and double bureaucratic layers also remove its authority, ,and 
heighten member apathy. 
Of course, the delegates are not alone ,to blame for their·minimal 
participation as responsible representatives. The GPCe's bureaucratic 
barrier works against democratic procedure in more ways tha~ one. The 
lack of informative communication to all members is another protective 
obstacle. Communication out from' the GPeC about the ~eneral work of 
CAP's and) recently, CUE (new Center for Urban Encounter) to de1egates and 
, \ 
I 
I 
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churches does exist in the form of an extensive monthly newsletter. How­
ever,. most of the information is promotional material, telling of the 
GPCC's p~ograms and good works--along with their financial needs. 
Information about GPCC activities' communicated to members strictly 
avoids discussing the different church factions, whether conservative or 
liberal, and the issues they- differ over. When open conflicts began to 
saturate the GPCC's Board meetings from 1964 onward, the real signifi­
cance of the di sagreements was ju'st not communi cated to member churches. 
An example are the minutes from the specially called Board meeting for 
the evening of March 30, 1965, to reconsider the GPCCls stand on House 
Bill 1307. The meeting was held in the Bethel AME (African Methodist 
Episcopal) Church. According to common testimony, the discussion was 
extremely tense and often times harsh;, yet, the mi-nutes are completely 
devoid of the true verbal exchange and, therefore, the true degree of 
conflict over the issue, HB 1307, IIcompensatory education,1t within the 
GPCC. In this case, as in others, members and congregations were not 
being- told what was the state of the crucial issues currently being 
"hammered" out in the GPCC. The word of mouth communication by some 
Board members to friends within a few cong.regations undoubtedly filtered 
dciwn, e.g., the Board's intense discussions 01 the issues during the 
1968 Summer Crisis programs in the downtown Youth Ministry and in Albina. 
Relatively few congregations, however!lc have their own personal repre­
sentative leaking informa~ion back to them. I have noticed a willing­
ness among the GPeC's professional staff members to discuss with me the 
important internal conflicts which had taken place in the GPec's' past 
years!lc but a strong reluctance, even complete mootness, about current 
disagreements on issues touching real conservative-liberal conflict. In 
I 
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such cases, the Executive Director and Board have consistently referred 
to the GPCC's ecumenical purpose: to be,a "meeting ground for friendly 
dialogue and cooperation on common problems.. Il Because excessive 
conflict violates the lIecumenical spirit"U .MY open conflict becomes 
embarrassing. The GPCC avoids it. In so doing, the. GPCC ecumen~cal 
functi on pragmati ca11y becomes a posture of not antagoni zi ng its s'urround­
ing secular powers. By fearing conflict and refusing to challenge power
, . 
structures, the GPCC's passive attitude conserves society's status ~. 
A Test of Authority 
The relationship between the GPCC and its several Community Action 
Programs has shifted progressively from year to year since the first, 
CAP was begun in 1964. When Paul Schulze began his work in Albina, the 
CAP which he developed there was largely a product of his own conception. 
As was pOinted out in the chapter on C-CAP, Schulze was almost given a 
,carta blanca· in Albina, because there were no rea'l models available at 
that time for church action programs to follow. The character he gave 
to C-CAP was lar~ely due to his own experimental efforts at several kinds 
of "secular" projects. Schulze intentionally directed the C-CAP program 
toward the socia-economic needs of· the black people, especially the 
youth, in'Albina. As pointed out in the C-CAP chapter, from the start" 
Schulze pointed the programs specifically at the "alienated ll black youth~ 
disregarding their church background, or lack of it. Na IIstringsli were 
attached, such as church-joining, or attending as a condition to enjoying 
the program's benefits. It was the momentum of this "secularized" direc­
tion in \l/hich Schulze launched the Albina program that made the 10ng­
lasting difference in C-CAP and the following CApt s under" the GPCC. 
I 
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Schulze1s overall style of CAP ministry was the same. C-CAP spo~sored' 
dances in 'Irving Park, and Schulze hired a black, non-church member to 
be his "street worker"--to make contact with the drop-out, black youth. 
I' 
This liberal approach to community action was an affront to the very 
conservative, Albina black churches. The result was that the. C-CAP 
program was not grounded in the local churches--a fact that was to plague 
C-CAP till the present. 
What significance does C-CAPls Jl style of ministryll have to do with 
the,organizationa1 structure of the GPeC? ~ts sig~Jficance directly 
affects the relationship of C-CAP to the GPCC in the following way. 'In 
progressive steps, C-CAP came more and more under control of non-church 
oriented people, until late 1968 and early 1969, when the GPCC faced a 
monetary crisis.. Uncharacteristically, the Board of Directors began to 
hold the Executive Director, Cate, accountable for this state of fiscal 
imbalance. Cate determined that it was C-CAPls great over-use of funds 
that was uncontrollably draining the GPCCls money. When Cate tried to 
take control of C-CAP by firing the interim director of C-CAP, he was 
staunchly rebuffed by the C-CAP's own Board of Directors. It was, in 
effect, a sho~-down of organizational power--in the face of unconstituted 
authority by the Executive Director over C-CAP.. The Albina C-CAP has 
maintained its Ilinterim director" until 1972. The GPCCls Executive 
staff was forced to spend much effort in 1969 and 1970, finding effec­
tive ways to bring the Albina·CAP back under control. An effective 
method of ncon trol,1I however" was never found, but a way of- circumventing 
C-CAP was finally worked out. 

Structurally, what the above progression of events.illustrates is 

the organizational dilemma which Paul Harrison identifies in the American 
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Bapti st Convent; on, and is endemi c to some degre'e inmost Protestant 
denominations. Formal authority is constitutionally vested in the con­
gregations, and the rest of the denominations· organizational structure 
is supposedly devoted to serving the needs of the individual congrega­
tions. There is little or no authority formally empowering the officers 
and staff. So it is with the GPec .. Cate's authority was a kind of 
lIgrasped power" over the CApis in the absence of any constitutional 
definition of authority. The test of authority over C-CAP also illus­
trates, therefore~ the previously common practice of the GPCC·s execu­
tives to operate with oligarchic power. 
The organizational problem which the ~APls present to the GPeC is 
founded on the very premise of Protestant freedom and spontaneous 
voluntarism. Like Harrison1s description of the American Baptist's 
organization, the local congregations are litera'lly laws unto themselves, 
and constitutionally~ are not accountable to any denomlnational organiza­
tion over' them'. Until 1968, the church CApis were operated without any 
constitutional provision to authorize' the structural addition.of the 
CApls. Schulze set up C-CAP's own Board of Directors in Albina, and 
made that local CAP Board of Directors a pattern for the rest of those 
seven CAP's which were to follow. Each CAP Board of Directors was to 
.' 
have its own local IIresponsibiltty" for its own special kind of programs. 
Both Cate and Schulze admitted that neither thought of the GPCCls 
formal organizational structure during the first two years of C-CAPls 
beginning, but they were primarily concerned with the practical effec­
tiveness of its new II style of ministry." When asked about the degree of 
the CApis present autonomY from the GPCC, Schulze answered that each 
CAP is IIjust about autonomous in practice right now. II He felt that the 
I

I 
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GPCCts role should not be to control or administer each CAP, but rather 
to assist and help coordinate assistance to the CAP's. Schulze' granted 
that he had never foreseen the GPCC as more than a coordinating agency 
for the CAP's, because he wanted the CAP's to be a kind of midwife to 
an essential' change in the local congregations' "style of ministering to 
thei r 1oca1 nei ghborhoods. II Both Schul ze a.nd Cate wanted those congre­
gations to develop into a new style of congregation, blending their 
separate efforts into a united ministry to their ,whole area. Special 
coordination of community act~on would come from the GPCC. Schulze 
wanted to dev~lop a new concept called IIparish clusters .. " Schulze wrote 
an introduction to the new GPCC constitution, soon to be submitted at 
,the annual 1968 meeting. Schulze there described the "parish cluster ll 
concept: 
The Church-CAP programs are the early stage formulations of what 
may eventually become smaller parish clusters working together 
even more 'unitedly on a total ministry to a neighborhood. Here, 
several parishes may well become one operational unit combining 
many of their efforts, making more economical use of their facili­
ties. While maintaining individual worship traditions~ they
could nevertheless do much together in education and community 
service. Some of their building resources could well be released 
for secular community use. (... ) 
It is essential that heavy emphasis continue on 10ca1 initia­
tive, planning and support of geographical area project ministries. 
Where additional funds are needed; they should be sought through 
the over-all supervisory structure. 
Although the church CAP programs must 'continue to maintain inia­
tive and primary responsibility for ministry for their respective 
areas, there is need for coordination through an effective and 
creative Commission. Many. of the communittes ~ problems are ,_ 
similar to those in other areas; hence, general evaluation and co­
ordination is importcm,t. in ,church-CAP, pl@ni.ng~ .The chur.ch-CAP 
structure allow,s the churches to become the agent. of comm_uni ty
development in neighborhoods. 9. , ' 
It is interesting to note a comment by the chairman of the committe'e 
whi ch' wrote' the new 196'8 consti tuti on, the priest who i ni ti ated the 
Catholic Churches' participation in the GPCC. He $aid: IIA lot of, people 
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carried out .. Mrs. Varner resigned in February, 1969, and Mr. Nelson was 
assigned to be the "interim director ll of C-CAP. In the following' 
months,- Nelson hired another person to the C-CAP st~ff, without con­
sulting William Cate over at the GPCC. ' 
It was in late 1968 that a new treasurer, Mr. Lowell Steen, took 
over for the GPCC. Mr. Steen was aghast at the great expenditures' 
through the previous summer and fall for the Black Summer.Crisis in 
relation to the income for 1968. (Part of the Summer Crisis program 
and expenditure was focused on the Youth Ministry and Charix Coffee 
House for ualienated ll youth. Note c~apter on Hub-CAP. But by far the 
largest outlay was for the ,work in Albina.) In an interview with Steen, 
he said that the GPCC's work in community action had had several bene­
ficial effects, and he named three specifically: demonstrated to the' 
city that the GPCC was truly acting to benefit the cqmmunity;, demon­
strated to the churc~ people of Portland what needs to be yet done; and 
it took some of the pressure off individual churches which could not 
have handled'the action projects individually. After paying these 
compliments, Steen said: ,lf,The financial situation of the GPCC was in 
a mess when' I was elected Treasurer. The admi nistrati on of the Counci 1 
was deplorable, starting with Bill Cate; As far as the money of the 
Council was concerned, Cate was irresponsible.. Cate didn1t know how 
much money was in the Council-Js- account, but he authorized spending it 
to the point of a great deficit. .. Cate CQuld do this because Bill 
Cate really was the GPCC. (Cate had announced his resignation by the
- , 
time of this interview, and Steen ,remained treasurer only through 1969.) 
The churches have a tendency to do thi s • . . to not put ministers .on 
the spot and hold them financially responsible. 'I Later on in the inter­
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view, Mr. Steen said that, as the financial officer of the GPGG, it was 
extremely difficult to deal wi,th the CAP's, because "we could never get 
a realistic, itemized budget of their planned expend~tures for the 
coming months, or year from most of the tAP's.1t Steen thought that a 
part of the i rresponsi b 1 e use of the money \'/a·s due to the CAP I saver-use 
of that ·extra. amount that had poured in~o the GPCG for the Summer 
Crisis. Yet, Steen still maintained that Cate himself allowed the situa­
tion to get out of hand. 
When telling about the events during the Black Summer Crisis at 
C-CAP, Mrs. Varner said that Co1den Brown, the special leader for the 
Black Crisis program, found out early in his stay with C-CAP that Cate 
held the purse-strings for anything connected with the Summer ,Crfses 
programing. Mrs. Varner said that Brown had convinced Cate that just 
about everything he (Brown) would undertake was an immediate necessity. 
She said that to everybody's amazement at C-CAP, Brown would come away 
from Cate1s'office with a check for whatever he wanted. Other respond­
ents corroborated this story, saying that Brown scared every minister 
who was connected with the Black Crisis events into believing that if 
his programs.didn't go off immediately~ as planned, the black community 
would reach the feared exploding point, and there would be "real 
trouble" (violence). Robert Nelson said that Colden Brown had, step by 
step, hired 15 black people as his special staff for the Black Crisis 
programs. Few expenditures were spared--if Brown advocated the need for 
the expense, according to the respondents. 
The speci.a 1 amount of money recei ved by' the GPCC for the Summer 
Crisis program at C-CAP and Hub-CAP totaled a~proximately $48,000. 
Most of this sum went to the Black Summer Crisis in Albina, and according 
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to Mr. Steen the books showed a large 1968 ·deficit of· about $lO~OOO~ 
This defi-cit increased at a rate over $1,000 a month when Steen,was 
first taking over as Treasurer. Later on Cate said that the CAP's 
deficit had reached $25,000 by the middle of 1969, when the GPCC was 
starting its new funding effort, the "Genesis Campaign. 1I In retrospect, 
it is easy to understand the sudden pressure which. the new Treasurer 
~xerted upon the Executive Director and the GPCC's Board of Directors. 
At the Board meetings, Mr. Steen relentlessly pursued the necessity 
for economizing and balancing the budget--in the early months of 1969 •. 
Cate advised all the CAP's about their' empty bank accounts~ especially 
C-CAP and its lIinterim director," Robert Nelson. 
It was in this situation that Mr. Nelson hired an extra assistant 
at C-CAP, without contacting Cate or his own C-CAP Board. Apparently, 
this new drain on the CAP's limited funds seemed to Cate a willful 
defiance:of his own authority by Mr. Nelson. This happened soon after 
the time Mrs. V.~rner res i gned at the end of February, 1969, and' Mr. 
Ne1son began to opera te in the capaci ty of "i nteri m di rector. II Accord-' 
ing to Mrs. Varner, Cate phoned her, inviting her to meet with him~ the 
GPec President, the Rev~ Royald Caldwell, and another GPCC officer, to 
di scuss fi ndi ng a permanent C-CAP di rector. to.~fo 11 ow Mrs. Varner. The 
meeting was set at a nearby, Albina, Roma.h Catholic settlement house, 
and Mrs. Varner became suspicious of the meeting.ls purpose. On her own 
volition, she called Mr. Nelson, and invited him to go to the meeting 
with her. As she suspected, Dr. Cate was surprised to see Mr. Nelson 
arrive at that meeting. Cate's purpose was to discuss the possibility 
of Mrs. Varner's taking the action of "dismissing" r4r. Nelson--·in her 
official capacity. If her guess was right, she wanted Cate himself to 
'. 1 
i 
I 
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say he wanted to fire Nelson. Mrs. Varner said~ "I figured that if they 
(GPGG) wanted to get rid of Bob (Nelson), he must be getting in their 
(white establishment IS) craw, and if so Bob is worth keeping at C-CAP 
working for us. II She descri bed Cate as becomi n9 very angry; the only 
'time she had' ever seen Cate "blow his cool. 1I She quoted Cate as telling 
Mr. Nelson, "You have blocked everything I have tried to do through our 
program for the Albina area •.. II 
I 
.1 
ISchulze and other respondents, including Nelson himself, described ! 
Mr. Nelson as a strong churchman, and a good friend of Gate during the 
early days 'of the GPCCts involvement in Albina. The longer Mr. Nelson 
became active in the C-CAP Board of Directors, and worked directly with 
and for many black people along with Schulze, he progressively became 
more militant for the black cause. 
Soon after this meeting with Mrs~ Varner 'and Mr. Nelson, Cate 
asked the President 'of the GPCG, the Rev. Royald Caldwell, to write a 
letter to Mr.~,Nelson, terminating his services with C-CAP, because of 
the CAP's' fi nanci a 1 troubles. Robert Nelson was determi ned to' fi ght Ca te 
j and the GPCC's authority over C-CAP to be the decision maker for dis­
! missing and employing the CAPls staff members'. Nelson knew he had,the 
I 
sympathy of most of the black people on the C~CAPts Board of Directors~ 
I 
 so he informed the C-CAP Board that they no longer had to take a back 

" 
seat to the GPCC. Nelson asked the C-CAP Board tO,decide whether heI should be fired~ or whether they (C-CAP) could find a solution to their 
I financial problems themselves. In an intervie~ with Robert Nelson about 
j 
a month after the President of the GPec had written the letter to C-CAPls 
1 Board chairman, demand'ing Nelson's dismissal as Hinterim director," 
1 
. 
t Nelson gave to the writer the four mimeographed copies of the corres- , 
"60 
pondence between the GPCC and C-CAP concerning Nelson's dismissal. As 
noted above, .however, Nelson remained lIinterim director" until 1972. 
Mr. Nelson told the researcher that the C-CAP Board had discussed 
in its recent meetings the possibility of leaving the jurisdiction.of the 
GPCC. The Board members, he said, felt they now had access to sources \ t 
of financial funds, both in and out of Albina, and that C-CAP could 
make it on its own from then on. Nelson said he discouraged them from 
parting from the GPCC~ because he thought it more important to remain in 
contact with the rest of the churches in Portland. The churches would 
be of great help in developing their ideas of urban responsibility, as 
well as receiving financial help from the churches in the long run. How­
'. iever, Nelson strongly stated that C-CAP was now taking the steps- necessary 
I 
I 
to obtain their autonomy to become more politically active. I 
The obvious problem which C-CAP has always had is the lack of 
I 
financial resources within its own constituency. Those few black churches I 
which were members of C-CAP, together with individual black people taking 
I interest in the progra~, had little' money to contribute. By itself,
. 
,. 
.C-CAP had little leverage to obtain national church funds or federal 
grants. C-CAP was largely financially dependent upon the GPCC. This 
hard fact was no deterrent, however, in C-CAP's willingness to challenge 
the GPCC I S author; ty over them. From the t"ime o~ Cate I s aborted attempt 
to fire Nelson, there was a different re1ationship between the GPCC-­
especially the Executive Director, William Cate--and the C-CAP group. 
Tension grew steadily. Robert Nelson and the C-CAP staff became more 
militantly active. For instance, on June 2,1969, a "rumble"'at an 
Albina hamburger drive-in brought a great number of Portland City Police, 
followed by a large number of arrests of the black people within the area. 
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At that time, the city1s Chief of Police was out of town at a conference. 
Because of the lIexplosive situation ;n Albina,lI.tbe Deputy Chief of 
Police, Pat Carr, decided to make a "show of force Jl by the police. 
. . 
Following the event,' Robert Nelson and ~;s s.taff were extremely indignant 
at the indiscriminant mass ar~ests and police violence against so many 
black on-lookers in the vicinity. Ne1son l s staff decided to coordinate 
a petition effort to recall the Deputy Police Chief, who made the 
decision to "show force. \I This type of political .activity was not can": 
sonant with Cate's concept of church-CAP business. ' Cate said that . 
Robert Nelson has been' ~'abrasive" to churches in the GPCC, and that he 
has "swiped our program" (from the GPCC) by moving C-CAP away from a 
"church-centered" CAP. 
I 
I 
I' 
i 
When C-GAP's own Board of Directors acted as its' own organization 
and rebuffed the authoritarian command from Cate through the GPeG's' 
President, Caldwell, that Robert Nelson be fired from C-CAP, it amount~d 
to C-CAP's dec1aration·of independence from the GPeG. That act also 
affected the other CApis intimate relationship to the GPCC. It became 
a tenuous business relationship. From then on, C-CAP's main connection 
to the GPCC was reduced to finances. I 
I 
Evaluation of Power and Authority 
As the first pages of this chapter discussed, the GPCC follows most 
Protestant denominations in America by placing its highest formal value 
upon the autonomY of the local unit and the freedom of the individual.­
Constitutionally, the GPCC's organization is anything but hierarchical. 
Max Weber's categories of authority are primarily ~pplicable to authori­
tarian and hierarchical organizations. Weberls models for studying 
J 
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organizations are, therefore, difficult to apply to much of America's 
religious organizations, and to the GPCC. 'The pietistic movements from 
Europe, particularly the Calvinistic groups, ostensibly feared old­
world ecclesiastica1 authority and excessive civil power. Largely out 
of this cradle of religious struggle and thought has come the American 
ideology for democratic government. Because American religions have' 
emphasized the suspicion of authority, these voluntary organizations-­
in formal structure--are the epitome of participatory democracy. 
However, as Paul Harrison has shawn, voluntary associations of all 
kinds in America, as well as religious denominations, have developed 
into complex organizations which have striking similarities to the 
highly centralized str~ctures of government and corporations. Contrary 
to their formal statements, the churches and other voluntary associations, 
have become corporate types in their centralized structures. The national 
officers and staff have obtained a significant degree of influence over 
the activities and policies of the local units and congregations; How­
ever, they have not obtained' power by constitutional authority. Max 
Weber's social organization theory emphasizes the necessity of legiti­
macy for those offices of authority. The people holding the offices are 
given the authority to make decisions and act by the "legal, II or con­
stitutional sanctions of that organized socia1 system. Because a social 
system cannot operate for long on the basis of the leader's own power 
alone, the leaders must find a kind of sanction which will give them a ' 
. ! 
i 
I legitimate right to exercise their power. As mentioned before, Paul 
I Harrison called this sanction rational-pragmatic authority in contrast 
J to Weber's rational-legal authority.
I During his first two years, 1959-1962, the new Executive Secretary, 
j I 
i 
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William Cate, departed little from the traditional type of ecumenical 
programs common to 1 oca1 'counei 1 s of churches. The GPCC was then forty 
years old. Many established procedures maintained its accepted tradi-' 
tiona1, annual programs. "Institutionalization ll had turned the organi­
zation away from developing new avenues of cooperative church projects. 
However, evidence indicates th~ time was ripe for Cate's kind of progres­
sive leadership in the GPCC. The process of secularization ~ad helped 
to bring several capable and vigorous liberal ministers to some of the 
larger congregations in Portland. The same pervasive, liberal influence 
was also loosening the moderately conservative attitude of many other 
clergymen in member congregations. On the other hand, when several 
ministers thought the GPCC's liberal actions had adversely affected 
their congregation, they moved in the opposite direction during the 
1960's. Two ministers officially withdrew their congregations from the 
GPGG in 1969,'and many more gradually reduced their financial support. 
A ,former president of the GPCC and member of the search committee I 
~ 
when Gate was interviewed for the Executive's Job became very critical 
I of the lIover-emphasisll during the 1960's on social action by the GPCC. 
He said that they were then looking for a man with new ideas for organi­I 
I zational management, but not too liberal. His iJn~ression from their 
interviewing Cate indicated that Cate held such moderate views ofI 
ecumenical church goals and acti~ities. This well-known Portland 
I 
minister said that he had no idea that Cate would turn out to be so 
I liberal as to go 'lover-board for political involvements, secular commun-I ity actions ... condoning actions by the Youth Ministry whichI 
1 
obstructed the ci ty' s po1 ice work . He added) "There i sn' tone 
I, 
II 
congregation in the GPCC that hasn't ,paid dearly for something the 
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Council had done to disrupt the law and alienate a lot of people in the 
city ••. ", In 1969 this respondent withdrew his congregation from GPCC 
membership in protest to, the GPCC's actions. 
,One of the most import.ant points this chapter makes is the wide 
breadth of the authority, although undefined (rational-pragmatic), that 
Cate had obtained. The chapter points out how he methodically nurtured 
individuals' support of social action goals. He gave them his personal 
attention. Several respondents have spontaneously described the loyalty 
Cate generated in this way. To a degree it is charismatic. 
This chapter has examined the oligarchic structure of power 
developed within the GPGC and the strength of Caters' IIgrasped authority.1I 
Primarily William Cate, Paul Schulze and other liberal GPCC leaders used 
their rational-pragmatic authority to attain their ultimate dual goal: 
social action in the' context of church cooperation, or ecumenism. 
Pragmatically, the classic meaning of ecumenics is the people1s willing­
. ness, or spirit for cooperative, democratic church actions. Conse­
quently, the GPCC's leaders' form of compelling their liberal interpre­
tation of church programing into social actions stands in contrast to 
the relatively reluctant, conservative lay church members in Portland's 
churches~ 
Important also to note is that Cate used "coercive ll , or o1igar'­
chic means to install his style of ecumenical efforts involving a wider 
range of "secularll life. That is to, sai~ Gate developed the oligarchic 
powers of a few leaders in the GPeG to accomplish more s~cularly 
involved, social action goals. IICongregational authority," the formal 
gov'ern'j ng pri nci p 1 e of the GPCC, was overcome by the i nforma1, practi ca1 
way of getting things done through the existing ·organization. It 
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allowed the real decision making to fall into the hands of the Executfve 
Director and a relatively few Executive staff members, together with an 
e1ite group of the elected Board and officers. However, on the 
informal ~ pragmatic power level, it \I·1as the Executive Director who held 
the ultimate direction of decision making. 
Secondly, attached to the leaders· oligarchic control of the 
organization was the layer of organizational insulation between the 
effective leaders and the large number of lay church members. The most 
important ingredient to this layer of insulation was the apathy of the 
congregations' delegates' to the GPCC's two Assembly meetings a year. 
Apathy was also fostered by the clergymen of the member churches, because 
they largely influenced the attitude and commitment to the GPCC. This 
chapter pointed out that the same relatively few delegates had held 
most of the elected offices of the GPCC.during the 1960's. 
Because clergymen's livelihood depends on the "success ll of their 
own congregations, few local clergymen can afford to encourage their most 
capable lay 'members to be lIecumenicallyll active in the GPCC at the 
expense of their. own congregations. Pastors of struggling congregations, 
or congregations which feel threatened by the liberalness of the GPCC, 
therefore, avoid the GPCC by not attending th~mselves and not sending' 
delegates. Those delegates who do attend the annual meetings do not 
chal1en~ the GPCC's pre-prepared slate of officers, etc. 
Also, the GPeC published information about its more liberal action 
programs, harmonized and filtered of the details which would be too 
offensive to the great number of apathetic member congregations. The 
news-letters minimized the controversial issues, and maximized unity and 
cooperation--through social action. Cate, Schulze, Bonthius, Wright, 
t 
. j 
I 
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Menzel and others made extra efforts, mentioned by several respondents, 
to publish a dearth of IItheological study papers ll as the basis of new 
"position papers~ which were adopted ,by the Board of Directors. TheII 
congregations, however, were a1most always left out of the preparation 
and ci rculation of these papers--un.ti 1 they were fi rmly adopted. 
By the unchallenged pre-selection of Board members and the control­
ling of information, a bureaucratic layer of insulation was built up by 
the more permanent, hired staff leaders, and extended to encompass their 
\ 	 new structural appendages~ the CAP's. The leaders consistently stressed 
the new action programs' religious orthodoxness and ecumenical IIneed." 
\ 
Apparently to a great degree they kept the image of ·the new programsI relatively conservative, until the Summer of 1968. 
I 	 In Part III of this chapter, the power-authority relationship 
between the CAP's, specifically the Albina C~CAP, is discussed in the , 
• context of the 1968-1969 dispute over C-CAP's excessive use of the CApis 
1 total funds. At C-CAP the spe~ial director for ,the Black Summer Crisis 
I program, Colden Brown, had been able to convince William .Cate to allow 
I him, Brown, to spend greater and greater amounts on their Crisis pro­
I gram, till there was a large deficit. However, that fall the new 
Treasurer, L. Steen, placed heavy pressure upon Cate to reduce the over­
spending following the Summer Crisis programs. Soon after Steen had 
bluntly made the accusation at a GPeC Board meeting, Cate took action 
to fire Robert Nelson at C-CAP. As-the chapter points out, Nelson 
resisted with the aid of the C-CAP Board of Dire'ctors., of whom very few 
were church members. According to Cate, C-CAP had become so non-church 
oriented and was continuing to spend money on new, non-church oriented 
staff members, he felt urgent tactis were needed. Several of -the C-CAP 
!'B!l'!'PII'! 
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Board, Mrs. Varner told the researcher, consisted of black activists, but 
not of Black Panthers, as Cate charged. When Cate could not get rid of 
Nelson and his association with the black IIradicals,1I Cate moved 
quickly to remove the GPeC as a major source of money for C-CAP. 
William Cate's interaction with the few conservatives on his Board 
of Directors over the use of funds for the 1968 Summer Crisis programs 
reveals that Cate reacted with his own brand of conservativism. How­
ever, Cate's reaction, toward the crititism directed at himself was his 
own effort to restore the confidence of his Board in the Community 
Action Programs, as well as in his management of them. 
Theoretically, the sharp criticism by the new Treasurer about 
Cate's loose financial management represented a significant tear in the 
canopy of ,insulation constructed around the CApls. In order to repair 
that hole, Gate had to restore the appearance of the CAP's religious 
orthodoxY and, social conservativism. Cate himself, therefore, reacted 
conservatively. Since Cate knew the GPGC's social action practices 
had to maintairl 'a 'degr€;e of visible conservativism to appease their more 
conservative members, he acted swiftly to rejuvenate that appearance. 
Another very important factor contributed to Cate's stimulation to 
restore the CAP's good image. A committee to·'rewrite the GPCC constitu­
tion was at that time sending out its final draft for the first adoption 
I reading in the April annual meeting. , This constitution completely 
I reorganized the GPGG's working organization around three main social 
I action divisions. One of the new divisions is CUE~ the Center for Urban 
I Encounter.' Its purpose is to offer a variety of means to educate the 
j 1aymen of the member congrega ti ons about social act; on: its' thea 1 ogi ca1 
meaning, its goals and its practical applications. Both Gate and Schulze 
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have told me that they consider CUE the'most- important vehicle-by which 
they would be able to convey social action goals into the GPCC's 
future. The adopt"i on of thi s cons ti tuti on, therefore, was extremely 
important to Cate, Schulze and all the liberal leaders. It was a 
crucial time. Cate did not want to jeopardize its adoption with a last­
mi nute conservati ve reacti on, erupting out of the Boar.d and mushroomi ng 
in a chain reaction throughout the general membership. It would have 
destroyed the liberal goals of the GPCC to which these men were so com­
mitted. 
In other words, Cate knew the GPCC had to maintain a paradoxical 
posture: a traditional, conservative appearance--an inherent part of the 
liberals' protective insulation-'-while at the same time, more seriously 
pursuing liberal social action ,goals. 
.~ 
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CHAPTER X 
, SOCIAL INSULATION 
In many church bodies and in their various structural divisions, 
evidence (viz., Chapter 1) confirms that an increasing number of the 
activist ministers involved in controversial issues have positions within 
the churches· organizations which are organizationall~ insulated from 
the lay members. Beginning with the "Selma Freedom March" in 1965, the 
greater proportion of clergymen taking part in protests, civil rights 
organizations, etc., has been non-parish pastors, such as campus pastors 
and specialized divisions of the national body. The many departments 
of the National Council of Churches and the ecumenical councils of the 
larger cities in the United States have also supplied more and more of 
the clergymen to the social activist ranks. These non-parish ministers 
are protected, that is, they are insulated by the independent, special­
ized departments within many of the ·larger church organizations through­
out the country. The local congregation is kept at a distance, organi­
zationally, so that it does not have much restrictive leverage upon the 
activist clergym~n in higher structural levels. This is also true in 
denominational groups without hierarchical polity--that is, without 
formal authority .. As part of the larger organizat·ional structures, these 
liberal clergymen do not need to fear the laymen1s displeasure against 
their own social action involvements. 
Throughout the preceding chapters, we have wrestled with the fact 
that with';n the GPCC's membership there was ~arely a perceptible reaction 
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to the GPec's new social action policie$ and activities. In the light of 
the conservative reactions described from studies listed earlier in the 
previous chapter, the question IIwhy" the relatively mild reaction to 
the GPCC's actions and le~ders .now leads this stuqy to the conclusion 
of its central question. Theoretically, the sociological answer for 
the unexpected m; 1d reacti on wi thi n the GPCC can be termed the' process 
of insulation. The emphasis on the social process, or interaction of 
people and. groups is deliberate. To be sure, .the GPCC's organization 
provides much of the GPCe's leaders and activist staff members'with 
structural insulation, but the II structure ll of the GPCC between the leaders 
and cOAgregational laymen is primarily informal organization. The Execu­
tive Director has led in the insulation process by maneuvering the 
constitutionally powerless Board of Directors through his own dynamic 
. , 
informal authority. This change of organizational impotence into a " 
formidable ·social force within the community was also dependent on the 
conditions predetermined by the dialectic process of secularization. 
The study has found seven separate forms, or aspects, of social insula­
tion surrounding the GPCC's social action programs. They are: (l) the 
apathy of the large numb~r of GPCC members; (2) the oligarchic take-over 
of the GPCC's governtng process; (3) the lack of communication .with the 
uninvolved member congregations; (4) the financial independence of the 
GPCC's action programs; (5) the church-CAP's semi-autonomous relationship 
to the GPCG, which made laymen's criticisms of GAP social action diffi­
cult to focus on the GpCC as the responsible agent; (6) the seculariza­
tion of an increasing number of parish pastors within m~mber congrega­
tions; (7) the GPCG1s ambivalent posture before laymen and the public, 
holding to conservative policies '~/hile acting very liberally. 
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The first form of insulation is member apathy. As Michels has 
informed us, the problem of membership apathy plagues almost every volun­
teer organization. However, in this loose religious organization, there 
is what we have previously termed, double volunteerism. The active lay 
chur~h member is asked to give loyalty to a second religious group, the 
GPCC, which is not a part of his own church background. However, the 
local congregation usually has soc~alized its better members into a 
primary loyalty for its own goals, doctrine and denomination. 'For the 
local church member's religious dedication, the GPCC seldom runs more 
than a distant second, third or fourth. 
The precariousness of the layman's loyalty to ,the GPCC easily comes 
to a separating point, because the local pastor will not encourage, but 
subtly discourage, his layman's participation in the GPee, if the pastor 
must choose between building the strength of his own congregation, as 
against the life'of the GPec. The local congregation can neVer escap~ 
its competitive situation, and the local pastor is judged primarily by 
its success 
, ~ 
If the pastor's laymen are partici­under his leadership. 
pating actively in GPeC committees, or on the GPec's Board of Dire~tors, 
, , 
etc., at the expense of participating in the life of the con9regation, 
and if the congregation is struggling to stay solvent, then the pastor 
will usually not hesitate to discourage his laymanls participation in the 
GPCC. The GPCe would have to be contributing a great deal to the local 
smaller congregation's survival solutions to demand even a strong 
secondary 1 oya1ty from stich pastors a'nd 1aymen. Consequently, in the 
case of many smaller congregations, the GPeC is looked upon as a competi­
tive religious organization, even though the GPCC's first goal is to 
reduce competition and aid cooperation between congregations. " Obviously, 
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the tendency to look upon the GPCC as a competitor of the local congre­
gation for its own talent 'and money is milch more prevalent amo.ng the 
more conservative congregations. 
As the, GPCC I S efforts became more and more slanted toward soci a 1 . 
action programs, the more conservative congregations took a decreasing 
interest ;n the GPeCls semi-annual meetings. Of course, the most con­
servative congregations refused,to atte~d at all, followi-ng the GPCCls 
multipl;'cation of. its church CAP's. Instead of negative reaction, their 
protest amounted to self-elimination. 
The second form of insulation was the oligarchic assumption of 
informal power primarily by William Cate and, secondly, by Paul Schulze. 
One or two elected officers may be considered loosely to have been in . 
this category of grasped author-jty, namely Robert Bonthius and Paul 
Wright. Because there was a vacuum of power at,the Executive s~aff level 
for accomplishing.the new courses toward social action, the aggressive 
personalities of Cate and Schulze quickly filled the opening. Since the 
Executive Directorts (Cate's) legal authority is almost completely 
undefined, to accomplish the goals of a strong, determined leader, the. 
new Executi ve ilgrasped" hi s author; ty in the pres~nce of that consti tu­
tional vacuum. Due to hi~ ex-officio membership:on all committees, 
including the Nominationg Committee, within his· first three Or four 
years at the GPCC, William Cate had established a Board of DirectorsI 
1 
which was sympathetic to the,liberal views of church practice, if not 
I 
committed to social action. The traditional pr~ctice of not nominating i j anyone to the Board of Directors from the floor of the Annual Meeting has 
I remai'ned consistent throughout the 1960's, and has virtually ~ssured 
Cate of a friendly Board of Directors .. 
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In the opinion of the writer, Cate's use of a peculiar combination 
of leadership qualities. gave him, to some degree, the charismatic' 
character necessary to accomplish a significant--almost radical--change 
in the GPec. Catets charisma was limited to the degree that he most 
often tried to influence people on a personal, one-to-one basis. His 
approach was low key and gradual, and consciouslY directed to a few 
important laymen of as many of the larger or important congregations as 
he could reach. Cate built up a personal following, a commitment, to 
social action principles in a group of laymen who were willing to work 
and serve on the GPCC's committees, etc.· 
Although Caters control of the Board of Directors was only· : 
inf~rmal, it was powerful in the area of promoting social action kinds 
of policies. Because of this broadly based social action. consensus on 
the Board, which Cate had methodically established, the Board of Direc~ 
tors especially, as well as th"e Commissions J chairmen and the Executive 
staff, became an oligarchic, protective covering between the church 
CAP's innovative social involvements and the critical church members" 
of the GPCC. If there is a "structural ll insulation in the GPCC, the 
informal, oligarchic control by the Executive and staff and the" Board 
of Directors is it. 
The third form of insulation was the lack of communication in both 
directions between the GPeG's leadarship and the uninvolved congregations 
(in social action). In this case, the Executive Director and his staff, 
together with the Board of Directors, acted not so much as a barrier ~o 
communication from the congregations, but rather as a filtering system, 
which absorbed the criticism directed at some of the CAP programs or 
other social action leaders. The filtering process worked in the other 
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direction also. The GPCC's Executive staff has long put out a monthly 
news letter, which interpreted the work of the separate CApis by toning 
down any "radical ll actions by the CApls, always trying to place the 
action within the context of solid theology, if not conservative 
theological reasoning. Intervie\'/ees have noted that Cate in his person­
al appearances to dissident congregations was a llmaster" at reinterpre­
ting the GPCC's controversial social policies and dispelling the con­
servatives' criticisms. 
The fourth aspect of insulation was the independent ~ources of 
money generously given directly to the· social action programs, apart from 
the support of the local congregations. As previously mentioned~ the 
national and regional levels of several denominations--the Oregon Dis­
trict of the United Methodist Women, the Presbyterian Church, USA's 
Board of Social Ministry, the Lutheran Church 'in Ame~icals Social Minis~ 
try and more--have contributed large annual grants to the GPCCls church 
CAP's and other social action work, such as the GPCC's new Center for 
Urban Encounter (CUE). Portland~s United Good Neighbors' ~und had also 
put C-CAP and East-CAP on their budget. Seldom were Cate and the Board 
forced to go to the local congregations for special hand-outs to 
finance the new social action goals. Since the independent sources of 
.. 
money released the Board from the necessity constantly to report to the 
congregati ons how we 11 the money vias be; ng uti 1i zed in any exact manner, 
the independent grants also released the Board from the conservative 
restraints of the majority of the member congregations. In fact, 
accura te 1y detai 1ed accounts .of the speci fi c use of mon; es by the 
church-CAP's was largely withheld from the Board of Directors itself. 
The fifth kind of insulation for the GPCe's leadership and CAP's 
. t 
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action programs was their inaccessibili~y, provided by the social distance 
inherent in the undefined organizational relationship of the church CAP's 
to the GPGG. When Paul 'Schulze took over the first church CAP in 
Albina~ he knew that there was no constitutional provision for the CAP's 
in the GPCC's structu~e. Schulze had almost a completely independent 
hand in developing the first CAP's, so he began to create the CAP's in 
the image of his ideal IIparish clusters. u Schulze-~always in consultation 
with Cate--decided to develop a local board of administration for each 
local CAP, made up Qf delegates from those local area congregations 
actively involved in the work of that particular'CAP. ',Each local board 
was eventually to make the individual CAP's' increasingly autonomous from 
the GPCC·s leadership. The degree of independence was determined by the 
amount of local, independent financial income each local, CAP had. For 
instance, ,Hub-CAP had, access from wi th in its own a rea to spec; a 1 contri bu­
tions by several of the largest downtown congregations in the city. The 
spec; a 1 grants to CAP's programs from denominati,ona1 foundati ons were 
most often given to the GPCC to divide, as it saw fit, among the CAP's. 
This financial control gave the GPCC leadership a greater control over 
some of the CAP's than 'over those more financi ally independent. , 
Because the GPCC published more frequently tn the later S1xties 
that each 1oca1 church, CAP had its own cctioh program speci ali zed for its 
own area and guided by its own board of directors, apart from the ~, 
the city's conservative congregations were' increasingly unable, to identifyI the GPCC itself as the target for their 'reactions. Because the CAP's 
t 
never were a constitutional part of the GPCC until 1969, the amount of 
unofficial authority the GPCC staff exerted over each individual CAP's 
j policies was largely a mYstery, even to members of the Board. The 
I 
I 
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undefined, semi-bureaucratic relationship of the CAP's, to the GPCC's 
executives served to blur the CAP~s responsibilities for their own 
l1beral activities. Therefore, the quasi-autonomous distance separating 
the CAP's from the,GPCC confused most members outside of the executive 
circle, and became a source of bureaucratic insulation against local 
church reactions. 
The sixth aspect of, insulation within the GPCC is the increased 
secularization of pastors serving local parishes among a wider number and 
'variety of church denominations. Applied to the ministry, "seculariza­
tion" does not mean that these men are less "sp iritual,1I or more 
materialistic, but that they are more sympathetic with social change 
through the chur~h's involvement in social action. Several of the 
studies of clergy, mentioned in Chapter 1, in the first part of this 
chapter give a perspective about those ministers ~ho are, or were, in 
parishes and took active parts in controversial social actions. However, 
there are also indications that a growing number of ministers who do 
not become activists are becoming more sympathetic with the church's 
social actions. 
In his 1967 nationa.l survey of 7,441 Protestant clergy, Hadden 
found that regardless of theology, conservative or liberal, clergymen I 
were "~verwhelmingly" sympathetic to the Negroes I right to achieve com­
I 
, , 
plete social justice in America. 1 However, those of 'conservative 
I 
theological background continued to be more conservat~ve on social 
I issues. Hadden asked three questions. The first, "I basically dis­
I approve of the civil rights movement in America,u was almost completely 
i 
rejected in every denomination. From a low of four per cent of 
Presbyterians to a high of eight per cent of Methodists and Missouri 
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Synod Lutherans agreed with the statement. 
r 
The second question of the survey was, "For the mos~ part, the 
churches have been woefully inadequate. in facing up to the civil rights 
issue. II Agreement to the statement was at a high of 77 per cent among 
American Baptists to a low of 69 per cent among Missouri Synod Lutherans. 
When the "probably agree" responses are added, the over-all proportion 
rises to 85 per cent. 
The third question was, "Many whites pretend to be very Christian 
while in reality ·their racial attitudes demonstrate their lack of or 
misunderstanding of Christianity,." Agreement with the third statement 
ranged from 78 per cent by Missouri Synod Lutherans to 83 per cent for 
Ameri can Bapti s ts and Pres byte ri ans. The "probab ly &gree II responses 
raise the total sympathetic group to at least 90 per cent in every 
denomination. 
This cross-section of American Protestant clergy, most of whom are 
serving pari~hes, demonstrates that more parish pastors are now con­
cerned abo~t real social changes within civil rights issues, even 
though a minority of those serving parishes become outspoken and per­
sonally involved. The broad spectrum of parish pastors· favorable 
attitude toward the church, i.e., the GP.CC as the church ecumenical 
participating in the local social action work, has helped to moderate 
the irate reactions of conservative parishoners~ In many ways since the 
GPCC's progressive social involvement', moderately tfsecularizedll pastors 
of member congregations have absorbed their laymen's cri·tical reactions 
by personally giving a constructive explanation of the GPCC's program­
ing. By calming reactionary laymen, instead of siding with their con­
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servativism, many parish pastors have become part of the insulation pro­
cess whic~ protects the GPCC. 
The seventh form of insulation is the GPeC's ambivalence in pre­
senting simultaneously to the public both an avowed conservative posture, 
while devoting its greatest efforts to liberal social actions. Because 
it pervades and influences all the ather insulative forms, this con­
tradictory word against action is probably the most important aspect "of 
insulation. It was to this "game" of playing it both ways that William 
Cate studiously styled his administrative efforts. Cate deliberately 
avoided antagonizing conservative churchmen from the time he arrived. 
Cate was 'a tireless spokesman .to a wide variety of church meetings 
throughout the city, reassuring the apprehensive congregations that the 
GPCC's new Community Action Programs were not taking over the GPCC's 
primary goals. Cate also minimized the incr~asing social involvement 
by reinterpreting it into conservative ("solid") theological terms. 
Paul Schulze and Robert Menzel (Hub-CAP),. both of whom were ministers in 
the very conservative Missouri Synod Lutheran Church, were of a great 
aid to Cate and the GPCC in preparing IIposition" papers on sticky 
issues, giving ~he theological justification for the proposed GPCC 
action,- or socfal stand. 
I nterna lly, then, the GPCC worked fi erce.ly to increase the effec­
tiveness of its social action programs, while externally the GPeC was 
widely propagandizing to the c~nservative churchmen and public that it 
was still using the more traditional programs that honored the status ~ 
va~ues of the local congregations. On the one hand, the GPCC leadership 
forcefully committed the organization to social action goals; while ~ 
the other hand, they revived many of the older programs that assisted 
OSl 

CHAPTER XI 
INSULATION--PREVENTION IN THE PROCESS OF LEGITIMATION 
Two Theories of Legitimation 
Although fewer liberal parish pastors are willing to risk the 
reactionary consequences from their own aroused laymen by becoming ac­
tive in socio-political causes, another IIbrand" of minister has become 
socially active--the non-parish minister. Examples of such activist, 
non-parish ministers are exemplified in the GPCC 1 s church CAP's, such 
as Paul Schulze and Robert Menzel. Apparently this pattern developed 
because of the insulation a non-parish church organization provides 
these activist-ministers. If this is true, how does the insulation of 
the larger organization legitimate these ministers' controversial 
activities? 
The key question becomes" what is legitimation? Max Weber con­
ceived of legitimacy in terms of sociology of .politics, and therefore, 
in the context of the relationship between command and obedience, power 
and authority. Weber asked the question, "How is political lea,dership 
established--that is, legitimated?" He has given a classical description 
of the three ways by which a leader's authority may be legitimated: 
rational-legal authority, traditional authority and charismatic authority. 
They are described in Chapter 9 relative to authority. 
In his study of the American Baptist Convention, Paul Harrison has 
found a fourth type of authority, which stands alone in its own style of 
.. 
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legitimation.. He calls it II ra tional-pragmatic lJ authority.. (This defini­
tion is also briefly discussed in Chapter 9 in the context of authority.) 
The power that comes to this office holder is not legally authorized by 
the organization, or its constitution. Usually such an office is given 
a certain amount of responsibilities, but very little legitimate author­
ity over other parts of the organization.. In order to "get things done ll 
and carry out responsibilities, the office hoJder begins to exercise 
power in the vacuum where no power was legally authorized. Harrison 
called it "power grasped. It Harrison's ,study points out that voluntary 
organizations are less likely to develop elaborate enough constitutions 
to spell out specifications of II ra tional-legal li authority, rational­
pragmatic authority. The power he grasps. is legitimated by its very use. 
As Berger and Luckmann would say, it is lIobjectivated li into a facticity. 
Weber said that authority is legitimated power •.Harrison shows that 
new power is acquired by a leader often because he has the temerity to 
"grasp" and exercise new power. Because he gets away with it, the power 
is changed into author; ty, and it becomes a II fact. \I 
More'recent writers in the sociology of knowledge interpret 

"l egi ~imation II as a much more comprehensive process--~ process that . 

explains and justifies our whole social order. 'All socially objecti­

vated "knowledge ll is legitimating. An lIobjectivation" is any human 

activity attaining a II rea lity that confronts its original producers as 

, a facti ci ty externa 1 to and other than' themselves" III 
Legitimation is essentially processua), because any Ilknowledge" 
that is socially objectivated into practi~al life is legitimating. 
Language names and evaluates social objects, and thereby places them 
into a social order. Then in return, language imposes its own order upon 
" 
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social things to the point that it builds up a cognitive and normative 
2structure!) wh·i ch becomes the knowl edge of its parti cul ar s'oci ety. In a 
processual dialectic, man creates his society and its order, principally 
through language, and society1s order, in turn, recreates the peopl~ who 
first produced that pattern of society. : 
I have noted before that by the continual outpourirg of himself, 
physically and mentally, man externalizes his inner person to society. 
Some of these products ,of his social interaction become objectivated,. 
or factually real. These social objects confront men as real natural 
objects, as .being separate from' man's own production. (This may also 
be seen as the process of institutional~zation.) Finally, the internal­
ization of social objects is man's transformation, or appropriatio~, of 
his own objectivated social structures into his own subjective con­
sciousness. The total interaction process of man with his own 
socially constructed world is dialectic, since although he is the con­
structor of his own social structures, the same structures turn back 
upon man and coerce him into new positions (physically, mentally and 
socially) within the social order. The social objects, or institutions, 
in effect, create and recreate men. The process of legitimation is the 
knowledge of these objectivated social structures, which is constantly 
used to explain and stabilize the'already established social order. 
More specifi,cally, legitimation is the continual re-telling and re­
, ---­
exp.l ai ning the meani ngs of the soci a 1 lI'facts II already accepted--but now 
weakening. 3 Legitim~tion is the process of continued social mainten­
ance. 
In the light of this dialectic process, it becomes clearer that' 
the objectivity of a social order is, at first, self-leg;ti~atinQ. By 
184 
simply being there, an establis.hed institution .habitualizes its own 
acceptance into being self-evident. B~t on-a- further level, this self­
legitimating facticity ;s never complete. The taken-far.-grantedr 
objectivity of an institution is periodically- challenged by the up­
coming generation, the new under-classmen, or new members of a group. 
During those times when events lead to a crisis, which forces the mem­
bers of the group to question the reasons as to 'the why of the institu­
ticn, or why its 
\ 
norms are followed, again and again the old legitimating 
·formula must be repeated. It is precisely during crises when strong 
challenges occur and when strong legitimating reasons must be offered. 
So the objectivations within ~ social group--the institutions, norms, 
the whole social order--are self-legitimating ~ long ~ there ~ no 
serious challenges. The GPec's leaders tried to do just that--prevent 
serious challenges to the new social action 'programs. 
A Paradigm of Structural Insulation 
From a sociology of knowledge point of view, the intensity with 
which a group needs to maintain its particular $ocial order depends upon 
the intensity of. the questions and challenges directed at its ordered 
practices. The actions that a social group undertakes t.o maintain its 
own social constructions are the processes of legitimation. In order to 
contrast the Weberian-based structural-functionalist understanding of 
how churches maintain, or legitimate, their authority as'against the 
interactionist's "knowledge" theory interprets it, I will use a recent 
study 'by James R. Wood as an illustration. Wood discusses how insulation 
fits into legitimating a church body's authority, but he views it 
through a structural interpretation. What is the relation of "social 
~ r-:I 
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insulation ll to legitimation? 
Most church laymen have little or no contact with their national 
church body. Few laymen know or understand the relationships and work· 
ings of the national agencies, departments and high offices of their 
church denominations. Yet, this social distance does not always 
insulate the national church1s high, policy-making leaders from the 
local laymen·s negative reactions. In a.recent study, James R. Wood 
compares the degree of formal authority built into different denomina­
. tions' polity and how this degree of hierarchical authority affects 
the willingness of local congregations to carry out the liberal racial 
integration policies of the larger church body. Woodis hypo~hesis 
stated: liThe strength of racial integration policy varies directly 
with the degree to which leader control is legitimated by denominational 
polity.1I4 Wood argues that when a sufficiently controversial policy is 
made by a denomination and it acts upon the policy (civil' rights 
actions, etc.) through congregations, then the members will be aroused 
from the i r apa thy. The 1a i ty wi .11 then cha11 enge the authori ty of the 
leaders. In these cases, .Wood reasoned, membership apathy would no 
longer protect the policy makers, and the determining factor supporting 
the policy makers· controversial policy would.·be formal authority from 
the organization. 
In his findings, Wood concludes that when members are aroused from 
their apathy to challenge leadership policy, informal power deteriorates, 
but formal authority becomes the crucial determinant of policy co~trol. 
Leaders are more likely to press for policy in controversial 
areas when they have 'formal authority insulating· them from mem­
ber resistance. 
I' 
I 
I 
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Data from 28 major religious bodies supported this logic.

The association bet\'/een denominational polity and strength of 

policy' in the highly controversial area of racial i.ntegration 

failed to disappear even when theology) regional membership, 

and size were held constant. Furthermore, the relationship was 

strongest in those circumstances (fundamentalis~, Southern 

membership and small size) where disturbance of apathy would 

appear to make policymakers most vulnerable. 

Viewed in the light of previous ,studies indicating that'offi­
cials in congregational bodies normally have control over policy
comparable to that of hierar'chical officials, these findings 
suggest that, the Hiron law of oligarchy" is not a law at all but 
an empirical generalization which does not hold in such circum­
stances' as extreme controversy. When there is controversy, 
leaders tend to retrench their control of policy to that level 
, which is anchored in the mandate of their offices. This retrench­
ment leads to an important differentiation of power based ,on the 
degree of authority. As hinted earlier, hierarchical leaders can 
better face controversy for at least two reasons: (1) While hier­
archical leaders may use their most powerful sanctions as little as 
possible (because of their alienating character), such sanctions' 
are significant as a backdrop for persuasive efforts, and they'may 
be used when necessary. For example, in most hierarchical denomi­
nations a rebellious congregation must surrender its property upon
withdrawal (or expulsion) from the parent body. Knowledge of this 
fact often tempers rebellion. (2) Even in a voluntary association 
to which an individual is free to belong 'or not to belong~ a mem­
ber is not free to reject the authority exercised by other indi­
viduals in accordance with the norms of the association (Bierstedt, 
1954:81). Hierarchical leaders have a solid resource in the norms5of du,e process and orderliness inherent in their polity. ' 
Woodis study is a good example of how organizational insulation works 
to protect the clergy who are in the higher echelons of a church' organiza­
tion. Wood does not include the parish pastor as a member of the "leaders ll 
of the denomination ,II who are protected by the formal authority of the 
organizationa1 structure. So it is in the larger organization, super­
ceding the local congregation) which gives the'organizational insulation 
to the denomination1s policy ~akers. Wood does not claim that the national 
church body's formal authority serves to insu,late the local pastor from 
lay reprisals. Wood's study does not consider the local pasto~ as a 
"l eader" in the national organization. 
Woodis independent variable was polity. He contrasted the IIformal 
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authorityll of hierarchical church bodies against the ulocal autonomY" of 
congregational governed bodies. The results of WoodIs 'investigation 
demonstrated that the hierarchical organizations give the policy makers 
the legitimate power to make'policies which are controversial and to 
insist the congregations enact such policies. 6 On the other hand, he 
found those church bodies with a congregational type of polity did not 
press for contr'oversial policies such as civil rights enactments. 
Woodis findings ~hould demonstrate that the GPeC is unable to take a 
stand on' civil rights, and certainly not be able to carry out any 10ng­
term civil rights activities. In contrast to hierarchical denominations, 
the GPCC's polity is radically congregational. Its leaders are without 
formal authority over its members. The fact is, however, the GPeC has 
taken a strong stand on civil rights and enacted several, vigorous 
Communi ty Acti on Programs for mi nori ty groups,. The di fference is that 
the GPCC has not tried to compel its co'ngregations individually to take 
liberal stands, nor even participate. Instead"tne GPCC used several 
methods to avC?id directly challenging the 'laymen's conservative, socio­
religious ideas. 
Wood emphasized the "fQrmal ll authority of the organization's 
(hierarchical) structure. The GPCC has no formal authority over congre­
.' 
gations. However, GPCC leaders have developed a limited informal author­
ity over their own bureaucracy--church-CAP's, GPCC commissions and com­
mittees. 
It is well known that most religiOUS and voluntary kinds of organi-" -.. ~ 
zations exercise control over their members primarily through normative 
power. The leaders appeal to the high ideals and religious standards to 
bring the devi~nt members under control. However~ among the large church 
" 
-.', 
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bodies with strong hierarchical polity, the formal authority entrusted 
I 
I to the policy-making leaders can be significant when exerted against 
deviating congregations. J. R. Wood points out that the hierarchical 
churches possess some very real coercive sanctions, such as: (1) con­
fiscation of property if the congregation tries to withdraw from the 
church body, and (2) strong order lines inherent in the polity, which 
gives due process. 7 The rest is norma~ive power, but it is deeply com­
pelling for those who have been socia1ized into those normative ideals 
since childhood. Hierarchical church leaders posses~, then, a combina­
tion of coercive-normative power over their constituency. In contrast, 
the GPCC has no formal authority and its normative powers are circum­
scribed on every side where one church body member may differ signifi­
cantly with another member church. As previously noted, the GPCC is 
extreme in its volunteer character. 
In his study of different churches' authority to enforce racial 
integration policies, J. R. Wood clearly concludes that hierarchical 
"leaders are more likely to press for policy in cO!1troversial areas when 
they have formal authority insulating them from member resist~nce.1I8 
More specifically, he says, the degree to which church leaders press, 
for controversial policies (racial integration) varies directly with the 
degree of the leaders' authority. Apparently viewing'it from a struc­
tural-functionalist point of view, Wood consistently equates II formal 
structure of the organization with "hierarchical'authority" of the 
leaders. His view of insulation is one of "structural insulation." Wood 
says, "Authority is important not only because it legitimates certain 
formal sanctions to be used against resisters, but also, and possibly 
more important, it gives the policymakers the support of persons who dis­
;,t~ 
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agree with their policies but uphold the political structure giving them 
the ri,ght to make such policies. 1J9 
Wood's use of the term "insulation", poses a'basic difference from 
my view of insulation, as applied to the GPCG. First, the protective 
covering which the insulation provides in the GPCC is much more of a, 
covering of the whole program of 'libera1 social 'actions, rather than a 
protecti on of the 1 i bera 1 1 eaders who deci ded upon it and enacted i,t. 'In 
other words, the insulation for the GPGG is not to legitimate ,the 
authority of the leaders of the GPCC so that the leaders· authorit~tive 
orders would have the power of the organization·s structure behind it . 
to give it coercive impact. Rather, the insulation in the'§E££ provided 
legitimation for the social action policies and ~ograms. in contrast to 
legitimating the people as leaders (Cate, Schulze, etc.), who are to have 
the legal authority to impose the action programs. Certainly it is 
impossible' ,to divorce the people, as authority figures, from the liberal 
action programs, but there is a significant difference between the GPeets ' 
action programs, which are removed from the laymen, and Woodis hier­
archical organizations, which impose their racial integration pro~rams. 
The practical difference between the GPCG's ~ivil rights (integra­
tion) ,actions as against the hierarchical denominations is that the GPCG 
did not try to pressure, or enforce, its member congregations individu­
ally to enact any particular policies of liberal social action. On the 
contrary, the GPGC's leaders avoided directly challenging their laymen's 
conservative views, religiously and socially. This was accomplished 
t' through their own process of insulation. 
In contrast to the "structural insulation" of Wood's study, I view 
I 
, --,­
\ the GPeC's insulation ~ essentially processual irr nature. Wood viewsI 
I 
::l 
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the insulation, provided by the formal structure of the organization, as 
legitimation of the authority of the hierarchical church leaders. 
Legitimation is already built into the formal organization of the hier­
archical structure, which in turn gives to its leaders the rational­
, ­
legal authority of potential coercive power to enact the integration pro­
gram at the laymen's level. The GPee's social action programs, on the 
other 'hand, were not enacted by formal authority, but by the combination 
., 
of several interacting groups and socia1 conditions, which combined to 
insulate the social action programs from conservative reaction. .These 
several interacting IIfactors" of insulation worked together to be the 
legitimating process for the GPee's new, liberal program. The-leaders, 
Cate, Schulze, etc., never sought, nor obtained, coercive power--at least, 
over the member congregations. In the hierarchical organization there 
is no real process of legitimation operative in the insulation around 
the leaders, 'since the formal structure's power to force compliance 
insures the leaders' new program. 
How Do the Individual Categories of Insulation Legitimate Such a 
Precarious, New Social Action? 
Taken individually, the seven farms of insulation did not act to 
1egitimate the 'GPCC's social involvement policy. Taken toget~er as an 
interacting whole, however, they have, for a short period of years, legi­
timated new and unorthodox programs. The separate definitions of the 
individual insulation forms in ~hapter 10 imply that some of the forms are 
controlled or manipulated by the leaders, while some of the ·o.thers are 
inert parts of the organization's social·system. The categories of 
(1) members' apathy, (5) the semi-autonomous relationship of the CAP's 
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to the GPCC, and (6) the general secularization of many parish pastors are 
obviously not categories of leaders' deliberate manipulation of the 
organization, but are more a part of the organization1s given social 
environment. It;s certainly a valid interpretation of the leaders' oli­
garchic ~ethods that they have manipulated the intercommunication systems 
in the GPCC deliberately to exert II control ll or guide the valueS and 
practices of the organization. While agreeing to this point, it is not 
to say that the specific goal-seeking actions of the leaders involved 
should be interpreted as being functionaries of IIstructuraJII power and 
authority. No one leader in the GPCC wielded the kind of authority as 
"legitimated power ll that would make him the causal determinant of the 
GPCC's new policies. No significant authoritative coercion was exerted 
to accomplish goals. The power inherent in organizational constraints 
of reward and punishment were minimal, because they were so unavai.1able 
to the executives. 
Instead of the leaders· built-in mechanisms of control, the GPCC's 
new social .inVolvement policy emerged out of the interrelations and inter~ 
actions of their legitimating elements--insulation--with the actors who 
most influence them. 
For example, the first insulation category described earlier is 
." 
membership apathy. If legitimation is the process of matntaining a 
social order's objectivity, then membership ~pathy neatly fits into pro­
moting legitimation. Because it miti~ates against those criticisms and 
embarrassing questions, which the GPCC1s "radical ll new policies engen­
dered, apathy automatically reduces the number of people who could become 
offended by the new social involvement. Since a large percentage of 
members' apathy allowed the discrepancy to continue between the leaders' 
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goal-seeking, as against the traditional, non-activist goals, new social' 
action experiments began to result in the remapping and reorganizing of 
the GPCCis total program and goals; The increased apathy was correlated 
with leaders' lack of organizational dedication to older definitions of 
goals, and conversely, the less democratic (repr~sentative) pressure 
brought to bear on the officers, the easier the officers' found it to 
manipulate the definitions of organizational norms and goals. 
On the other hand, the second and third categories of insulations 
listed before as (2) the leaders· oligarchic methods and (3) ·the lack of 
i nter-organi zati anal communi cati on, need further expl anati on" as IImarl i­
pulated ll categories. Considering oligarchic methods first, it could be 
argued that Cate did obtain such a high degree of informal authority over 
the GPCC, his rational-pragmatic authority'may have contained more 
coercive powe~ than that· of church leaders i~ hierarchical denominations 
who operate with rational-legal authority~ Paul Harrison noted this in. 
the concluding pages' of his study of the Ameri~an Baptist Convention. 
But no group can function without (formally defined) leadership, 
and it has been argued that when leaders are divested of author­
ity they will necessarily seek and gain power in order to meet 
their responsibilities; the power'they acquire may exceed that 
which ordinarily accrues to leaders in non-totalitarian, hier­
archical institutions. 10 
In one senSe Harrison's analysis does fit the GPCC, since there is some 
question whether Cate could have accomplished the radical turn-around to 
liberal goals without individually taking over informal, personal power. 
." . 
It is true that Cate gradually grasped an inordinate amount of informal 
author; ty wi thin the GPCC to i nfl uence its adopt; on of hi s .pol i ci es of 
social involvement. However, there is no evidence that Cate used coer­
cive power on members of the Board to impose his will upon their decision 
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making; In the area of administration, in the case of the CAP's, 
Chapter 5 revealed Cate did use a heavy hand in trying to "take over u 
the C-CAP in Albina (from Robert Nelson) after ihe 1968 Blatk Crisis 
program. 
, Yet, in de~ermining the goals of the organization, no sanctions nor 
other forms of naked power were evident. Cate did not need this aliena­
ting approach. His methodical groundwork had laid a strong foundation 
for great personal and informal authority. Through his control of the 
Nominating Committee and through the apathy of the great, majority of, mem­
ber congregations, Cate developed an oligarchic Board of Directors which 
was sympathetic ideologically toward 1ii?eraliz'ing' the GPCC's goals. These 
Board members usually supported Cate in his proposals, largely because 
they believed in him so thoroughly. Without much doubt, Cate had solidi­
fied his organizational strength through personal charismatic authority. 
(Cate also came to lean on Schulze for his social, action expertise, for 
hi s practi c;a1 management abi 1 i ty to make idea's work, and for hi s abi 1 i ty 
to translat.e social action problems' into acceptable conservative 
theology. I"n the process, Schulze also attracted a large amount of per-, 
sonal admiration from within the GPCC.) 
Probably the best example of Catels organizational charisma is the 
.~ 
fact that ,not one of the 19 Board members who were interviewed for this 
study knew what the organizational relationship of the CAP's was to the 
GPCC. They did not know what kind, nor degree, of authority the Board 
had over the CAP IS. With three or four exceptions, they implicitly 
trusted Cate and Schulze to know and administer this fuzzy, semi­
autonomous relationship. 
Instead of coercive sanctions wielded from the power structure of 
:rr 
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his office upon those who would oppose his ideas~ Cate relied on slowly 
building his social involvement concepts into the dominant majority of 
people--key people-who controlled the policy-making body, the Board of 
Directors. The strength radically to change goals did not de.rive from 
the power inherent in the organization's structure~ per ~, but from an 
interaction of people and events which changed the attitude and expecta­
tions of enough policy makers to change what the .organ,ization stood for- ... 
its very meaning. First, in 1963-1964 they ,adopted and put into app1i­
cation the practical change in action programs, and by 1969' thes~ 
policy makers recognized that the change to social action goals was 
accepted enough--legitimated--by members so that the organization!s con­
stitution was rewritten around the new goals. 
Talcott Parsons' classical functionalist concept of power as force-­
lithe control of the use and organization of force relative to territory 
is alway's a crucial focus of the politica1 power system ..• "--went 
hand in hand with his Weberian concept of authoritY.,ll IIAuthority to 
bind and to coerce a member of the collectivity is, in this respect, of 
the same fundamental character as authority to assume a treaty obliga­
tion.,,12 In other words, authority is society's legal right to use 
coercive power. (I realize Parsons later modified his definition of power 
to emphasize II ccl1ective .goals ll as motivation of social 'control and 
thereby deemphasized authority as legalized force. However, I think his 
original commitment to the Weberian definition of authority still stands.) 
, Authority must be understood as legitimated power; however, without 
force, there is no authority. Much the same as Paul Harrison said above, 
Parsons later stat~d that authority in the political system is the 
"power ... to get things done ... for ... the ..'. collectivity u13 
iI; 
. , 
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In trying to dispel the functionalists' concepts of "systemic 
necessities," "societal forces,1J etc., Walter Buckley comes close to 
saying that power is changed into authority, not through coercion, but 
through willing consent of the gover~ed. What Buckley ends up saying 
is that power and authority are relational: "inasmuch as power and 
authority are relational concepts, what may be a system of authority to 
some actors may be a system of power to. others. ,,14 However, he gets 
hung up on what is the difference between uwilling consent" to authority 
and the "legitimation" of it. He states that the real meaning of 
legitimation for authority isJ"voluntary compliance. 1I15 
I certainly agree with Buckley that power and authority have a 
"relational and hence relative n~ture" and that for l.egitimation of 
authority to take place there must be something of a practical compli­
ance. 16 However, the way I have tried to present legitimation in these 
pages is not as "willing" consent, or "consensus,1I by the working 
majority, but rather, it is the lack of successful or serious challenges 
to the powers that be--"to the way things are done around here. II 
Wi 11 i am Cate, Paul Schul ze and others "grasped authori ty," but 
nev~r obtained, nor used enough coercive power to change GPCC goals. 
The leaders did not change organizational goals. It was. due to several 
forces, ~ larger process. The more gradual process that changed the 
organization's goals was the dialectic of'legitimation, vaci1lating 
between challenge-resistance-retrenchment-reestablishment and challenge­
reconsideration of possible changes-challenge-change. 
The third category of insulation--filtered or lack of communication-­
is also an example of the leaders' partial ability to impose C'control ll ) 
the legitimation of their own goals upon the organization. In this case, 
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they controlled it by managing the inter-organizational communication 
system. The leaders did it by suppressing or greatly minimizing any ac­
tions in the new CAP's which would be considered too" controversial. 
Organizationally, the CAP's are removed from out of view and out of 
influence of the congregations and laymen. The leaders controlled the 
communications system by filtering it in both directions. Since the 
CAP's are bureaucratically related to the"GPCC's head offices, member 
churches are forced largely to rely on the GPCC·s own public relations' 
interpretations of the CAP's more controversial activities. This rein­
terpretation of questionable social action activities into more conserva­
tive acceptability may be viewed as a regular part· of the GPec's 
Ustructural" system. In Parsonian terms, the executives' action of 
filtering the organization's communication between the organization's 
working units where the controversial actions' take place (CAP's) and the 
organization's member churches is fulfilling the Ilneed" to attain maxi­
mum organizational equilibrium through IItension.management" in order to 
achieve the collective goals. 
There was certainly more to the effectiveness of insulation as part 
of an overall process of legitimation than merely a coercively imposed 
break i"n communications. The leaders' manipulation of inter-communica­
tions waS not an outgrowth of their authority, but it was .the other way 
around. Consequently, the constant use of communications as public rela­
tions was done quite subtly. The information going out to the constitu­
ents in the churches was generally self-complimentary about the CAP's 
and avoided stating in detail their work with controversial issues. 
Neither was negative feedback from members authoritatively cut off. 
Rather, conservative reaction was often nipped close to the grass roots 
h-~" 
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by liberal pastors and laymen, who placated angry conservatives in their 
own congregations with the defensive arguments learned from the GPCC's 
theological "position papers. 1I Feedback was filtered through the inter­
active forms of insulation. Outgoing propaganda reinterpreted, and 
minimized the radicalness of their action programs. 
Generally, the GPCC was not characteri zed by authori tative struc­
turing of its people in the organization with a regimented system of 
roles, norms, status, authorities, etc. These social orders are present 
in the GPCC, as ;n any social organization, but they are loosely present 
as the cond i ti ons whi ch shape the context of i nterac ti on's between the 
units--people. Controls of communication, for instance, are between 
the core group of "actives,1I as against the inactive member churches. 
Within the internal organization, the looseness of the inter-relation­
ships of activ~ participants permitted their dialectic interaction to 
create and recreate new meanings and goals for the organization. Conse­
quently, the stream of new situations which arose out of the GPCC's 
change to comm~nity action efforts brought on further unstructured and 
unregularized conditions within their organizatiori. These were the 
chaDges that, although constructive to some, appeared threatening to 
conservative members. 
," 
'I 
Insulation--the Process of Prevention ! 
At first by not requesting extra money for the churches, and by not 
bringing the issue of sponsorship of the new community action p~ogram 
before the General Assembly, the Executive Director and other leaders 
did not arouse the conservative membership. By minimizing the liberal 
nature of the new church CAP's through minimum exposure before the gen­
198 

I' eral membership, and by maintaining the central importance of the old,I 
1 
conservat.f.ve goal of helping to preserve the existence of the member con-· 
gregations (as a facade), the leaders began the erocess of elimi,nating 
challenges to their programing, and i.e., to their change-over to liberal 
goals. The GPCCls long-range effort to ~et and eliminate challenges to 
its soci a 1 acti ons I have chosen to' call the proces s of i nsu1 a ti on__ By 
preventing questions and criticisms to become serious challenges to the 
new church-CAP's themselves', the insulation process prevented th~ 
fledgling social action programs from being fatally disrupted. It is 
., 
important to note here that because the insulation was primarily a pre­
ventive agent, acting to maintain the objective reality of the new pro­
graming, it was essential.ly a negative. form of legitimation. Although 
the seven forms of insulation acted in various capacities to protect the 
GPec's new policies, some more positively than others, their over- . 
riding purpose was to prevent and protect, rather than to promote and 
educate. The insulation process may be described as the GPCC's multiple 
defense. line (for its new objectivated uknowledge") against the forces of 
conservative reaction. 
The prevention of strong external criticism to focus too intensely 
upon the new liberal action programs was also the objective meaning of 
legitimation. There is both an objective and subjective aspect to 
legitimation. As long as the member churches accepted,without challenging, 
the. GPce's new policies, merely ~ the fact that they were there, being 
. . 
performed as a 1 egi ti rna te pa.rt of the GPeC,' the new acti vi ti es became 
an objectively real part of the institution. They worked. They remained 
and grew. They were self-legitimating. The new policies became more and 
more equated with the GPCC; therefore, they became objectivated "know­
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ledge" within the group. 
However, it is not at all certain whether the new style of organi­
zation has,been internalized and accepted as subjectively real by the 
greater proporti on of the GPCC I S member churches.. Camp 1 ete and effec­
tive legitimation has a good balance between both objective and subjec­
tive defi ni ti ons of the new real i ty.' Before the GPCC I S new soc; al 
action program CQuld be accepted internally by members, it had to be 
explained as being the "correctll interpretation of what the church 
. 
organization's purpose really was. In a word, 
, 
it had to be objectivated 
first. Religions usually remain above the large proportion of day-to­
day criticism for the very reason. that their institutional orders are 
presented as unchangeable, as part and parcel of divine manifestation, 
existent from the beginning of time. Because the sacred is immutable, 
or objective, by its very definition, religious institutions and their 
goals are equated with this objectivity. The almost imperceptible 
change in the interpretation of a religion's practical goals (which 
takes place in all religions if they are to maintain their releyance in 
their changing societies) are reinterpreted as having been the "real" 
meaning of its goals from the beginning. In othe'r. words, a'religious 
institution constantly legitimates, itself and other necessary groups by 
." 
defining their goals within a sacred, cosmic reference, which trans­
cends history and man. Change in religious organizations, objective and 
subjective, is understandably difficult and slow. Consequently"leaders' 
of the GPCC, as a religiously based group, who would have tried to 
engineer a relatively quick change in their general member'S subjective 
understanding of their group's specific goals, almost certainly would 
have faced defeat. This is exactly what \OJilliam Cate and his fellow 
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leaders worked to avoid. They took advantage of the GPCC's divided 
constituency--its membership's nsplit personality. II Instead of 
attempting to reach the GPCC's generally inactive membership of 
churches, they concentrated on the inner core of active participants. 
At the level of selected, loyal worker-leaders, an unhurried, but 
intensive socialization into social acti'on goals was directed at this 
core group. These people were allowed to internalize the new goals. 
During the first half of the 1960's, Cate, Schulze, Menzel and other 
leaders answered the objections of the Board members, and explained how 
direct social action worked by enthusiastically demonstrating it at 
C-CAP. Because a great percentage of this group did internalize the 
changed interpretati ons., the organi zation was able to act forcefully 
during the last half of the Sixties. 
After the core group had subjectively made the social action goals 
their own, things began to happen in the GPCC. As soon as the first 
CAP was established in Albina, the effort to legitimate the program's 
objective ~~ality went into operation. Challenges were prevented' 
essentially by one general means: the minimization, if not prevention, 
of communication between· the conservative congregations and the· activist 
leaders in the GPCC, especially the Board of Dire.ctors. The impressionI . 
mus t not be gi ven tha't the GPCC IS 1 eadershi p made no effort to carry out 
a positiv~ campaign to propagandize and sell the general membership on 
accepting the new ofganizational goals. However, the abundant regular 
mailings and all other forms of public relations accomplished it in the 
rryanner bes t descri bed by the modern po 1 i ti ca1 ,term, IImanaged news. II The 
GPCC's communications with the Board membership and public did an excel­
lent job of presenting to mass media a positive vie\-, of its social action 
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1 
I. 
I 
accomplishments. The internal turmoil and criticisms were well con­
tained within the Board of Directors, and often even kept from the 
Board. This management of the communications was the foundation of the 
process/of insulation. Seven various forms of insulation have been. 
listed earlier. Three of these forms, as noted before,. are grounded tn 
the GPeC's social 'environment: four are due to the individual efforts 
of a few, aggressive leaders. The effect, however, of all seven of the 
insulation processes have been the same: to legitimate the GPCC's 
social action efforts by pacifying the -criticisms of the more conserva­
tive members. The insulation dampened the negative feedback so that no 
important challenges were mounted against the GPCC's liberal policies. 
The criticisms were usually unpublicized and kept within a relatively 
small group of leaders. The liberal Board of Directors seldom con­
sidered any of these'conservative com~laints worthy of their meetings' 
discussiori:time. There were three major exceptions: (1) City Hall's 
vehement att~ck in 1968 upon the GPCCls downtown Youth Ministry program; 
(2) the 1965 dispute over the GPCC's support ~f HB 1307, which ca11ed 
for busing disadvantaged children to other schools with better programs; 
(3) the 1968-1969 internal conflict about the over-use of funds for the 
preceding Summer Crisis programs. As pOinted.. out in Chapter 9, the 
Board of Directors generally sustained William Cate's policies and the 
CApis progressive action programs, i.e~, Robert Menzel in the downtown 
Youth t4i.nistry and Colden Brown with the' Black Crisis in Albina. The 
Board, which had contro) of both the output and 'feedback mechanisms to 
and from,the members, was able to manage to placate most serious 
criticisms coming from the broad number of congr~gations. Within the 
Board of Directors it was a different story in each of the above three 
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instances. There was serious internal r~action and conflict in each 
case, but also in each case, Cate had a core group of very strong and 
able supporters on the Board, which stood by Cate and his progressive 
social action policies. With the challenges,stifled within the Board, 
the.process of self-legitimation continued. The organization's social 
action programs were reaffirmed, and thus objectivated as legitimate. 
policy_ The different forms of insulatton had done their work in the 
process of legitimation--to the degree that it preserved the n~w programs;, 
policies and goal of community action involvement . 
.­
CHAPTER XII 
A MORPHOGENESIS OF SOCIAL CHANGE 
A certain kind of organizational morphogenesis took.place within 
the GPCC between 1960 and 1970.. As the goal~ of the organi.zation . 
change9 from assisting its members in meeting their competitive demands 
for self-preservat;-on over to the goal of social action,- so a change 
took place within the structure's inter-relationship between the volun­
tary members and the leadership. The change was essentially in communi-· 
cation between its member congregati ons and the organi zati o'n I s center of 
authority. As the GPCC became more olig"archic, with authority more 
firmly in the hands of the Executive Director and Board of Directors, 
it also became more communicative with those congregations involved with 
. social action and less so with those congregations not involved. Those 
congregations, whose goals and practices did not change to match the 
changing ~oals and practices of the GPec's new social action orientation, 
were those congregations which lost communication with those in authority 
at the GPec. 
.­
As documented previously, before the 1960·s the GPCCls conserva­
tive goals' were nbviously uninvolved, socio-politically." The GPec's 
programs were studiously non-controversial, but rather, geared to offer 
adequate rewards to the local congregations so as to insure their con­
tinued support of the GPCC. Due to religious plur~lism, the exclusively 
defined plausibility structures of individual churches were being torn 
asunder, so Portland's various reli~ious marketing agencies have found 
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that their IIproduct" needed to be standardized for mutual protection. 
Before the 1960's, survival demands forced many c,ongregations to sup­
port the GPCC in exchange for the reward that the GPCC help each congre­
gation satisfy consumers' (prospective members') demands. Before the 
changeover, the GPeC's congregational-centered programs were geared to 
help its participant congregations to rationalize the competition 
between themselves, and thus prevent irratjonal competition and 
possibly mutual annihilation. Portland's mainline, Protestant congre­
gations "needed ll the GPCC, and the GPCC needed them. This mutual 
responsibility between members and organization fostered a mutually 
increasing communication between each other. ,The GPCC needed the finan­
cial support of each congregation, as well. The bigger the congregation, 
the better. In return the GPCC offered the good ,rewards of its coopera­
tive educational programs (released time and teacher training), along 
with the latent reward for participating clergymen, e.g., their mutual' 
social and psychological s~pport, instead of competitive suspicion. 
Because ,any voluntary organizat"ron relies heavily upon membership 
I support, the leaders must make available some kind of rewards (often 
latent), or continually reconvince the members of the organization's I
~ stated goals. If the organization changes its goals, it must either 
I reconvince the membership of the value of the new goals, or offer suit­
able r~ards--or recruit a\new set of ~mbers.l ' 
Since each of the member congregations has only marginal ,loyalty I to the GPCC, compared to the primary formal ties with their own denomi-
I 	 nations, membership in the GPCC is one of extr~me voluntarism. The 
I 	 strength and source of the congregations' values and norms are in their 
own denomination. The denomination's theology and practices are deeply 
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traditional,.and each of the denomination's pastors are schooled and 
socialized quite thoroughly into the value system of that church's 
background. 
Because of the congregations' extreme voluntarism towar4 the GPCC, 
Figure 12.1 tries.to demonstrate that before 1964 the larger congre­
'gations most interest~d and active in the GPCG were the source of po~er 
and authority in the GPCC. Those c~ngregatiqns which participated most 
actively in the GPCC's politics attended in force ~t the annval.meetings 
to elect their own congregations' members to the GPCC's Board o~ 
Directors. Admittedly, they were from the more progressive, enumenical1y 
minded denominations. These strong congregations controlled the GPCC 
before the 1960· s, but di d so conservati ve ly to obta.i!!. the support of 
more of the city·s congregations as potential members. Although there 
\4/as a large degree of disinterest and apathy among member congregations 
before th~ 1960·s, those few, active congregations did not attempt ·to 
cut off the inactive congregation.s in an oligarch·ic manner. It appears 
that the GPCC's Board of Directors then tried .to communicate with all 
congregations by informing them of the GPCC's programmed assistance for 
congregations. 
I 
Before the 1960 1s, apathy of the majority of other member congre-' 
.j I 
gations appears to have been the greatest deterrent to feedback; however,I . 

I 
 the GPCC provided no organizational machinery for. feedback, and thus 

discQuraged it. The movement of information outward was motivated byI the GPCC's precarious need for financial ~upport. The GPCC theri sent 
out frequent bulletins, propagandizing the GPCC's current types of 
as.sistance for member congregations· programs. The GPCC's leaders were 
merely advertizing the reward$. of membership. 
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Late 1958's and Early 1960 l s 
Figure 12.1 illustrates the source of authority by the double lines 
emanating from those few congregations which were most involved in govern­
ing the earlier GPCC. The single arrows demonstrate the" source and 
direction of communications with the organization. The double-lined 
arrows demonstrate the informal authority, which those larger and most 
politically active congreg?tions in the GPee came to exert within the 
Board of Directors. The constant plight o'f financial instability during 
the pre-1960 ' s forced the GPeC to be greatly dependent upon those con~ 
gregations contributing the largest sums. 
Also organizational communication was primarily in one direction, 
originating in the several larger churches which supplied most of the 
GPeC's elected leaders. Combined with the apathy of the majority o~ 
other member congregations, there was little means of feedback of 
information to the Board from these "outside" congregations. However, 
because of the constant need for financial support, the GPCC then sent 
out a steady flow of information to all congregations, advertizing the 
advantages of membership in the GPCC. 
The Period from 1963 to 1968 
Figure 12.2 indicates the complete change of direction in the flow 
of communication and,authority. The hard, unfiltered information was' 
communicated within the Board among its members; thereby, automatically 
excluding any person from the uninvolved, conservative congregations. 
First, that information purposely disseminated to the general mem­
bership was managed information in the sense that the Executive staff 
filtered the information concerning the CApis most controversial activi­
lDT 
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The GPCC, Late 1950 l s and Early 1960'5 

Finances - Very small budget. 
Programs - Congregational centered. -' 
Participation of members - High degree' of apathy. 
Intercommunication - One-way publicity. to the congregations about rewards 
and advantages given to them by the GPeC's activities. 
Goals - Conservative, non-controversial. . 
Authority - Larger urban congregations dominated GPec. 
(Double lines above indicate direction of authority.) 
, 
J 
---
.1 
~ 

2D8 
C-CAP 
East-CAP 
~ 
Exe~. Di.rec- I~ 
I tor,·)Staff 
f . ~ , Hub-CAP ~\Board "~ 
r 
of 
Directors 
-' 
-
Involved 
Co.ng~egations 
Soc; al 
Action 
Goals 
Figure 12.2 

GPeC, From 1963 Through 1968 

Fi nances - ~lany new, /loutsi de" independent sources.· 

Programs - Community Action Programs (CAP's) becarne,central. 

Participatio~ of members - General decrease of apathy. 

f\uthority' -- Shifted to ne\\} Executive Director and his staff. 

Intercommunication ... Primarily bet\veen activist congregations and staff; 

uninvolved congr~gations excl~ded. 
Goals - Radical ch~nge to social action. 
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ties. The leaders thus were able to present a less objectionable picture 
of the CAP's programs to the conservative congregations. Negative feed­
back from member conservatives was also effectively stymied from return­
i ng· to the Board. The two ...way fi 1teri ng of 'communi cati on between general 
membership and the Board becam~ extremely effecti.ve as an insulation 
process without· formal implementation. 
Secondly, because Paul Schulze consulted regularly with Cate, the 
CAP's during this period carried out their activities with Caters 
'fairly complete knowledge and consent. 
Thirdly, the 1960's witnessed an almost complete reversal of the 
lines of au~hority from that illustrated in Figure .12.1. Membership on 
the Board became more thoroughly liberal, and·the Executive more firmly 
grasped the reigns of authority in guiding policy decisions. As these 
lJinside ll communication lines became more engrained, more people and con­
gregations appeared to support the Executive's ~uthority to set social 
action policies. 
Fourth, when the GPCC's leadership (Executive staff and Board of 
Directors) implemented the new social action goals into the 1968 Summer. 
Crisis programs, the activities (and thus the goals) became controversial 
enough to stimulate significant public rea~~ion throughout the city. 
However, as illustrated in Figure 12.2, the negative feedback loops from 
the conservative congregatio.ns to the Board, etc., sheltered (insulated) 
the leadership from criticism. 
The Period from 1968 to 1970 
Although social action had come to dominate, informally, the GPeC's 
previous goals in the 1960's, in 1968 the change of goals was formalized 
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with the adoption of the new constitution. It strengthened social action 
in three ways: (1) It added to the Board a representative from each 
church denomlnation that had five or more of their own congregations as 
members of the GPCC .. (2) The CAP's,were given separate, voting repre­
sentation on the Board. (3) The GPCC was reorganized around three new 
working divisions, the most important being the Center for Urban 
Encounter (CUE). 
CUE was a completely new piece of organizational machinery, which, 
unlike the CAP's, did not evolve or uhapp~n.1I It was mostly the product 
of the ima.gination and work of Paul Schulze. He realized the essential 
conservativism of most of the member congregations and church laymen. 
Schulze came to feel strongly that if the GPCC's social action work was 
to be educated and convinced about the Christian necessity for socia'l 
action to be carried out through local churches. Schulze wanted CUE to 
do this education job, thereby changing the laymen's conservative, ' 
critical attitude toward social involvement. CUE's stated purpose is ' 
lito challenge and equip people in parishes for a relevant ministry to the 
city. II CUE now provides a wide variety of intensive training sessions, 
geared mostly to "parfsh clusters" and the new Metropolitan Ministries' 
community involvements. 
.­
A fourth change during this time was the CAP's individual movements 
toward autonomy, apart from the GPCC. Figure 12.3 shows the Executive's 
author; ty, ill us trated by daub 1eli nes, to be moved toward CUE and no 
longer extended to the CAP's. 
Our three Figures sho",/ the GPCC's morphogenesis by illustrating 
organizational changes in the 1960~s in the GPCC's intercommunication 
and authority. In corporate types of organizations, increased communica- ,i 
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#~ 
Finances - Foundations and private sources decrease~ gifts--specificly
for CApls. 
'Programs_ ... Social action remained, but shifted main efforts from CAP's 
to CUE. 
Participation of members - Apathy of members began to increase ,again. 
Authority- - CApls asserted own autonomy, ,but new division, CUE, is under 
formal authority of Board and Executive. Informal authority
still in Executive. 
Intercommunication - Continues primarily wltn involved, urban larger 

congregations; membership on Board of Directors 

greatly enhances it. 

Goals - Overt pursuit ov social action goa1s diminishing, while some 

.,~conser:~a~ive, goals being revived. 
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tions between'the leaders and employees increases the leaders' ability 
; 
to know about environmental changes. This allows the organization more 
I 
quickly and 	 efficiently to adapt to the changing environment. However,! ' 
the GPCC is 	not corporately organized, but democratically (representa­
tively) governed. The GPCC does not have a planned cybernetic system of 
feedback loops, which funnel~ information back to a central data pro~ 
cessing office for analysis. The GPCC leaders do not manage a' feedback 
system in a pre-planned sense. Usual,ly" in corporate ,organizations, it 
is assumed 	 that the leaders will be the conservers of the organization's 
, , 
I 
status 9uo--tha.t the leaders need the specially tailored intercommunica­
tion system to perceive the organizationls ecological contingencie's and' 
innovations. The leaders then, possibly, understand the need for 
I 
~ 
organizational adaption--for morphogenesis. 
In the GPCC and mai n 1 i ne Protestant denomi nat; ons, it is the 1 ay ,
I members \,/ho tend to be most conservati ve, not the leaders. ' ConsequentlyI in the GPCC, 	 the leaders' management of communication ~ not so much to 
I 	 be better ~bl~ to adapt· to changes within the organization's changing 

environment, but to prevent the m members· resistance to the leaders' 

proposed liberal changes.

I 	 The GPCCls leaders had increasingly ·become aware of new contingency 
I 	 situations, especially in proximity to Portlandls downto~~n churches. 
I 	 They saw the need for organiza~ional innovations to be made in the GPCC 
I 
I 	 to meet the changes presenting serious social problems to the community.
I The leaders 	wanted the GPCC to become involved. Conservative membersI 
l 	 did not want the change from "religious to secu1ar ll values. Instead of 
the GPCCls ordinary members, laymen, making i.nnovative, practical adapta­
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tions (religiously) to the changing environment, which are usually the 
first signs of needed change-adaptations (noted by the cybernetic feed­
back system) within corporate groups, the GPCC's leaders have taken the 
initiative for new organizational changes. Primarily by informally 
managing the organization's intercommunications (a method of i.nsulation), 
the leaders have been able to move the GPCC out from conservative socio­
religious values and actions into new socially oriented goals and role 
patterns. 
! 
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CHAPTER XIII 
CONCLUSION 
'Generally, manls relationship to society is 'a. continuous dialecti­
cal process. Society is'a product of man; yet man is a' product'of-' 
society. This basic social dilemma of man leads to a f~ndamental para­
dox. Soci'ety has no reality or meaning except that which is bestowed 
upon it by human acts. On the other ,hand, alJ that we know about man isI 
in the context of society. So every individual develops and attains hisI
~ own personhood and conducts hi s 1 i fe acti v;-ti es to form hi s i denti ty-­
I 
I as a result of the total social processes in which he is immersed. Man 
cannot exist ap,art from society. Yet, he himself creates it, and it 
j recreates h.i m. 
Society appears to common sense as something independent of humanI 
I acti vi ty and as bei ng a pa rt of the inert gi veness 'of nature. In 
1 
reality the structure of society is human meanings externalized in I 
human acti vi ty'. Therefore, part of the tensi on between man and ,theI 
social world he creates is the false independence "lith which man imaginesI 
his'social constructions are endowed, but which in reality, are appropri­I 
ated by man himself. Man loses the human meaning, of his own social con~I 
structions, and thereby is alienated from his own society. He becomes! 
I 
 subservient to it. 

So man's own works, insofar as they are part of a social world, 
become part of a real action world; his social constructs become a real-, 
ity other than himself. In other words, aliet)ation "is the process 
_"ii''; 
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whereby the dialectical relationship between the individual and the world 
is lost to consciousness. l The individual forgets that this world was 
and continues to b~ co-produced by him. There is an unresolved tension 
between man and th~ human world which he creates, but which is now 
estranged and now turns back on him to rule man. Alienation is the over­
extension of the process of objectivation, whereby the human objectivity 
of the soci~l world is.transformed in- consciousness into the non-human 
objectivity of nature. 
The essence of alienation is the imposition of a fictitious 
inexorability upon the humanly constructed world. The innumerable con­
tingencies of human existence are transformed into inevitable revelations 
of universal law. Activity becomes process. Choices become destiny. 
These powers become independent of the men who have constructed them. 
When alienation,is religiouslt legitimated, the independence of these 
powers is vastly undergirded, both in the social order and· in the indi­
vidual' consciousness. When man is alienated from his own world so that 
he cannot make free choices regarding the reality of the relationship of 
man to society and other men, then alienation results in a polar repulsion. 
However, it must not be thought that religious formations have onlyI 
I 
 to be alienating, inert, mechanical reflections of their socia·l base. 

I 
 Actually, some religions have proved the ability to de-alienate social 

structures and to give religious legitimation to the de-ali~natton. 
I De-alienation by religion is relatively rare but it has historical 
I 
t validity.2 In the Biblical tradition, the confrontation of ·the social 
I order with the majesty of the Hebrew's transcend~nt God caused society 
to be relativized to such an extent that one may validly speak of de­\ 
1 
alienation--in. the sense that, before the face of God, the institutions 
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are revealed as nothing but human works, devoid of inherent sanctity or 
immortality (Nathan confronting David, etc.). 
Peter Berger's concept of alienation and de-alienation describes 
the fundamental paradox which accompanies secularization. On one hand, 
religion most generally legitimates the humanly constructed social struc­
tures as being immutable and sacred co~s. On the other hand, when\
. 
religion withdraws its support'of traditional social structures and· 
1 reveals them to be really human constructs and not immutable IIfactici­~ 
I 
 ties ll of the world, then religion secularizes, de-alienates, causes 

l social change, and in some cases, encourages ~evoluti.on. The prophetic 
I tradition in the Old Testament contains many cases of this relativizing, 
and resulting process. Therefore, a de-al·;enating. religion secularizes' 
1 
by removi ng its own web of re 1 i g.; ous sancti ons strung through much of the 
I soci a 1 order'. When re 1 i gi on acts in thi s double manner, it reveals a 
I basic, pervading ambivalence in relation to secularization. Religion's. 
I ambivalent poles are between statu~~ and relativized social structures, 
I a world-maintaining compared to a world-shaking force, conservativism 
I compared to secularization.· 
I In the United States as in previous history, once a religion has 
I est~blished itself, it in turn legitimates the predominating social 
I structures 	\vhich men have constructed into social IIfacticities. 1I Religion 
I 	 thus provides a posltive function by supporting the established social 
order, but inherent within this superficial support is the process of 
alienation. The established order turns back on the religion and prevents 
the religion from becoming dis-establishmentarian. Vlhen "established" 
social constructs determine and coerce the religion which support the 
society, the humanly constructed social order is revealed to be against' 
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man himself (the human being). The social order reveals itself to be 
alienated against man. In the degree that the conservative elements of 
a religious group take the part of the established social orders and 
resist the prophetic actions for change of other elements of the same 
relJgious group, then the society's religious order, as part of the con­
servative social structures, acts to alienate further society's struc­
tures against man, as man ..When the GPCC's new program stepped ou·tside 
of the established social norms, society's constructions--the police, 
churches, newspapers, the public, etc.--reacted indignantly. On the o'ne 
hand, there are those in the GPeC who remain true to the traditional 
Protestant posture--that the church support, not challeRge, 10ng­
established community norms and institutions. These conservative church­
men tend to foster false consciousness (reify) toward man's humanly con­
structed norms, institutions and ideologies as being objectively part' 
of the given, n.atural world. In this stance they'participate in the' 
process of-alienation. On the other hand, those GPCC liberals who have 
used the GPCC to challenge those same social qbjectivations as being 
merely representations of human activity have promoted the process of 
de-alienation. Consequently, the GPCC dialectly acts and reacts 
ambivalently toward society. ~ 
It becomes more evident from' the preceding theory about the GPCC 
that the alienation of "secular" social structures is aicied by religion 
when we recognize that established religious groups contribute to the 
ossification of humanly produced social structures by lending their 
special ability to deify, Or make the, social construct appear inexorable. 
This kind of religious legitimation of status ~ order is more normal 
than not. Until the 1960's, the GPCC played its conservative role of 
1I/MIfIl' 
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legitimating Portland's more established social order. However, when the 
GPCC moved into its new soc,ial action programs, instead of giving 
unqualified support, the GPCC's programs openly questioned several of 
the city's important social norms. In contradiction to most religious 
groups wi thi n the ci ty, the GPCC began' to act as an agent for soci a 1­
de'-a1; enati on. 
To the degree tha t the GPCC' s acti on programs de-ali enated soci ety., 
the GPCC contributed to secularization. That is, the GPCC revealed that 
local government and law enforcement, b~siness and education'~re only 
human, social products--not immutable facts. In so doing, the GPCC 
removed its own religious legitimation of these structures, ',and forced 
the process of secularization, in essence, social change. ' 
Because de-alienation of a group·s norms often threatenes it with 
the loss of its fundamental meaning before the rest of society, the 
group is also subject to the threat of its own anomy. As we have seen, 
the threat of basic change to the goals and practices of political, 
economic and educational groups did foster anomY and social tension 
among them. The city's law enforcem~nt agency over-seeing juvenile 
social deviants viewed the GPCC's Youth Ministry as a real threat to 
its authority. The GPGG-led Grape Boycott (1969) greatly threatened local 
business men. The GPec lobbied for the legislative bill, HB 1307 (1965), 
which provided busing for minorities in schools 'without educational 
opportunities, so it became a' threat to the cityls upper middle-class 
and their better high schools. The GPGC's C-GAP assisted black juvenile 
deviants and "revolutionary" black cultural projects, threatening police 
and whi tes. The; r anomy gave way to overt rea'cti on. S1 nee the threat 
of anomy means a certain amount of social chaos (normlessness) within the 
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threatened group, those seen to be the source of this threat (GPCC) were 
regarded with suspicion and distrust. Documentation in Chapter 7 shows 
that the Women's Protective Division, City Councilmen and other city 
government. officials were distrustful and angered .by the church CAp1s 
successful infringement upon their law enforcement activities, etc. 
Result: tension, conflict and reaction against the GPCC. 
The GP~CIS .primary ecumenical goal, stated in its pre-1969 ,con­
stitution, was to increase the areas of cooperation between the member 
congregations. Sociologically interpreted, its purpose was to reduce 
tension between its competing members. Following 1964, the GPCC's 
practical 9Q£l shifted from tension reduction between congregations ~ 
to, in effect, increasing social tension between some secu1ar structures 
and the churches. Although William Cate and other GPCC leaders went to 
great 1engths to minimize that tension by mollifying the City fathers 
and the churches with the assurance that the GPCC's community action 
programs were not a ureal threatU to the established community power 
structures, the latent, undeniable product of the church CAP's activi­
ties was often increased anomy and tension. Even though unintentional, 
the work of the church eApls did expose the humanne$and thus the rela­
tiveness of some widely accepted norms for treating deviant youth and 
black segregation in Portland. Unwittingly, the GPee radically moved to 
become an instrument of de-alienation and secularization. 
The research here has shown there was a· significant negative reac­
tion by the public--by several secular groups in the city--against the 
GPCe's aggressive social action programs. Fo11owing the front page 
newspaper stories about the GPee's 'Youth Ministry to runaways and drug 
users in the downtown area, several public organizations withdrew support 
~ 
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of the GPCC or publicly chastized the GPCC's actions. Why was there not 
a substantial reaction from the conservative member congregations? Some 
evidence has indicated that there probably was a greater reaction among 
the church members than was actually registered upon those interviewed 
for, our sample (mostly former and present Board members). Some of this 
member reaction got through to the Board,. but most of it was mi nim; zed 
at the grass ,roots, filtered through the insulation process. In other 
words, there was a c~hservative member reaction actually registered' at 
the leadership level, but it was minimal. Yet, other studies quoted here 
(Chap'ter 1) have shown that congrega ti ons across the country have reacted 
vehemently against their own pastors' direct involvement in social 
actions and causes. 
In searching for the reason for the discr~pancy in the conservative 
religious reaction against the GPCC, I have concluded that the GPCC's 
multiple process of insulation effectivelt minimized its members' .£Q!l­
servative reaction. The insulation has served.to remove from view--to 
"hide ll--the GPCe's de-alienating social involvements from the conserva­
tive congregations. The GPCC has demonstrated itself to be a specific 
exception to local church members' reactions. The Hinsulation ll of the 
GPee and its l,eaders allowed for the excepti on. 
Since no cO,ng~egations were coerced into social action participa­
ti on, no conservati ve congr:ega ti 'on was forced ~ nto re-eva 1 ua ti ng i tse1 f 
and seei.ng itsel f as a religious legitimator of the ~ "secularH 
social order (local government, etc.). The several forms of insulation 
screened the de-alienating social actions from the uninvolved members. 
The filtered communication between the GPCe's offices and the conserva­
tives prevented any coordination of wide conservatlve disaffection against 
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the GPCC. The process of minimizing conservative members' challenges to 
the GPCC's liberal action programs is summarized in the ·forms of insula­
tion (viz. 	Chapter 10). 
The form of insulation listed last (seventh) in Chapter lO--the 
GPCC's ambivalent policy of changing its primary goal to direct 'involve­
ment in community actions, while publicizing .its conservative, congrega­
tional-centered programs for those churches which wanted them--describe 
in microcosm the plight of the GPCC's overall interrelationship with its 
community. Sociologically, the GPCC was pursuing two contradictory goals. 
Formerly a conservative organization, the GPCC turned to serve the con­
tradictory goal of challenging its own .community's institutions, 
practices and values. If the evidence from this investigation does 
indicate a real, although qualified, disconfirmation of Durkheim's theory 
of social conservation by religion, the paper makes no claim to general­
ize this finding toward wider social worlds. If anything, the study 
does demonstrate an important exception to the general conservative role 
of local religion in one community. 
Equally important, the same evidence indicated that, while not 
conserving but de-alienating its secular social order, this ecumenical 
religious group was in the process of pursuing paradoxical organizational 
goals. The social catalyst that permitted the organization to do it was 
the process of insulation. The GPCC was going in two directio~s at once. 
As its social acti.on programs de-alienated some of the city's most 
taken-for-granted, lIestablished" institutions, the GPCC had the latent 
effect of relativizing those institutions, i~e., local gov~rnment (law 
enforcement), education (school busing for racial equality), businesses 
(secondary, local grape boycott)., 
222 
Unintentionally, the GPCC had come to play this role of de-a1iena­
tion, because Cate and other leaders did not appear to have realized then 
that their commitment to socially controversi.al causes would necessarily 
involve having to choose to withdraw their own organization's (rel~gious)' 
sanctions from community power structures, i.e., effect de-alienation. 
The GPCC's Board was embarrassed by its CAP's social actions which 
offended conservative community values and norms. Paradoxically, the 
GPCC tried to offset in the eyes of its conservative constituency the 
GPCC's liberal social involvements by reassuring members that its own 
actions were not the apostate's steps from orthodox IIChristian" values 
and its conservative social norms. The GPeC's leaders indicated in 
several interviews that they were exceptionally sensitive to the conser­
vatives' old criticism that the GPCC was IImixing religion with politics." 
They attempted to disprove this accusation. I view this attempt to give 
the appearance to conservatives that the GPCC was socially anQ politi­
cally neutral as being the GPec's reversal back to co~serving those old 
power structures. In order to prevent members ' social anomy and conse­
quent reaction against itself, the GPCC brought back some of its tradi­
tional programs and tended to legitimate the present social structures, 
rather than de-alienate them. 
Sociologically, conservative denominations have one thing in 
common. They are, whether Catholic, Protestant. or Jewish, reactionary on 
socio-political issues. Silence and neutrality are the hallmarks of 
religious conservativism on such issues, viz. the church in Germany 
during the early years of Hitler's take-over. As noted earlier, the 
1ack of cha11 enge· to the way th i ngs are done--and to those who do them-­
indicates that silence itself legiti~ates those patterns. of doing things .. 
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Quiescence, neutrality, or compliance, by group members legitimates the 
powers that be. In this manner, the religious conservatives conserve the 
established .values and· norms of society. 
Although the GPeC had steadily increased until 1968 the number of 
"position papers" (to be sent· to the press, etc.) on some.local prob­
lems, since then it became neutral on most political issues. Not long 
after the' ci ty pol ice made charges again'st the GPCC I S downtown Youth 
Ministry program in .1968, this researcher asked the GpeC Executive 
Director, William Cate, about the GPCC's goals in the light of their 
recent controversy with law enforcement.. Cate answered, liThe Church has 
always been the supporter of things good and decent. We are a coopera­
tive church group, worki ng for better c.ooperati on among peopl e, for 
better lines of communication--a healthier Portland. The police's role 
is justified as part of the state. We need law and order. The state's . 
purpose ;s to keep order, harmony and just laws--as part of God1s plan 
for peace. II Cate added, IIHowever, God's church has 'loya1ties that 
transcend ohedience to the state. Conscience sometimes transcends-­
and speaks--and demands obedience." 
Cate's response summarizes the GPCC's ambivalence. On the conser­
vative side, although two of the GPCC's church CApis programs have run ' 
afoul of some established community norms, the GPeC Executive here 
presents the Council itse1f as supporting the community's common 
va1ues--what is IIgood and decent." Gate also describes the work of the 
police, law and order and th'e GPGC--all on the same side. Gate. is say­
ing that the GPec is, politically, a ,conservative force in the community. 
Gate is also reassuring the local congregations of the GPeC that the 
GPeC helps and strengthens each of the congregations in their common 
:.ill 
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cause--to [keep 	 their own members and get more. 
On the liberal side, Dr. Gate applied the transcendent standard to 
the church and to the GPCC"saying the church must have a higher loyalty 
to God rather than to the state. In calling back to the radica1 trans­
cendentalization of God and the church's primary responsibility to this 
"completely other" value, Gate is harking back to the ancient Isra'elite 
prophets. To that deg'ree, the GPCG is' relying on a standard which com-' 
pletely relativizes all other values and norms. Before the transcendent, 
God, all institutions are revealed as nothing but human works. 
Religious institutions rarely challenge their own established 
social order, largely because the leaders sense the conservative wrath 
built into their own organizations, as well as that of their own society's 
power structures. A few modern religious b9dies have contributed 
energetically to both social change, as well as to the ossification of 
the status~. William Cate and the GPeC tried to straddle this socio­
religious"p~radox--on the one hand, to conserve the established social 
order (integrate society), and on the other, to challenge society to 
change (diSintegration). ' Gate recognized the danger of reaction against 
being too prophetic. By galvanizing the GPGC1s ever-increasing commi,tmentj, 
to social action' types of programs with a generous amount of propagandaI 
I 	 about their great effort to promote a few old; conservative-pleasing 
programs, Gate was able to maintain the appearance that the GPeC was 
not rejecting its traditional goals for radical ones. This ambivalent 
appearance was an important insulating quality. 
Within Western religion is the seed of protest, the potential for 
vital change in the face of any society_ That potential to beget social 
change resides in a religion1s own grasp of a transcendent standard, by 
J 	 iIIoIooJ: • ~ 
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which all other values are gauged. Without this transcendence, there is 
no ultimate meaning given to man1s humanly made structures. Only if 
religions of transcendence do not become so well accommodated to 
society that their sense of the transcendent standard is not lost, can 
they maintain this basis for criticism and dissent pgainst domtnant 
vested interests of ruling and influential elites. Consequently, if 
church'institutions (GPCC), which claim loyalty ,to a transcendent stand­
ard, are to contribute positively to a democratic society where social 
change and secularization are encouraged, then ~ substantial degree of 
unadjustment between religion and society must remain, despite the fact 
that the unadjustment itself will be the source of some anomy, tension 
and conflict. 
Theoretically, the actions of the GPCC a,re, 'a description of the 
ambivalent social power of a local (ecumenical) religious group to 
divide, as well as unite; to disintegrate, as well as integrate, the 
old order of society; to liberate, as well as conserve; to de-alienate, 
as well as reduce social anomY. The GPCC i'llustrates this paradoxical 
impact on a local society. The evidence, which largely disconfirmed the 
study's original working hypothesis, also confirmed that by dividing 
its goals between b,eing a world-maintaining along with a world-shaking 
force, the GPCC was indeed successful at side-stepping serious, conser­
vative reaction. 
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